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ABSTRACT
I am concerned in this thesis with Frege's problem
of explaining the difference in cognitive value between
(oaýa and true `a=8 •
In Chapter 1, I examine the Paradox of Identity,
which purports to reveal a conflict between the view that
"identity relates objects" and the fact that identity sen-
tences differ in cognitive value. I show that this conflict
results from the incorrect assumption that substitution of
codenotational singular terms preserves cognitive value.
Hence, the paradox exposes a problem about the notion of
what is said or expressed by a sentence.
In Begriffsschrift, Frege held that cognitive value
remained invariant under substitution of codenotational
singular terms, so he regarded the paradox as a reductio
of the view that "identity relates objects." To account for
the difference in cognitive value between la=ac and true
La=SY, Frege proposed that identity be taken to be a rela-
tion holding between expressions. In Chapter 2, I argue
that this theory cannot be coherently maintained.
In Chapter 3, I turn to Frege's Sense/Reference
theory. On this theory, truth value remains invariant under
substitution of codenotational singular terms, and cognitive
value remains invariant under substitution of terms having
the same sense. The difference in cognitive value between
aca=sa and true ra=·1 is attributed to the difference in sense
between a and 8. The main problem is Frege's ascription of
sense to proper names. I develop this issue in the context
of the recent debate between Saul Kripke, who attacks
Frege's theory, and Michael Dummett, who defends it. I argue
that Dummett's defense is insufficient.
In Chapter 4, I examine the recent attempts by Saul
Kripke and Alvin Plantinga to defend Mill's theory of names,
and I explore whether either offers an explanation of the
difference in cognitive value between Ia=oa and true c=B•,
when a and 8 are both proper names. I argue that Plantinga's
explanation does not work, and that Kripke has offered only
the framework of an explanation.
Name and Title of Thesis Supervisor: Richard L. Cartwright
Professor of Philosophy
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CHAPTER I
THE PARADOX OF IDENTITY
My concern in this thesis is with Frege's problem
of explaining the difference in cognitive value between
(a=al and true c=B3. In this chapter, I will say what
this problem is and I will.outline my plans for dealing
with it in this thesis.
In "On Sense and Reference"l (SR for short), Frege
observed that identity sentences (i-sentences, for short)
differ in what he calls "cognitive value" [Erkenntniswerth]:
a=a and a=b are obviously statments of differing cog-
nitive value; a=a holds a priori and, according to
Kant, is to be labelled analytic, while statements of
the form a=b often contain very valuable extensions
of our knowledge and cannot always be established
a priori. The discovery that the rising sun is not
new every morning, but always the same, was one of the
most fertile astronomical discoveries. Even to-day the
identification of a small planet or a comet is not
always a matter of course.z
Roughly, i-sentences of the form Ic=(a are true but trivial,
while i-sentences of the form (al=8 are, if true, often
interesting and informative. This observation is accurate
and examples come readily to mind: 'Mark Twain = Mark Twain'
is a mere truism hardly work remarking, but 'Mark Twain =
Samuel Clemens' says something of considerable literary and
historical significance.
However, Frege continues, the fact that i-sentences
differ in cognitive value would appear to conflict with the
generally accepted view that "identity relates objects,"
the view, that is, on which Q,=8I is understood to express
that a relation, being one and the same thing as, holds be-
tween the objects denoted by a and 3. For since the re-
lation is said to hold between the objects themselves, he
argues, then what is said or expressed by ac=B"--the cog-
nitive or informational content of the sentence--is simply
that the objects stand in the given relation. (a=81 and
(y=61 (a, 8, y, 6 not necessarily distinct) would there-
fore say the same thing--have the same cognitive or infor-
mational content--if the object denoted by a were one and
the same as the object denoted by y and the object denoted
by 8 were one and the same as the object denoted by 6; for
the same relation would be said to hold between the same
objects. So, Frege concludes, fa=-a and true ra=&0 could
not differ in cognitive value:
.. . if we were to regard equality [Gleichheit] as a
relation between that which the names 'a' .and 'b'
designate, it would seem that a=b could-not differ
from a=a (i.e. provided a=b is true). A relation
would thereby be expressed-of a thing to itself, and
indeed one in which each thing stands to itself but
to no other thing.3
On this interpretation of '=', then, it would appear that
the two i-sentences, 'Mark Twain = Mark Twain' and 'Mark
Twain = Samuel Clemens', both say the same thing.: that a
particular object, Mark Twain or Samuel Clemens--call him
what you will--is self-identical. But everything is self-
identical; and so, paradoxically, on the view that (a=B
is about the objects denoted by a and , the i-sentence,
if true, appears less a significant remark about the desig-
nated objects than a trivial rehearsal of the Law of Iden-
tity.
Let us standardize some notation. Where So is a
sentence containing the singular term a, Sa/S results upon
replacing a at one or more of its occurrences in So by the
singular term 8; and where f is any expression that denotes
something, d(n) is the denotation of n, i.e., the entity q
denotes. Now, Frege assumes in the argument that if (a=81
is to be understood as expressing that a relation holds
between d(a) and d(B), then the way in which the objects
are specified is irrelevant to the cognitive or informa-
tional content of fa==8: .if we. were to. replace a. by a
codenotational singular term (or 8 by a codenotational
singular term), the resultant sentence would have to have
the same cognitive value as the original. But Frege is
clearly proceeding here on the basis of a very general
assumption about what is said or expressed by a sentence,
namely, that if So is genuinely about d(a), i.e., if So
ascribes a property to d(a) or if So expresses that d(ao)
stands in a particular relation, then the cognitive or
informational content of So is d(a)'s having the given
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property or d(a)'s standing in the given relation. Only the
object dC(a), not the term a, is part of the content of Sa;
and so, if we were to replace x at one or more of its occur-
rences in So by any codenotational singular term 8, the re-
sultant sentence Sa/S would have to have the same cognitive
value as Sc. We state this generalized substitution prin-
ciple as follows:
(I) If So is about d(a), then if d(a)=d(8), then So and
Sa/$ have the same cognitive value.
Given this substitution principle, Frege's argument is easily
shown to be valid. Suppose that aý=8 is about d(a) and d(B),
and consider our two i-sentences,
(1) Mark Twain = Samuel Clemens,
and
(2) Mark Twain = Mark Twain.
If (I) is true, then d('Mark Twain') = d('Samuel Clemens');
and since (2) is obtained from (1) by replacing 'Samuel
Clemens' by 'Mark Twain', then by (I), (1) and (2) must have
the same cognitive value. This argument does not depend upon
any characteristic of the particular names chosen, and so, we
have, quite generally, that ra=al• and true ra=l cannot dif-
fer in cognitive value.
This argument is known in:the literature as The
Paradox of Identity, a reflection of the widespread miscon-
ception that the argument exposes a problem peculiar to
identity. To be sure, identity is a very special relation.
11
It is, after all, the only predicate generally considered
to belong among the logical constants, and it does give
rise to some very special and difficult puzzles of its own.
But this cannot be one of them, because similar arguments
are easily devised for other commonplace properties and
relations. The sentence,
(3) Mark Twain wrote Innocents Abroad,
for example, would ordinarily be understood to ascribe the
property of having written Innocents Abroad to Mark Twain;
and so, according to (I), if we were to replace 'Mark
Twain' in (3) by any codenotational singular term, the
cognitive value of the sentence ought to remain unchanged.
Now 'the person who wrote Innocents Abroad' is such a co-
denotational term for, not only is it true that Mark Twain
wrote Innocents Abroad, but he was the only person to have
doe so; and yet,
(4) The person who wrote Innocents Abroad wrote Innocents
Abroad,
if not a truism, is so nearly so as to clearly differ in
cognitive value from (3). In this example, we chose the
substituted singular term carefully in order to parallel
Frege's argument, wherein he had transformed an informa-
tive sentence into a trivial one. But there is no need to
adhere to this format if we want to show that the problem
about the difference in the informativeness of i-sentences
can be reproduced elsewhere. It is sufficient to note
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that if (1) is an informative i-sentence, then,
(5) Samuel Clemens wrote Innocents Abroad,
cannot have the same cognitive value as (3): the non-
trivial character of (1) goes hand-in-hand with (5)'s
telling us something that (3) does not, and conversely.
To recognize that the problem is thus generalize-
able, however, is to recognize that the substitution prin-
ciple must be false. For what these examples show is
that although So is about d(a), and although d(a)=d(B),
it need not be that Sa and Sa/8 have the same cognitive
value. The root of the paradox, therefore, does not lie
with identity: the apparent conflict between the view
that identity relates objects and the fact that i-sentences
differ in informativeness derives from an erroneous view
about what is said or expressed by a sentence. This, as
we know, is the moral Frege drew in SR. His solution
there was to distinguish between that which is said or
expressed by a sentence,.namely, a thought [Gedanke], and
that which the sentence is about, or, more accurately,
that which it refers to, namely, its truth value.
However, in his Begriffsschrift,4 Frege had drawn
a different moral from the paradox. There he had con-
cluded that identity failed to relate objects, and instead
related the names denoting objects; i.e., Frege had denied
that =•a=B expressed that the object d(c) was identical
13
with the object d(B), and he had maintained instead that
rc=BS expressed that the name a denoted one and the same
thing as the name 3. In Chapter 2, I will show that this
Begriffsschrift view of identity is thoroughly incoherent.
It is widely believed that the Begriffsschrift theory
fails because it incorrectly attributes the informative-
ness of i-sentences. to the difference in the expressions
used to denote objects. I will argue that the Begriffs-
schrift theory not only provides an inadequate explana-
tion of the difference in cognitive value between ca=ia
and true ra=aB, it provides a logically incoherent ex-
planation.
In Chapter 3, I turn to Frege's SR solution to
the paradox. As I mentioned above, his solution in SR
is to affirm that identity relates objects and to deny
that substitution of codenotational singular terms pre-
serves cogitive value. In SR, Frege connects the denota-
tion of a singular term a with the truth value of So, and
he connects the sense of a singular term a with the thought
or proposition, expressed by Sa. Frege's SR solution is
generally believed to be correct in the case of descrip-
tions, but it has been questioned in the case of proper
names. In Chapter 3, I will focus on this question of
whether proper names have meaning. I will take up this
issue within the context of a debate between Saul Kripke,
who attacks Frege's theory of names, and Michael Dummett,6
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who defends it. I shall argue that Kripke's attack on
Frege is devastating, and that Dummett has failed to pro-
vide any adequate response for Frege.
In Chapter 4, I turn to Kripke's own response to
the paradox. Kripke holds Mill's view of names, on which
proper names are said to lack meaning; he must show how,
on this view of names, Sa and Sa/B can differ in cognitive
value when a and 8 are proper names. I will try to show
that Kripke, by distinguishing between metaphysical and
epistemological issues, has laid the groundwork for a co-
herent solution to the paradox. I will be especially
interested in this chapter in making clear Kripke's posi-
tion, and in. correcting Dummett's misrepresentation of
Kripke's views. However, there remains still the problem
of filling in the framework Kripke provides before one
can rightly regard him as providing a solution to the para-
dox. But this is a task I am not able to handle here. As
such, I end this thesis not with a solution to the paradox,
but with the promise of a new and interesting framework in
which the issues can be joined.
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CHAPTER 2
FREGE'S BEGRIFFSSCHRIFT THEORY OF IDENTITY
1. Introduction
Granting that i-sentences differ in cognitive
value, the Paradox of Identity can be viewed as a reductio,
either of the substitution principle (I), on which cogni-
tive value is held to remain invariant under substitution
of codenotational singular terms, or of the assumption
that "identity relates objects." In SR, as we have noted,
Frege chose the former course; but in his youthful logical
work BegriffsschriftI (B_, for short), Frege had opted for
the latter. As Frege relates the story in SR, reflection
on the paradox had convinced him that the information con-
veyed by an i-sentence could not be about the objects them-
selves, for then each true i-sentence would reduce to con-
veying the trivial information that the designated object
is self-identical. If a true i-sentence of the form (a=BT
is to be informative, he concluded, then its informative-
ness would have to reside in the fact that the different
expressions, a and S, turn out to stand for the same thing:
What is intended to be said by a=b seems to be that
the signs or names 'a' and 'b' designate the same
thing, so that those signs themselves would be under
discussion; a relation between them would be asserted.2
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Thus, Frege says, he had been led in Bg to reject the view
that (a=BT expresses that the relation being one and the
same thing as holds between the objects denoted by a and 3,
and to maintain instead that f(a=Bg expresses that a rela-
tion holds between the expressions a and 8 themselves,
namely, the equivalence relation denoting one and the same
thing as.
Now Frege's reconstruction in SR of his Bg reasoning
is misleading on two counts. First, he had explicitly
denied in Bg that the informativeness of an i-sentence re-
sides solely in the fact that different expressions stand
for one and the same object; on the contrary, he had argued
that what was significant was not the expressions per se,
but the fact that the different expressions go along with
different ways of determining [Bestimmungsweisenl the object.
Second, Frege's reconstruction is superficial in that he
fails to mention what was obviously the critical factor
both in his denying that identity relates objects as well
as in his maintaining that identity relates expressions,
namely, the view he had held about what is said or expressed
by a sentence: if reflection on the paradox had indeed led
him to reject the view that identity relates objects, then,
as our analysis of the paradox showed, this could only have
been because he had held a view about what is said or ex-
pressed by a sentence that committed him to (I); and, again,
if he had held that the informativeness of an i-sentence
18
resides solely in the fact that the different expressions
stand for the same object--and, to repeat, he did not hold
this--there remains a gap in his reconstruction, namely,
the inference from the assumption that the informativeness
of an i-sentence resides in the fact that different ex-
pressions stand for the same thing to the conclusion that
the i-sentence must therefore express a relation holding
between these expressions, and to justify this step, one
would like to have some account of what is said or ex-
pressed by a sentence. These both have had harmful con-
sequences: the first, of masking the connection between
the Bg and SR theories of identity, and the second, of
vesting i-sentences with a mystery they do not rightfully
possess--or, more accurately, that i-sentences possess if,
and only if, all sentences do.
Despite these errors in his reconstruction, however,
Frege's description of his Bg treatment of identity is
essentially correct. The equivalence relation, which he
had called "equality of content" [Inhaltsgleichheiit] (_c,
for short), and which he had represented by the symbol 'V',
was defined as follows: the judgment 'FA-B' means
The symbol A and the symbol B have the same conceptual
content, so that A can always be replaced by B and
conversely.3
The symbol for equality of content was part of the object
language, and since it, unlike the symbols for negation
and material implication, represented a relation that holds
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between expressions instead of their contents, it required
a special convention:
Elsewhere, signs are mere proxies [Vertreter] for
their content, and thus any phrase they occur in
just expresses a relation between their various
contents; but names at once appear in propria
persona so soon as they are joined together by the
symbol for equality of content; for this signifies
the circumstance of two names' having the same
content.4
Hence, names in Bg were systematically ambiguous: they
stood for the objects they customarily denoted everywhere
save when they occurred at either end of a symbol for
equality of content, at which place they stood for them-
selves. (This shifting between talk of 'objects' and talk
of 'contents' will be explained below.)
The Bg theory of identity has been by and large
ignored in the philosophical literature. It is the SR
theory that has proved of greatest interest, and since the
Bg theory is a nonstandard theory of identity, and since,
moreover, Frege himself came to repudiate the Bg theory
(replacing it with the SR theory), it has been viewed as
an early aberration happily forgotten. What criticism
there has been of the Bg theory reduces to the following
three charges:
(a) It has been alleged that the information contained in
an i-sentence, when interpreted in the manner of Bg, can
only be the trivial information that the linguistic com-
munity has adopted such-and-such conventions, not the sub-
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stantial information embodied in a genuine discovery about
the world. (This is derived from Frege's own criticism of
the Bg theory in SR. Linsky,5 Kneale )
(b) It has been alleged that the Bg theory is circular or
that it involves a vicious infinite regress. (Russell,7
8 9Wiggins, Kneale )
(c) It has been alleged that the Bg theory is flawed by
use/mention confusion. (Churchl)
Of these criticisms, the first is, on my view, not only
unpersuasive, but unheedful of what Frege actually says in
Bg; the second is based on a misunderstanding of the Bg
theory; and the third, though accurate, has never been
fully spelled out--it is a passing remark in one of Church's
footnotes--and when this criticism has been picked up by
others, it has been construed as a purely formal problem.
Thus, such an able commentator as Montgomery Furth has
remarked:
[The Bg theory of identityl has the merit of accounting
for the interest of true "A=B" as against the unin-
formativeness of "A=A". But the price is exorbitantly
high, for the device renders it practically impossible
to integrate the theory of identity into the formalized
object-language itself; e.g., to state generally such
a law as that if F(a) and a=b then F(b).ll
I agree with Furth's criticism of the formal aspect of the
Bg theory, but he is much too generous in allowing that
Frege can account for the difference in cognitive value be-
tween '%=oO and true =81. The Bg theory is an utter
failure. It is so thoroughly confused and unappealing that
21
I suspect Frege himself to have been dissatisfied with
it. 12 Many years later, Frege attributed the error of his
Bg account of identity to two factors: (a) insufficient
attention to the distinction between sign and thing signi-
fied, and (b) confusion in the Bg notion of content
[Inhalt]. 1 3  I agree with Frege's diagnosis. I shall
develop all of these points in this chapter.
Before turning to the Bg theory, however, I wish
to note a problem about interpretation. In SR, Frege
indicates that his Bg theory of identity was prompted by
reflection on the paradox. But he does not discuss the
paradox in Bg, nor does he acknowledge there that he is
offering a nonstandard account of identity. (Rather, his
primary concern in Bg is to justify the inclusion of a
symbol for identity in his system of notation. More on
this in the next chapter.) Hence, in regarding the Bg
theory of identity as a response to the paradox, I shall
have to extrapolate from the text and rechannel his re-
marks towards a solution to the puzzle.
2. The Begriffsschrift Theory
We have so far given a brief description of the Bg
theory of identity. What has yet to be explained is why
Frege had adopted it.
We have drawn attention to the following point:
i-sentences appear to derive their significance from the
22
fact that there is quite often more than one expression
in a given language that stands for an object. This was
an important (though not overwhelming) consideration for
Frege. But it is only in conjunction with the substitu-
tion principle, (I), that it justifies denial of the view
that ýa=8O is about d(a) and d(8). That is, there is no
inconsistency in holding that an i-sentence, a=ý , is
about d(a) and d(8) even though its informative character
stems from there being different expressions on either
side of the identity sign--if one does not accept (I).
This is the position preferred by some philosophers today.
Quine, for example, remarks in Methods of Logic that
"['Cicero = Tully'] is informative, because it joins two
J4different terms. And he later adds:
S. . since the useful statements of identity are
those in which the named objects are the same and
the names are different, it is only because of a
peculiarity of language that the notion of identity
is needed. If our language were so perfect a copy
of its subject matter that each thing had but one
name, then statements of identity would indeed be
useless. 15
Quine, however, does not accept (I), and with no evident
discomfort, he is a vigorous defender of the view that
lac=Sa is about d(a) and d(S):
But to say that the need of identity derives from a
peculiarity of language is not to say that identity
is a relation of expressions in language. On the
contrary, . . . what are identical are the objects
with themselves and not the names with one another;
the names stand in the statement of identity but
it is the named objects that are identified.± 6
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So, the point we must explain is Frege's acceptance of (I),
or something very much like (I), in Bg.
We turn, then, to the semantic theory Frege held
in Bg. On that theory, a sentence corresponds to its con-
tent [Inhalt]. This might be understood as a thought, but
only if we are careful not to assimilate this use of
"thought" to Frege's more familiar technical notion of
Gedanke from the SR theory. The sentence stands for or
denotes its content--the sentence is, in Frege's words,
a Vertreter (agent, proxy, substitute, representative) for
its content--and the parts of the sentence, in turn, stand
for or denote corresponding parts of the content of the
sentence. The structure of the sentence, then, mirrors
the structure of the thought. This situation might be
pictured so,
John loves Mary Sentence
+ + +
JOHN LOVES MARY Content
where the arrows indicate the denoting relation. If an
expression in a sentence functions solely as proxy for its
content, then we can see rather easily from the diagram
that were we to replace any one of the parts of the sen-
tence by any other which has the same content, then the
24
resultant sentence would have the same content as the
original.
Of course, some mirrors are more accurate re-
flectors than others. Frege developed his Begriffsschrift
to provide a more perspicuous representation of thought
than is afforded by ordinary language. It was to serve as
a tool for the abstract sciences, and especially mathe-
matics, which required, he felt, a system of notation com-
mensurate with the rigorous standards of proof and preci-
sion of thought essential to them. Natural language, he
said, "proves to be deficient in the matter of protecting
our thinking from error."l7 Its primary fault is ambi-
guity. We find many expressions in natural language which
have more than one meaning. 'Bear', for instance, is used
in one sense when we speak of a woman's bearing children
and in quite another when we speak of a person's bearing
up under adversitiy. Ambiguity becomes especially perni-
cious when logical differences are covered up. Consider,
for example, the two sentences
(6) The horse is a roan,
and
(7) The horse is a mammal,
where (6) speaks of an individual horse while (7) does not.
Although (6) and (7) appear to have the same grammatical
structure, they represent thoughts which have radically
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different logical structures. Using Frege's later termi-
nology, (6) expresses the circumstance of an object's
falling under a concept while (7) expresses the subordina-
tion of one concept to another. This crucial logical
difference between the contents of (6) and (7) is masked
by the superficial similarity between the grammatical
structure of (6) and (7). In Bg, of course, these con-
tents receive rather different representations.
Just as ordinary language sometimes fails to
reflect logical differences, it sometimes marks distinc-
tions which are of no logical importance. For instance,
in a language like German which has case inflexions there
is great flexibility in the:ordering of words in a sentence.
But this choice of word order is largely a matter of force
or topic, and so only of psychological or pragmatic impor-
tance. This is precisely Frege's reason for not reproducing
the subject/predicate distinction in his Begriffsschrift:
In language the place occupied by the subject in the
word-order has the significance of a specially important
place; it is where we put what we want the hearer to
attend to specially. . . . This may, e.g., have the pur-
pose of indicating a relation between this judgment and
others, and thus making it easier for the hearer to
grasp the whole sequence of thought. All such aspects
of language are merely results of the reciprocal action
of speaker and hearer; e.g. the speaker takes account
of what the hearer expects, and tries to set him upon
the right track before actually uttering the judgment.
In my formalized language there is nothing that cor-
responds; only that part of judgments which affects the
possible inferences is taken into consideration. What-
ever is needed for valid inference is fully expressed;
what is not needed is for the most part not indicated
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either; no scope is left for conjecture. 18
Protecting thought from error is not the sole
interest of natural language. Natural language is a
versatile and flexible instrument, capable of serving a
community of speakers in a wide variety of circumstances.
The fact that it must serve so many interests, however,
means that it must compromise the needs of each particular
one; and so, when we consider the specialized task of
representing inference, we ought not be surprised to find
that natural language is less than ideal:
Language is not in such a way dominated by logical
laws that compliance with grammar would of itself
guarantee the correctness of thought processes.
The forms in which inference is expressed are so
diverse, so unstable and elastic that it is easy
for premises to slip in unnoticed which are then
overlooked in listing the necessary conditions for
the validity of the conclusion, thereby lending it
a greater validity.than it should by rights have.19
A strictly delineated group of forms of inference
is just not present in language with the result
that it is not possible on the basis of linguistic
form to distinguish a flawless argumentation from
one in which steps have been left out. It can, in
fact, be said that the former is almost not to be
found in language, that it runs counter to the feel
of language, because it would be bound up with an
insufferable prolixity. Logical relationships are
almost always only hinted at by language and left
to guesswork but not properly expressed.20
Protecting thought .from error, however, was to be the sole
interest of Frege's Begriffsschrift, and, therefore, it was
to have the vital properties mentioned in the passages just
cited which natural languages lack. In particular, it
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was to be governed by logical laws in such a way that
mere adherence to grammar would guarantee the formal
correctness of thought processes.
Only that portion of the content of a sentence
which counted for inference was of any interest to Frege,
and this he called the "conceptual content" [Begrifflichen
Inhalt] of the sentence:
S. . let me observe that there are two ways in which
the content of two judgments may differ; it may, or
it may not, be the case that all inferences that can
be drawn from the first judgment when combined with
certain other ones can always be drawn from the second
when combined with the same other judgments. The two
propositions 'the Greeks defeated the Persians at
Plataea' and 'the Persians were defeated by the Greeks
at Plataea' differ in the former way; even if a slight
difference of sense is discernible, the agreement in
sense is preponderant. Now I call the part of the
content that is the same in both the conceptual content.
Only this has significance for our symbolic language;
we need therefore make no distinction between proposi-
tions that have the same conceptual content.21
Since each sentence is inferable from itself, with or with-
out any additional premises, Frege's condition for sameness
of conceptual content comes to this: two sentences have
the same conceptual content if, and only if, they are
mutually inferable. Hence, a sentence in Bg was viewed as
a transparent substitute for its conceptual content, and
any other sentence having the same conceptual content could
serve in its stead.
Both sentences and parts of sentences were said
to have contents. The content of .a sentence was called an
28
"assertible content" [Beurtheilbar Inhalt]; the content of
any other kind of expression--and so, of a singular term--
was called a "nonassertible content." The quoted condition
for sameness of conceptual content--mutual inferability--
only applies to assertible contents, and nowhere in Bg
had Frege explicitly stipulated the conditions under which
two singular terms were to have the same conceptual content.
In keeping with the general semantic structure of Bg, how-
ever, the indicated course would be to take two singular
terms as having the same conceptual content if, and only
if, replacement of one by the other in any given sentence
results in another sentence having the same conceptual con-
tent as the original. We ought to note that Frege's prac-
tice in Bg was to take two singular terms as having the
same conceptual content if, and only if, they denote the
same object; and thus he identified the conceptual content
of a singular term with the object for which it stands.
Since the content of a part of a sentence is said to be
part of the content of the whole sentence, we find that
objects themselves are parts of thoughts. This hybrid
notion of 'content' reveals a confusion in Bg which Frege
later attempted to rectify by distinguishing between the
sense and the reference of an expresssion.
Frege's brief remarks on sameness of conceptual
content require some further comment. The two sentences,
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(8) The Greeks defeated the Persians at Plataea,
and
(9) The Persians were defeated by the Greeks at Plataea,
differ only as active and passive; and since, according to
Frege,.these two sentences have the same conceptual content--
which is to say that whatever inferential relations the one
enters, the other enters too--no corresponding distinction
is made in his Begriffsschrift. Since there is no active/
passive distinction to be found in Bg, and since (8) and
(9) have the same conceptual content, then the point of not
differentiating between the two sentences is that any sym-
bolization of (8) serves equally as a symbolization of (9).
For example, if we were to symbolize (8) as a two-place
relational sentence, 'F(a,b)', according to the translation
scheme:
'a' : 'The Greeks'
'b': 'The Persians'
'F(S,.rl)': ' defeated n at._Plataea'
then, since this is also a symbolization of (9), we should
more accurately give 'F(ý,n)' as
'F((,n)' : ' defeated n at Plataea' or 'n were
defeated by at Plataea'
Hence, the fact that (8) and (9) have the same conceptual
content is not proved in his Begriffsschrift, but rather
it is assumed at the outset. Frege is here obviously
relying on a person's intuitive knowledge to recognize
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that (8) and (9) have the same conceptual content. Were
a person unaware that sentences related to one another as
(8) and (9) have the same conceptual content, Frege's
Begriffsschrift would not help him to find out that they
are. For, if this person were unaware that (8) and (9) did
have the same conceptual content, he would not symbolize
each in the same way, but would, perhaps, take ' defeated
rn at Plataea' as 'E( ,n)' and '1 were defeated by at
Plataea' as 'G(r,)I'. In this case, he would not be able
to prove, using only the rules of Frege's Begriffsschrift,
that 'F(a,b)' and 'G(b,a)' have the same conceptual content,
because
F (a,b) EG(b,a)
is not formally valid.
On the other hand, we are able to construct dif-
ferent strings of symbols in Frege's Begriffsschrift which
have the same conceptual content and which, moreover, can
be shown to have the same conceptual content using only
the rules of his Begriffsschrift. For example (using
modern notation),
(10) ((p q), p)> p,
and
(1i) p> (q p),
are both theorems, and so, since they are mutually derivable,
they have the same conceptual content. On the translation
scheme:
31
'p': 'war is hell'
'q': 'hope springs eternal'
(10) and (11) would be symbolizations, respectively, of
(12) If if if war is hell then hope springs eternal then
war is hell, then war is hell,
and,
(13) If war is hell, then if hope springs eternal then
war is hell
Hence, (12) and (13) have the same conceptual content, and
unlike (8) and (9), the fact that they have the same con-
ceptual content can be proved in Frege's Begriffsschrift.
Of course, we might imagine there to be a person who rec-
ognizes intuitively that (12) and (13) have the same con-
ceptual content, and so symbolizes (12) and (13) in the
same way. But for most of us, the fact that (12) and (13)
do have the same conceptual content is not intuitively
obvious, and so Frege's Begriffsschrift is of great help.
Obviously, then, some distinctions between propo-
sitions that have the same conceptual content are made:
some sentences of the form I-pEQ are theorems in his
Begriffsschrift and others are not. The Begriffsschrift
was intended to aid in evaluating inferences, and so to
aid in determining whether two sentences are mutually in-
ferable. Hence, there appears to be no theoretical reason
for not enriching Frege's artificial notation to include
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an active/passive distinction, adding on an axiom to the
effect that any two strings of symbols which differ only
in that one is active and the other passive (however this
is to be marked) have the same conceptual content. In
this enriched language, (8) and (9) could be shown to have
the same conceptual content on formal grounds alone. As
far as I can tell, the reason for not doing so is a prag-
matic one: it is just intuitively obvious that sentences
like (8) and (9) have the same conceptual content, and
there is no point in cluttering up the symbolic notation
to mark a distinction which can be more easily seen with-
out its aid.
We return, now, to the main point of our excursion
into the Bg semantic theory, which is to seek an analogue
to the substitution principle, (I). If we assume that the
notion of "cognitive value" in SR coincides with the Bg
notion of "conceptual content," and if we take advantage
of the fact that every sentence in Bg is said to stand
for or denote its conceptual content, then we have our
analogue in
(II) If Sa is about d(a), then
if d(a)=d(B), then d(Sa)=d(Sa/S).
How does this principle fit into the Bg theory? Frege's
Begriffsschrift is intended to be an artificial notation
which so accurately reflects the structure of thoughts
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that the symbols themselves can be treated as if they were
the contents represented, and so inference, which is
actually a matter pertaining to thought, is reduced to a
manipulation of symbols. Frege's Begriffsschrift, however,
is only the grammatical framework of a language. Had it
been a full-fledged language, and were we to imagine 'John
loves Mary' to be a sentence of the language, then as we
saw from the diagram a few pages back, (II) is immediate.
In fact, we fill the framework provided by his Begriffs-
schrift by associating the symbols with sentences from a
natural language. But natural languages are imperfect
representations of thought, and so in assigning a particu-
lar analysis to a given sentence from some natural language,
we must be sure that the sentence does take the proposed
analysis. And here is where (II) comes in, namely, to
help test whether a given analysis accurately represents
the conceptual content of the sentence. If we have a
sentence containing a singular term, Sa, and we wish to
determine whether Sa is about d(a), then by trying out
different singular terms in place of awe slowly eliminate
the likelihood that the conceptual content of Sa depends
upon any other feature of these terms than the object they
stand for if the conceptual content of the sentence remains
unchanged.
If I have reconstructed the Bg semantic theory
correctly, then it is just such an application of (II)
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which led Frege to reject the view that an i-sentence of
the form .a=8c is about d(a) and d(U). He believed that
ra=a) and true (f=B3 differed in conceptual content, and
so, since d(a)=d(B), but d(Sa)cd(Sa/3), r (a= could not
express a relation which holds between d(a) and d(U).
3. Criticism of the Begriffsschrift Solution
How does Frege's Bg theory solve the problem of
the difference in cognitive value between ca=al and true
(fW=$? According to the theory, the two i-sentences, (1)
and (2), are understood as
(14) aEb,
and
(15) aEa,
respectively, where the singular terms on either end of the
ec-symbol, by the convention laid down, stand for themselves.
Let us assume that (14) is about that which the terms on
either end of the ec-symbol stand for--and similarly for
(15). And let us assume further, that (14) and (15) are
both true and yet differ in conceptual content, i.e., that
d('a-b')# d('aEa'). Since (15) results from (14) by re-
placement of 'b' by 'a', then by (II), 'a' and 'b' also
differ in conceptual content, i.e., d('a')$d('b'). But
this is no longer puzzling, because 'a' and 'b' are dif-
ferent expressions.
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Note, however, that (14) says that the symbol 'a'
has the same conceptual content as the symbol 'b', i.e.,
that d('a')=d('b'); and (14) was assumed to be true. Yet
the conclusion of the argument is that d('a')3 d('b').
On reflection, we ought not be surprised at this
result. We cannot properly speak of the denotation of an
expression, for an .expression might denote different ob-
jects in different contexts, namely, its usual content or
itself. It is precisely this ambiguity which was traded
on to produce the contradiction. The easiest way of getting
around this difficulty would be to drop Frege's awkward
device of having an expression stand now for its content,
now for itself, and adopt, instead, the convention of
forming the name of an expression by enclosing that ex-
pressing within single quotes. The whole, following
Quine, is called a quotation. Each expression in the lan-
guage now always stands for its content--never itself.
We would represent (14) and (15), respectively, as
(14') 'a' ' b',
and
(15') -a'-'a' .
A quotation is, from the logical point of view, a simple
name: the occurrence of 'a' in ''a'' is, in Quine's phrase,
a mere orthographic accident, because d("a"') is not
uniquely determined by d('a'); and the unfortunate tendency
to overlook this fact, that is, to unwittingly assume that
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the structure of the notation reflects logical structure,
would be avoided had we adopted a different, but equally
suitable, convention. At any rate, a consequence of a
quotation's being a simple name is that substitution within
single quotes is illegitimate. We cannot construe (15')
as resulting from (14') by replacement of 'b' by 'a', but
only as resulting by replacement of ''b'' by ''a'i. Con-
tinuing the argument, since (14') differs in conceptual
content from (15'), i.e., d(''a'E'b'')4d(''a'E'a'') and
since (15') results from (14') by replacement of 'b'' by
"a", then by (II), "a" and "b'' also differ in con-
ceptual content, i.e., d(''a'')/d(''b''). No contradic-
tion arises, for (14'), assumed true, says that 'a' and 'b'
have the same conceptual content, i.e., d('a')=d.('b'); and
'a' is not the same sign as ''a''.
It would appear, then, that with this slight
notational emendation, the Bg theory solves the problem
about the difference in cognitive value between fa=ao
and true ra=Ba. By taking an i-sentence to be about the
terms occurring in the sentence, (II) is satisfied and the
puzzle dispelled. But this is not so.
To begin, note that the assumption of the truth
of (14') was never used in the argument. In fact, the
truth value of (14') was irrelevant to the argument; for,
the difference in conceptual content between (14') and (15')
was found to consist solely in the difference between the
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singular terms occurring in (14') and (15'). However, a
difference in conceptual content between (14') and (15')
might arise from the fact that (14') and (15') differ in
truth value, or, it might arise from the fact that (14')
and (15'), while agreeing in truth value, contain different
singular terms. But the Bg theory does not distinguish be-
tween these two sorts of cases. Hence, it is misleading--
if not false--to say that the Bg theory accounts for the
fact that there is a difference in cognitive value between
"a=a` and true (a=B .
There is, however, a more serious problem with
the theory. By using the single quote method of name
formation, we have'been able to reestablish a uniformity
in the notation: an expression always goes proxy for its
content, never itself. We find, however, that ec, although
a relation'which holds between expressions, holds between
these expressions qua contents. That is, it is not the
expressions on either end of the ec-symbol which are now
said to have the same content, but the content of those
expressions, i.e., what those expressions stand for.
Hence, it would be incorrect to describe ec as being a
relation which holds between expressions and not contents;
for it does hold between contents, albeit contents of a
special sort--contents which themselves have content,
namely, symbols.
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Now, for a given expression, as, in general, for
any given object, there is quite often more than one ex-
pression which uniquely identifies it. For example, 'the
word 'four'' and 'the first word of the Gettysburg Address'
both denote the same word. And it is therefore possible
for two i-sentences, fa=a. and true a.=8S, to differ in
cognitive value when the object denoted by 'a' and 'b'
happens to be a word. For example, compare 'the word
'four' =the first word of the Gettysburg Address' with
'the word 'four' =the word 'four''. The latter is a tru-
ism, but the former is not. Using this fact, it is rela-
tively easy to show that the same difficulty which Frege
found with the view that ra=80 is about d(a) and d(B)
also burdens his own.
'Mark Twain' is (identical with) the pen name of
Samuel Clemens. So, the conceptual content of ''Mark
Twain'' is the same as the conceptual content of 'the pen
name of Samuel Clemens'. Consider, now, the two ec-sen-
tences:
(16) 'Mark Twain' Ethe pen name of Samuel Clemens,
and
(17) 'Mark Twain' E 'Mark Twain'.
(17) is a truism, but (16) is more subtle: since 'Mark
Twain' is one and the same word as the pen name of Samuel
Clemens, and since a word denotes whatever it denotes,
then 'Mark Twain' must stand for the same thing as the pen
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name of Samuel Clemens. (17) results from (16) by replace-
ment of 'the pen name of Samuel Clemens' by 'Mark Twain''.
Since, as has been previously noted, 'the pen name of
Samuel Clemens' has the same conceptual content as ''Mark
Twain'', i.e., since d('the pen name of Samuel Clemens') -
d(''Mark Twain''), then by (II), (16) and (17) must also
have the same conceptual content, i.e., d((16))=d((17)). But,
it is not at all obvious that (16) and (17) do have the same
conceptual content-- (16) is much more informative than (17).
There seems to be just as much reason for supposing that (16)
and (17) differ in cognitive value as there was for supposing
that 'Mark Twain is identical with Mark Twain' and 'Mark Twain
is identical with Samuel Clemens' differ in cognitive value.
As long as there is more than one expression which
can uniquely identify a given object, we are faced with the
problem of difference in cognitive value. Such was the case
for identity, and such, we have just found, is the case for
ec. This fact had been concealed from us in the emended ar-
gument in the previous section because of the way in which
that argument had been set up. In using the single quote
method of name formation, we had surreptitiously assumed that
the names on either end of the ec-symbol named different ex-
pressions. For a quotation actually contains its denotation
as a proper part; so, two quotations differ if, and only if,
their denotations (which are, in fact, their quoted interiors)
differ.
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In the emended argument, the expressions on either
end of the ec-symbol in (14') differed because the expres-
sion on either end of the identity sign in (1) differed.
This was not due to our use of single quotes to form names,
but rather to the fact that quotations are names: the
same would hold whatever names--whether proper names,
quotations, or definite descriptions--were used to refer
to the singular terms in (1). Distinct objects require,
on pain of ambiguity, distinct names; and we had, essen-
tially, adopted the simplifying assumption that no name
names more than one object. Of course, this assumption
does not justify our having the same expression on either
end of the ec-symbol in (15') because the same expression
occurred on either end of the identity sign in (2). For,
in general, it need not hold that any two distinct names
name distinct objects.
Were we, then, to let 'a' and 'b' be arbitrary
names of expressions and consider,
(18) aEb,
and
(19) aEa,
we would see clearly that ec runs afoul of (II). For, let
us suppose that (18) and (19) are both true and yet differ
in conceptual content, i.e., that d('aEb')fd('aEa').
Since (19) results from (18) by replacement of 'b' by 'a',
then by (II), 'a' and 'b' differ in conceptual content, i.e.,
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d('a')4d('b'). But it is, as we have just seen, possible
that a and b be one and the same expression, i.e., that
a=b, in which case 'a' and 'b' could not differ in conceptual
content, i.e., d('a')=d('b').
The fact that the problem of difference in cognitive
value can be reproduced for ec is certainly damaging to the
Bg theory. How damaging becomes evident from the following
considerations.
On the Bg theory, an i-sentence is understood to
be (really) saying something about the singular terms
occurring on either end of the identity sign, namely, that
they have the same conceptual content. There are not, on
this account, two relations--identity and ec--the one
holding between objects and the other holding between names
of objects. There is only one relation, for the view that
an i-sentence fr=cB is about d(a) and d(B) has been rejec-
ted since it conflicts with the fact that i-sentences dif-
fer in cognitive value. The conceptual content of an i-
sentence, then is that the singular terms occurring in the
sentence have the same conceptual content, so when a given
i-sentence is translated into-Bg.g nOtation,,athe singular,...
terms:..flanking the .ec-symbol are understood to stand for
the singular terms flanking the identity sign. But, since
to a given singular term there might correspond more than
one name which uniquely identifies it, there is no unique
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correlation of i-sentences with ec-sentences. This would
raise no serious difficulties if each of the ec-sentences
correlated with a given i-sentence had the same conceptual
content. But, as we have just shown, this is not so.
Since the various ec-sentences correlated with a given i-
sentence might not have the same conceptual content, we
shall not be able properly to speak of the conceptual con-
tent of an i-sentence. That is, the conceptual content of
an i-sentence would not be determined so much by the singu-
lar terms occurring on either end of the identity sign as
it would be by the names used to denote these singular
terms. Hence, the conceptual content of an i-sentence
which. Frege sought to capture with his Bg theory, namely,
that two singular terms stand for or denote one and the
same thing, is hopelessly masked.
4. A Second Interpretation of Equality of Content
One response to the problem would be to step to
the next level and seek a relation which holds between
names of names of expressions. Aside from the evident im-
plausibility of this scheme--Are we to suppose than an i-
sentence says something about (some? all?) names of the
singular terms occurring on either end of the identity
sign?--it is simply a dead end, for there can be little
doubt that we shall once again run square against the prob-
lem of difference in cognitive value for this new relation.
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Another--and more promising--response would be to
attempt to save the Bg theory by placing a restriction on
the language such that each expression in it can be
uniquely identified by no more than one name. In this way,
the argument in the previous section would be blocked: for,
now, two names of expressions, 'a' and 'b', would be such
that a=b if, and only if, 'a' 'b' (i.e., d(a')=d('b')).
And this, I think, is the kind of thing Frege actually does
in Bg.
In the last section, we had regarded the .terms on
either end of the ec-symbol as names of the corresponding
expressions occurring on either end of the identity sign
in the correlated i-sentence. However, in the text,
Frege understands the terms occurring on either end of the
identity sign to stand for themselves, and so chose like-
wise for the terms on either end of the ec-symbol. By
doing this, the names are, so to speak, given directly and
there is thus no problem about determining whether we have
the same or different sign as we had last section when the
names flanking the identity sign were given indirectly.
On this interpretation, the singular terms occurring on
either end of the identity sign are not used to stand for
their customary denotations; in this context, the singular
terms are used to stand for themselves (hence, they are
both used and mentioned), and the claim of identity is so
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understood that the mentioned singular terms are said to
have the same conceptual content (i.e., to stand for the
same thing). In
(1) Mark Twain = Samuel Clemens,
the expressions 'Mark Twain' and 'Samuel Clemens' stand
for themselves, and '=' is understood to express a relation
between these names. In Bg notation, this i-sentence, (1),
is represented as
(20) Mark Twain E Samuel Clemens,
where, again, 'Mark Twain' and 'Samuel Clemens' stand for
themselves.
In order to avoid confusions which might arise from
both using and mentioning a given expression in a given
context--i.e., of using an expression autonymously--our own
procedure was to insert single quotes around the expressions
occurring on either end of the ec-symbol. So, (20) became
(21) 'Mark Twain' E 'Samuel Clemens'.
However, we had overemphasized the naming aspect of quota-
tion and forgotten the particular virtue of single quotes
which makes it preferable to other methods of name forma-
tion, namely, that a quotation exhibits or displays its
denotation. In a sense, a quotation is a perfectly trans-
parent name: for anyone familiar with the single quote
method of name formation, acquaintance with a quotation is
tantamount to acquaintance with the object for which the
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quotation stands. (Indeed, this is the paradox of quota-
tion: whereas the value of using single quotes lies in
our being able to look inside the quote marks and see the
expression denoted, the logical condition of a quotation's
being a name is that what appears inside the quote marks
counts for naught.)
The importance of so exhibiting or displaying an
expression becomes apparent when we consider, again,
(16) 'Mark Twain' E the pen name of Samuel Clemens.
On the view just outlined (16) turns out to be nonsense:
it is not a well-formed (i.e., syntactically coherent) sen-
tence. The expression 'the pen name of Samuel Clemens'
certainly names the expression 'Mark Twain', but it fails
to exhibit or display 'Mark Twain' or, indeed, any other
expression. Hence, not (16), but
(22) 'Mark Twain' E 'Mark Twain'
corresponds to the i-sentence
(23) Mark Twain = Mark Twain.
And, again, not (16), but
(24) 'Mark Twain' - 'the pen name of Samuel Clemens'
corresponds to the i-sentence
(25) Mark Twain = the pen name of Samuel Clemens.
(This latter example is a bit more obvious, because (16) is
true, but (24) and (25) are both false.) (16) is not well-
formed because, in an ec-sentence, the expressions said to
have the same conceptual content must actually appear in
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the sentence. Quote marks serve not so much to form names
as they do to underscore the fact that the quoted expres-
sions, in that context, stand not for their ordinary con-
tents, but for themselves. In effect, then the single
quotes are mere explicit reminders that the quoted expres-
sions are occurring autonymously.
There is, thus, a 1-1 mapping from the set of i-
sentences onto the set of ec-sentences which is described
by the following algorithm: given an i-sentence, replace
the identity sign by the ec-symbol and place single quote
marks around the expressions flanking the ec-symbol. To
reverse the procedure, simply delete the outermost pairs
of single quote marks occurring around the expressions
flanking the ec-symbol and replace the ec-symbol by the
identity sign.
5. Criticism of the Second Interpretation
I think this interpretation is much closer to
Frege's intentions in Bg than is the account provided in
section 3. But there remains, still, a question about the
logical status of our use of single quotes in ec-sentences:
Are these quotations to be regarded as names or not? Frege,
I think, would wish to say that they are names; for, his
own device was to have the terms on either end of the ec-
symbol occur autonymously. But it is doubtful whether
quotations can be logically regarded as names on this
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interpretation.
First, quotations do not belong to the same syn-
tactic category of expressions as do proper names and
definite descriptions. For, whereas "a'E'b'' is well-
formed when 'a' and 'b' are singular terms in the language,
were we to replace either ''a'' or ''b'' by a proper name
or a definite description--not a quotation--the resultant
string would no longer be well-formed. The case is en-
tirely analogous to replacing the wedge in '(p v q)' by
either a left parenthesis or a propositional variable, to
obtain, respectively, '(p(q)' and '(p r q)'. Parentheses,
logical connectives, and propositional variables belong to
three distinct syntactic categories.
Second, if we are to regard our single quote con-
vention as a species of name formation, we shall have to
recognize that the requirements of our notation severely
limit the alternative conventions open to us: we can only
adopt a convention wherein the mentioned expression is
displayed or exhibited. So, for example, instead of
single quotes, we might have adopted a procedure Geach
once proposed, namely, underlining the mentioned expres-
sions, i.e., writing 'Mark Twain' instead of ''MarkTwa.in". 2 2
However, we would be unable to use the most widely known
alternative to quotations, namely, Tarski's structural-
23descriptive names. On this convention, an expression is
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described by spelling it: indicating the letters making
up the expression (using names of these letters, of course)
and specifying the ordering of these letters. So, for
example, 'Mark Twain' would be denoted by the structural
description:
the expression consisting of two words, the first of
which is composed of the letters em, ay, ar, and kay
(in that order),, and the second of which is composed
of the letters tee, double-u, ay, eye, and en (in
that order).
Or, adopting the symbol '"' to represent concatenation,
and using '#' to represent a word boundary, we could de-
note 'Mark Twain' by the somewhat shorter expression:
em ay ar kay # tee double-u ay eye en
Yet,
'Mark Twain'Eem ay ar kay # tee double-u ay eye en
would be ill-formed, and for the very same reasons that
(16) was ill-formed: the actual expressions said to
have the same conceptual content must be exhibited in the
ec-sentence (just as they are exhibited in the i-sentence).
We mention this point in particular because of
the importance Tarski and Quine attach to the fact that
structural-descriptive names can be used in place of
quotations. For, if quotations are to be regarded as
names, it is claimed, they must be regarded as simple
names, i.e., as having no significant logical structure.
For example, Tarski says:
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Quotation-mark names may be treated like single
words of a language, and thus like syntactically
simple expressions. The single constituents of
these names--the quotation marks and the expres-
sions standing between them--fulfill the same
function as the letters and complexes of
successive letters in single words. Hence they
can possess no independent meaning. Every
quotation-mark name is then a constant individual
name of a definite expression (the expression
enclosed by the quotation marks) and in fact a
name of the same nature as the proper name of a
man. 24
And Quine:
. . . from the standpoint of logical analysis each
whole quotation must be regarded as a single word
or sign, whose parts count for no more than serifs
or syllables. A quotation is not a description,
but a hieroglyph; it designates its object not by
describing it in terms of other objects, but by
picturing it. The meaning of the whole does not
depend upon the meaning of the constituent words.
The personal name buried within the first word of
the statement
'Cicero' has six letters,
e.g., is logically no more germane to the statement
than is the verb 'let' which is buried within the
last word.25
And, the fact that the word inside the single quotes
appears to be of logical significance is claimed to be an
incidental feature of the notation which would be avoided
had we adopted structural-descriptive names instead.
Quine argues,
The quotational context ''9>5'' of the statement
'9>5' has, perhaps, unlike the context 'cattle' of
'cat', a deceptively systematic air which tempts us
to think of its parts as somehow logically germane.
Insofar as this temptation exists, it is salutary
to paraphrase quotations by the following expedient.
We may adopt names for each of our letters and other
characters, and Tarski's "'' to express concatena-
tion. Then, instead of naming a notational form by
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putting that notational form itself bodily between
quotation marks, we can name it by spelling it.2 6
The shift from quotation to spelling has an indepen-
dent advantage . . ., but incidentally it is instruc-
tive as stressing that any non-referential occurrences
caused by quotation are surface appearances, dispelled
by an easy change in notation.2 7
But, turning the argument around, if we cannot replace
quotations by structural-descriptive names, then it is not
true that the incorporation of an expression within single
quotes is merely an incidental feature of our use of quota-
tions; and so it is now doubtful that the occurrence of
'Mark, Twain' in ''Mark Twain'' is of no logical signifi-
cance; and if it is a condition of our regarding ''Mark
Twain'' as a name that the embedded constituent 'Mark
Twain' be of no logical significance, then it is doubtful
whether "Mark Twain'' can be regarded as a name.
This brings us, now, to the heart of the matter:
the proper logical analysis of ec-sentences.
Frege, no doubt, construed an ec-sentence to be a
relational sentence, i.e., as admitting the analysis
rR(a,8)I; for ec is said to be a relation which holds be-
tween expressions. The most natural analysis, then, of an
ec-sentence, ''a E'b'', would be
(26) R:
a: 'a'
8: 'b'
However, the remarks at the end of the previous section
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would seem to indicate that the quote marks go along with
the ec-symbol, so that the relational analysis of "a'E'b''
would be:
(27) R: '-'
a: a
8: b
Analyzed in the manner of (26), ''a'E'b'' results by com-
pleting the function-expression '(.)E( )' by the argument-
expressions ''a'' and ''b''. Analyzed in the manner of
(27), on the other hand, ''a'E'b'' results by completing
the function-expression ''( )'-' ( )'' by the argument-ex-
pressions 'a' and 'b'. Which of these analyses are we to
choose?
Frege's discussion of function and argument in Bg
is a bit thin, and it is, moreover, flawed by (a) failure
to distinguish carefully between functions and function-
expressions (and, similarly, arguments and argument-expres-
sions), and by (b) failure to separate functions and argu-
ments (i.e., to distinguish between concept and object).
One fact, however, which clearly emerges from the text is
that there might be alternative analyses for a given sen-
tence which are equally correct, i.e., that there need not
be a unique logical analysis for a given sentence. (Frege
seems anxious to make this point in order to underscore
the greater flexibility of his own function-argument
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analysis than is allowed by the rival subject-predicate
analysis.) For example, he says,
Let us suppose that there is expressed in our formalized
language the circumstance of hydrogen's being lighter
than carbon dioxide. In place of the symbol for hydro-
gen we may insert the symbol for oxygen or nitrogen.
This changes the sense in such a way that 'oxygen' or
'nitrogen' enters into the relations that 'hydrogen'
stood in before. If an expression is thought of as
variable in this way, it is split up into a constant
part representing the totality of these relations and a
symbol, imagined as replaceable by others, that stands
for the object related by the relations. I call the
one part a function, the other an argument. This dis-
tinction has nothing to do with the conceptual content;
it concerns only our way of looking at it. In the man-
ner of treatment just indicated, 'hydrogen' was the
argument and 'being lighter than carbon dioxide' the
function; but we can equally look at the same concep-
tual content in such a way that 'carbon dioxide' is
the argument and 'being heavier than hydrogen' is the
function. We need in this case merely to imagine 'car-
bon dioxide' as replaceable by other ideas like 'hydro-
chloric acid gas' or 'ammonia'. 28
I take it that Frege is arguing that the sentence
(28) hydrogen is lighter than carbon dioxide
can be given the analysis (F(a') in either of the following
two ways:
(29) F: is lighter than carbon dioxide
a: hydrogen
or
(30) F: hydrogen is lighter than
a: carbon dioxide
Moreover, he claims, either analysis is correct. Analyzed
in the manner of (29), (28) results from the completion of
the function-expression' ( ) is lighter than carbon dioxide'
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by the argument-expression 'hydrogen'. Analyzed in the
manner of (30), (28) results from the completion of the
function-expression 'hydrogen is lighter than ( )' by the
argument-expression 'carbon dioxide'.
Hence, it might turn out that the choice between
analyzing "a'-'b'' in the manner of (26) or in the manner
of (27) is entirely superficial, for they might both turn
out to be equally good analyses. But what constraints are
there on something's counting as a correct analysis?
Frege enunciates two constraints which are of particular
importance for us.
First, the mode of analysis chosen must have no
effect on the conceptual content of the given sentence.
Repeating what he says in the above-quoted passage, "This
distinction [between function and argument] has nothing to
do with the conceptual content; it concerns only our way of
looking at it." Again, he says,
We attach no importance to the various ways that the
same conceptual content may be regarded as a function
of this or that argument, so long as function and argu-
ment are completely determinate.2 9
Second, in order to regard an expression in a
given sentence as an argument-expression, that expression
must occupy a position open to substitution:
Suppose that a simple or complex symbol occurs in one
or more places in an expression (whose content need
not be a possibEl content of judgment). If we imagine
th-s symbol as replaceable-by another (the same one
each time') at one or. more of its occurrences, then
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the pa of the expression that shows itself invariant
under such replacement is called the function; and the
replaceable part , the argument of the function.TO-
Taking these two considerations into account, we
now wish to determine which, if either, of the two analyses,
(26) and (27), is a correct logical analysis of the ec-
sentence ''a'-b''.
Let us consider (26) first. ''a'E'b'' cannot be
correctly analyzed in the manner of (26) because (26) fails
to satisfy the substitution condition. The single quotes
go along with the ec-symbol. As we have mentioned a number
of times, any expression occurring on either end of an ec-
symbol must be embedded in single quotes; hence the single
quote marks are an invariant part of an ec-sentence. As
Frege explained the ec-symbol, whereas signs elsewhere
stand for their contents, kehren sie plotzlich ihr eignes
Selbst hervor, sobald sie durch das Zeichen der Inhalts-
31
gleichheit verbunden werden . . . . (Bauer-Mengelberg's
translation of this clause is more dramatic in placing the
burden of autonymous denotation on the context rather than
on the expressions than is Geach's quoted on p. 19:
"they suddenly display their own selves when they are com-
bined by means of the sign for identity of content."32
The very understanding of the ec-symbol is that what appears
on either side is mentioned; and our single quotes serve
merely to mark this fact. By separating the single quotes
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from the ec-symbol, as is done in (26), it becomes possible
for the blanks to be filled by signs which do not stand for
themselves, and so, it becomes possible to substitutionally
derive ill-formed nonsense strings like (16).
Indeed, Frege's own practice in Bg is to regard
''a'E'b" in the manner rather of (27). For example, he
derives his theorem 57 (with single quotes inserted appro-
priately)
f(c)
f(d)
( c, d ) r I
from
I . 1
ftd)
f(c)
33
33by replacing 'd' by 'c' and 'c' by 'd'. That is,. he re-
gards the quoted expression as occupying a postion open to
substitution. Had he carved up ec-sentences in the manner
of (26), he would have had to supplement his substitution
table to include replacement of ''c'' by ''d'' and ''d''
by "''c
Having disposed of (26), we turn to (27). (27)
seems to accord with the substitution constraint. But, if
le
I
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we are to regard an ec-sentence, "a'''b", as built up
from 'a', 'b', and ''( )'( )', we will find ourselves in
conflict with the other constraint, namely, that the logi-
cal analysis of a given sentence into function-expression
and argument-expression(s) have no effect whatsoever on
the conceptual content of the sentence. To see this point,
turn back to our discussion in section 3. In order to show
that (14') and (15') were both true and yet differed in
conceptual content--and did not violate (II)--we had to
assume that our use of single quote .. marks entailed-that
(15') resulted from (14') by replacement of ''b'' by ''a''
and not by replacement of 'b' by 'a'. Such replacement
would be justified, however, only if we were to analyze ec-
sentences in the manner of (26), where quotations are re-
garded as replaceable elements of an ec-sentence. Analyzed
in the manner of (27), on the other hand, quotations cannot
be so regarded; rather, (15') is viewed as resulting from
(14') by replacement of .'b' by 'a'. And, in that case, the
argument we had constructed fails.
Hence, neither (26) nor (27) provides an adequate
model for a relational analysis of ec-sentences. Since
these two are the only plausible candidates, it does not
seem possible to assign an ec-sentence the logical form
rR(a,8) 3'. Indeed, there seems to be no way at all of carving
an ec-sentence up into function-expression and argument-
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expression(s); and so, from the logical point of view, an
ec-sentence must be regarded as an unanalyzable whole--a
simple symbol possessing no significant logical structure.
6. Formal Difficulties with Equality of Content
The importance of having to treat an ec-sentence as
an unanalyzable whole ought not be underestimated.
Consider the argument
a b
b-c
aEc
(In this section, we suppress single quote marks where no
confusion will result in order to facilitate exposition.)
This argument is clearly valid, because ec is transitive:
if 'a' has the same conceptual content as 'b' and 'b' has
the same conceptual content as 'c', then it must be the
case that 'a' has the same conceptual content as 'c'. One
should expect that such an obvious truth as the transiti-
vity of ec be expressible in Bg, i.e., that the argument
turn out to be formally valid. (To be sure, it can be
shown to be formally valid in Bg, but illegitimately, I
think; for the axioms governing 'E' in Bg are axioms for
identity, not ec.) But, if an ec-sentence has no signifi-
cant logical structure, then we cannot justify the validity
of the argument by appealing, e.g.., to the fact that the
item said to be equivalent in content to 'a' in the first
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premise is the same as the item said to be equivalent in
content to 'c' in the second premise; for this would appeal
to the internal structure of the premises. Perhaps ec is
transitive, i.e., perhaps ec is a transitive relation; but,
as noted, we cannot logically regard ec-sentences as re-
lational sentences, so we have no formal means of represen-
ting the transitivity of ec. If an ec-sentence is a simple
symbol possessing no significant logical structure, then
we shall have to represent it as such. The most perspicuous
logical representation of the argument we can devise, then,
is the following:
P
r
And this argument, as we can plainly see, is not formally
valid.
There are two axioms in Bg governing ec:
(31) , c..
and
(32) f(d)
f (C)f("c)
Although (31) and (32) together would, if 'E' were assigned
the usual interpretation of identity, provide a complete
axiomatization of identity within .a first order theory,
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they cannot consistently carry the interpretation Frege
desired in Bg. For example,
-I. . bEb
would seem to be sanctioned by substitution in (31). This
cannot be, however, for if our analysis of ec-sentences is
correct, 'c-c' has no replaceable, i.e., substitutible,
parts. The difficulty with ec is most dramatic when we
consider the interpretation of variables in ec-sentences.
Quine has, on many occasions, drawn our attention to the
intimate connection between reference and quantification; 3 4
and his observations in other contexts are easily trans-
ferred to our own.
By a rule of inference given in section 11 of Bg--
essentially, Universal Generalization--we can infer
(33) 6L h
i.e, in modern notation,
(34) (x) (x=x)
from (31). How are we to understand (33) (or (34))? The
standard rendering of (33) (or (34)) would be
(35) Everything is such that it has the same conceptual
content as itself;
just as the standard rendering of
(36) is a man,
i.e., '(x (x is a man)', would be
(37) Everything is such that it is a man.
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However, there is a significant difference between (35) and
(37). The property of being a man is a property of objects,
not names of objects, and so, in (36), the Gothic letter
which marks the argument place in '( ) is a man' is supposed
to be replaced by a name which stands not for itself, but
for whatever it is customarily taken to stand for. Ec, on
the other hand, relates names of objects. Hence, the Gothic
letters in (33) are supposed to be replaced by names which,
in this context, stand for themselves. So, whereas in (37)
the indefinite pronoun 'everything' is the antecedent of
'it' in (35), 'everything' cannot be taken to be the ante-
cedent of the pronouns 'it' and 'itself'. Were we to com-
bine (35) and (37), the result,
(38) Everything is such that it has the same conceptual
content as itself and is a man,
would be either false or nonsense: that which is said to
be a man cannot be the same thing as that which is said to
have the same conceptual content as itself.
There appears to be no way of expressing any general
properties of ec by means of quantifiers and variables.
For, consider
(39) xEy,
where 'x' and 'y' are supposed to be variables, notconstants.
If the expressions flanking the ec-symbol are understood to
stand for themselves, then (39) is not, as one would expect,
an open sentence, but a closed sentence (whose truth value
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and conceptual content escape me). For (39) says that the
expression 'x' has the same conceptual content as the ex-
pression 'y'. This becomes explicit if the single quote
marks we dropped earlier are reinserted. Fully spelled
out, (39) should be
(40) 'x'-'y'
For the same reason, (34) cannot properly be rendered as
(35): the expressions occurring on either end of the ec-
symbol stand for themselves, and so they are not bound by
the universal quantifier. The full English rendering of
(34) with single quotes reinserted would be,
(41) Everything is such that 'it' has the same conceptual
content as 'itself'.
Nor, can the problem be solved by shifting the universe of
discourse and having the variables range over expressions
rather than the objects these expression denote. For,
whether we construe (34) as
(42) Every object is such that 'it' has the same conceptual
content as itself;
or as
(43) Every expression is such that 'it' has the same conceptual
content as 'itself',
again with single quote marks reinserted, we find that we
cannot express the generalization.. Choice of a range for
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the variables is pointless because we have no variables to
range over anything.
Frege failed to observe this difficulty in his
theory partly, I think, because he failed to clearly
separate the objectual from the substitutional interpre-
tation of the quantifiers (although Frege obviously in-
tended the quantifiers to be understood objectually).
This is not surprising. For, objectual/substitutional
confusion in the interpretation of quantifiers is the
direct analogue for quantification of use/mention con-
fusion in the interpretation of singular terms. Here, for
example, is the passage in which Frege introduced the
quantifier-variable notation in Bg:
In the expression of a judgment we can always regard
the combination of signs to the right of I- as a
function of one of the signs occurring in it. If
we replace this argument by a German letter and if
in the content stroke we introduce a concavity with
this German letter in it, as in
this stands for the judgment that, whatever we ~y
take for its argument, the function is a fact. Since
a letter used as a sign for a function, such as ·
in 4(A), can itself be regarded as the argument of a
function, its place can be taken, in the manner just
specified, by a German letter.35
On the substitution interpretation of the universal quanti-
fier,
(x)Fx
reads as
Every substitution instance of 'Fx' is true,
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rather than as
Everything is such that it is F,
the more familiar objectual reading. The main virtue of
substitutional quantification is that it succeeds in blur-
ring use/mention distinctions that are prominent in objec-
tual quantification; the substituends of substitutionally
interpreted variables need not be names, i.e., they need
not stand for or denote anything. Of particular interest
to us is the fact that quantification into contexts of
quotation is not problematic on the substitutional inter-
pretation. As Dunn and Belnap observe,
the substituends of variables need not be re-
stricted to be names (nouns). Variables may occupy
the place of expressions of other grammatical cate-
gories, for example, sentences. With this convention
firmly in mind, we can say things like
(11) (P) (Q) if "P" and "Q" are sentences, then
"P&Q" is a sentence, and "P" and "Q" are
its conjuncts.
And we can do so without running the risk of making
a mistake about use and mention through inadvertently
referring to the sixteenth letter of the English
alphabet by using ""P"".
Indeed, if we also have the convention that signs
of the object language are used autonymously as names
of themselves, then we may drop the quotes without
having to introduce any quasi-quotes or other ugly
notational conventions:
(12) (P) (Q) if P and Q are sentences, then-P&Q
is a sentence, and P and Q are its conjuncts.
The substitution interpretation thus ives logicians a
way of preaching what they practice.3t
But, were we to adopt substitutional quantification, we
should still not be able to save the Bg theory. For the
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substitutional interpretation has the important feature of
shaking loose names from their role as names, i.e., as ex-
pressions which stand for or denote something. And it is
clear that Frege wished to construe the expressions flanking
the ec-symbol as names, indeed, as names of themselves, be-
cause Frege wished .to maintain that the name occurring in
(44) Mark Twain E Mark Twain,
is the same name as that which occurs in
(45) Mark Twain wrote Innocents Abroad,
even though it names itself in (44) and it names the man
in (45). This cannot be consistently maintained on the
substitution interpretation. For, as Binkley has recently
shown, although we can make sense of
(x)F'x'
on the substitution interpretation, we cannot make sense of
(x) (F x' & Gx)
where we have, as Binkley calls it, a mixing of levels, i.e.,
where a single quantifier binds occurrences of a variable,
some of which occur within quotation marks, some of which do
not.37
The problems we have run into in this section bear
out Furth's remark quoted earlier that it is impossible to
incorporate the general theory of identity into Frege's
Begriffsschrift. We simply cannot give any coherent
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interpretation to a formula like
(i.e., the universal closure of (32)) where we bind two
occurrences of a variable and only one of these is an
occurrence at either end of an ec-symbol.
7. The Failure of the Begriffsschrift Theory of Identity
At the beginning of the chapter, we noted that if
a sentence, Sa, is about d(a), then it ought not matter
which of the many expressions which could stand for the
object is actually used in the sentence. Of course, there
was some question about what does not matter, i.e., about
what remains invariant under substitution of codenotational
expressions, whether it is truth value or conceptual con-
tent. But, for the sake of argument, we accepted Frege's
suggestion that conceptual content is the invariant prop-
erty. Unlike Frege, however, we kept the substitution
principle, (II), firmly in mind when it came to considering
ec. In section 3, we took seriously Frege's claim that ec
relates expressions, and we supposed that if ec is a rela-
tion which holds between expressions, then it ought not
matter which of the many names which could stand for a
given expression actually serves in an ec-sentence. But
it did matter: it turned out that, on the Bg theory, the
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expressions flanking the ec-symbol must be understood to
stand for themselves.
Frege's claim that an ec-sentence expresses a
relation which holds between the expressions flanking the
ec-symbol certainly violates the spirit of the substitu-
tion principle. Indeed, it cleaves to the letter of the
principle only trivially. For, if an expression in an ec-
sentence stands for itself, then there is no distinct ex-
pression which could stand for the same thing in that con-
text. That is, there are no two distinct singular terms,
a and , such that if each is understood to stand for it-
self, then each stands for the same thing. The substitu-
tion principle is, then, satisfied simply because there is
no codenotational substitute for an expression that occurs
in an ec-sentence. But why should we suppose that the ex-
pressionsstand for anything? After all, the substitution
principle would be satisfied in the same way--i.e., vacu-
ously--were we to suppose that a sentence (any sentence) is
about each and every expression occurring in the sentence.
This is surely absurd, for there seems to be a distinction
worth preserving here, namely, between saying that an ex-
pression stands for itself and saying that an expression
does not stand for anything at all.
On closer inspection, we uncovered a further prob-
lem with ec-sentences. Previously, we had found that
there could not be a distinct codenotational substitute
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for an expression flanking the ec-symbol. Then in section
5, we found that we could not even locate the expressions
flanking the ec-symbol. They had become welded to the whole
ec-sentence in a way that prevented us from logically pars-
ing the sentence into function-expression and argument-ex-
pressions.
Finally, we considered how ec-sentences fare in
arguments. An ec-sentence is supposed to express a rela-
tion which holds between the singular terms occurring at
either end of the ec-symbol: each singular term stands
for or denotes itself, and the sentence as a whole expresses
the circumstance that the one expression has the same con-
ceptual content as the other. The reason Frege understood
the singular terms to be standing for or denoting themselves
was that the conceptual content of an ec-sentence is affected
by the expressions occurring in it. Now, the conceptual
content of a sentence, recall, is that part of the content
of a sentence which counts for inference. Hence, one would
expect that the inferential relations an ec-sentence enters
into will be determined by the conceptual content of the
sentence, and so, by the singular terms which occur in the
sentence. However, the only way the singular terms con-
tributed to our logical treatment of the ec-sentence was in
determining whether one ec-sentence was the same as another
(in the sense of same sequence of expressions). We could
not formally capture those inferences which depended upon
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our intuitive understanding of ec.
The evidence, then, is overwhelming that the Bg
theory of identity is a failure. However, our criticisms
of the theory have turned on technical considerations, and
it is, therefore, not easy to understand where the theory
went wrong. In this final section, I should like to step
back and attempt to explain the error, and I shall do so
by examining a suggestion that has been advanced by some
commentators, namely, that the Bg account of identity is
circular or involves a vicious regress.
Recall the first clause of Frege's definition of
'FA-B', which was, with single quotes inserted appropriately,
(46) The symbol 'A' has the same conceptual content as
the symbol 'B'.
In The Principles of Mathematics, Russell remarked that,
if taken as a definition of identity, (46), "verbally at
least, suffers from circularity."3 8  Russell's brief, and
slightly hedged, criticism of Frege's Bg theory of identity
was fleshed out recently by David Wiggins, who argues that
(46) generates a vicious infinite regress:
Asking for the sense of 'a=b', I am told 'a' and 'b'
have the same content, or designate only one thing.
Unless something is said to justify calling a halt
here, the explanation generates a new statement of
the same form as the original explicandum--'The con-
tent or designatum of "a" = the contentor designatum
of "b".' Applying the same explanation to this we
get 'The content or designatum of "the content or
designatum of 'a'" = the content or designatum of
"the content or designatum of 'b'".' But evidently
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we can never reach in this way what seems to be
needed to carry the explanation through, a state-
ment only about signs. 39
However, it is not at all clear that Wiggins has
demonstrated that (46) generates a vicious infinite re-
gress. For it appears that he has misinterpreted ec as a
relation which holds between contents, not signs. In
Grundlagen, Frege noted:
instead of "the segments are identical in
length", we can say "the length of the segments is
identical" and instead of "the surfaces are
identical in color", "the color of the surfaces is
identical". 40
Following Frege's example, we could rephrase (46) to read,
(47) The conceptual content of the symbol 'A' is the same as
the conceptual content of the symbol 'B'.
The crucial step, however, would be to take (47) as
(48) The conceptual content of the symbol 'A' =the conceptual
content of the symbol 'B',
for (48) immediately reduces to
(49) A = B,
via the obvious identities,
(50) The conceptual content of the symbol 'A' = A,
and
(51) The conceptual content of the symbol 'B' = B.
So, were to interpret (46) as (48), ec turns out to be none
other than old-fashioned identity dressed in strange clothes.
Now, it appears that this is the way Wiggins has taken (46)
in the quoted paragraph, and, if so, then not only has he
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shot wide of his mark, but he has also failed to generate
the regress, because each sentence he comes up with is a
mere reformulation of the original. Following the examples
of (50) and (51), we find that 'the content or designatum
of "the content or designatum of 'a'"' denotes the same
thing as 'the content or designatum of "a"', which in
turn, denotes the same thing as 'a'. Applying this same
procedure to the expression 'the content or designatum of
"the content or designatum of 'b'"', Wiggins' convoluted
sentence, 'The content or designatum of "the content or
designatum of 'a'" = the content or designatum of "the con-
tent or designatum of 'b'"' just reduces to 'a=b'.
Although Wiggins' argument is inconclusive, I
think that he and Russell are on the right track. There
is something odd about (46), and this hunch is strengthened
by the fact we unearthed in section 5, namely, that ec-
sentences must be treated as unanalyzable wholes, thereby
preventing any general' account of ec. The apprehension
about (46) centers around the phrase 'the same conceptual
content' and takes the following rough form. (46) says
that the symbol 'A' and symbol 'B' have one and the same
conceptual content--i.e., that they have numerically the
same conceptual content. After all, had Frege meant that
they have qualitatively the same conceptual content, he
would have been explicating similarity or resemblance, but
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not identity. However, if, as Frege believed, identity
is inapplicable to contents, but only to signs, then the
phrase 'the same conceptual content' must be eliminable
in favor of some locution which expresses a relation which
holds between the signs standing for this conceptual con-
tent. Yet (46) is Frege's attempt to do precisely that
job, i.e., to express a relation which holds between the
signs 'A' and 'B'. Hence, the air of circularity hovering
about (46). But we have to make these intuitions more
precise, and to do so, we again take our cue from Grund-
lagen:
The judgment "line a is parallel to line b", or,
using symbols
a//b
can be taken as an identity. If we do this, we
obtain the concept of direction, and say: "the
direction of line a is identical with the
direction of line b". Thus we replace the symbol
// by the more generic symbol =, through removing
what is specific to the content of the former and
dividing it between a and b. We carve up the con-
tent in a way different from the original way,
and this yields us a new concept.4 1
Frege's remarks here coupled with those in the passage
quoted earlier suggest the following idea. The sentence,
(52) The direction of line a is identical with the
direction of line b,
might be logically analyzed in two different ways, each
of which assigns it the form (R(,8) '. We might, on the
one hand, understand (52) to say that the relation of
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identity holds between line-directions, in which case,
(52) would receive the following analysis:
(53) R: is the same as
a: the direction of line a
8: the direction of line b
Or, on the other hand, we might understand (52) to say that
the relation of sameness-of-direction holds between lines,
in which case it would receive the following analysis:
(54) R: the direction of is the same as the direction
of
a: line a
8: line b
There might, of course, be other reasons for preferring one
analysis to the other, but at this state, both are prima
facie plausible.
Parallel to this treatment of (52) there would be
two logical analyses of (47), each assigning it the form
(R(a,f8)3 :
(55) R: is the same as
a: the, conceptual content of the symbol 'A'
8: the conceptual content of the symbol 'B'
and
(56) R: The conceptual content of is the same as the
conceptual content of
a: the symbol 'A'
8: the symbol 'B'
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If we analyze (47) in the manner of (55), then (47) is
understood to express a relation which holds between the
conceptual content of the symbol 'A' and the conceptual
content of the symbol 'B', i.e., between A and B, namely,
identity. If, on the other hand, we analyze (47) in the
manner of (56), then (47) is understood to express a re-
lation which holds between the symbol 'A' and the symbol
'B', namely, the relation of having the same conceptual
content. Earlier, we had taken (47) in the manner of (55),
but, to be fair to Frege, we shall have to understand (47)
(or (46)) to be analyzed in the manner of (56), i.e., to
express an equivalence relation which holds between the
symbols 'A' and 'B'.
We are all familiar with equivalence relations.
Mathematically, an equivalence relation is a binary rela-
tion which is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive. An
equivalence relation defined over a set, S, partitions the
set into a family of pairwise disjoint subsets. Identity,
ordinarily understood, is also an equivalence relation, one
which an object bears only to itself, and so each subset
belonging to the family into which identity partitions S is
a singleton. Clearly, the equivalence relation having the
same conceptual content cannot be identity, for a given
singular term might bear this relation to a singular term
other than itself. That is, different, i.e., non-identical,
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singular terms might stand to one another in the relation
having the same conceptual content. However, this same-
ness or difference of singular terms must be understood
in terms of ec, and it is in this fact that we can locate
the circularity of (46).
Frege's claim is that identity must be construed
not as a relation which holds between contents, but as a
relation holding-between the terms that specify these con-
tents. However, in order to express the relation, we must
specify the terms themselves, and so, an ec-sentence ex-
presses an equivalence relation..holding between the items
denoted by the singular terms flanking the ec-symbol.
For example, the ec-sentence,
(46) The symbol 'A' has the same conceptual content as
the symbol 'B',
expresses the circumstance that an equivalence relation
holds between the items denoted by "the symbol 'A"' and
"the symbol 'B'". I would suppose that a minimal condition
for grasping the conceptual content of a given ec-sentence
is that one know which expressions occur in the sentence,
and, in particular, whether the expressions flanking the
ec-symbol are the same or different. Since thee.terms
flanking the ec-symbol stand for themselves, however, one
must therefore know whether the terms flanking the ec-
symbol stand for the same item or .not. Hence, in order to
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grasp the conceptual content of a given ec-sentence, we
must be able to determine whether the singular terms
flanking the ec-symbol stand for the same--i.e., identical
--item or not. In the case of (46), we. must be able to
determine whether the items denoted by the singular terms
"the symbol'A'" and "the symbol 'B'" are the same or not,
and hence we must be able to determine the truth-value of,
(57) The symbol 'A' = the symbol 'B'.
Identity, however, does not relate contents, but the
expressions that stand for them, and so, our determining
whether the singular terms flanking the ec-symbol stand
for the same item or not means that we shall have to de-
termine whether the singular terms themselves have the
same conceptual content. That is, (57) must be understood
to express an equivalence relation which holds between the
terms that denote the symbol 'A' and the symbol 'B'. But,
since in this context the terms are understood to stand
for themselves, the ec-sentence corresponding to (57) is
none other than
(46) The symbol 'A' has the same conceptual content as
the symbol 'B'.
Hence, in order to grasp the conceptual content of a given
ec-sentence we must already know it, and this is a very
small circle indeed.
It is for this reason, then, that we had to treat
an ec-sentence as an unanalyzable whole. We do not come to
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grasp the conceptual content of an ec-sentence by exer-
cising our knowledge of the conceptual content of the
parts of the sentence and the way in which the conceptual
contents of these parts combine to form the conceptual con-
tent of the whole. Rather, we come to grasp the concep-
tual content of a given ec-sentence in one fell swoop.
Each ec-sentence is, so to speak, sui generis.
We can sum up the results of our analysis of the
Bg theory of identity as follows. Sentences of the form
(a=BI are, by and large, informative, whereas sentences of
the form la=a0 never are. The reason seems to be that
( a) is a logical truth, whereas a=B-) need not be a logi-
cal truth. Were the Bg theory faithful to these facts,
sentences of the form %,-8' should be, by and large, in-
formative, whereas sentences of the form (•- ) should not.
Unfortunately, it turns out that no ec-sentence..is trivial,
because the important distinction between those ec-sentences
which are logically true and those which are not breaks
down.
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CHAPTER 3
FREGE'S SENSE/REFERENCE THEORY
1. Introduction
Frege's elegant SR solution to the Paradox of Iden-
tity can be seen as proceeding in two parts. First, he shows
the argument itself to be unsound: substitution of codenota-
tional singular terms preserves truth value, not, as had been
assumed in the argument, cognitive value. And from this cor-
rect substitution principle, together with the assumption
that "identity relates objects," it does not follow that
'o=oO and true ao=8' cannot differ in cognitive value. Sec-
ond, Frege offers an explanation for this difference in cog-
nitive value between -a=a% and true lo=B~. There is associ-
ated with each singular term, he says, besides its reference
(if it has one), also a sense, i.e., a particular way of pick-
ing out, presenting, or determining the reference; and just as
it is the reference of a singular term that is relevant for
determining the truth value [Warheitswerth] of a sentence
containing that term, so it is the sense of a singular term
that is relevant for determining the cognitive value [Erkennt-
niswerth] (literally, knowledge value) of a sentence contain-
ing that term. In so far, then, as a and 8 are singular
terms that have the same reference but different sense,
(a=0 will, like fa=al, be true, but fa=0 will be 83
informative in a way fa=aI is not.
When we found 'a=a' and 'a=b' to have different
cognitive values, the explanation is that for the
purpose of knowledge, the sense of the sentence,
viz., the thought expressed by. it, is no less
relevant than its reference, i.e. its truth value.
If now a=b, then indeed the reference of 'b' is
the same as that of 'a,' and hence the truth
value of 'a=b' is the same as that of 'a=a.' In
spite of this, the sense of 'b' may differ from
that of 'a,' and thereby the thought expressed
in 'a=b' differs from that of 'a=a.' In that
case the two sentences do not have the same
cognitive value. 1
Here, by way of illustration, is Frege's own
famous example. The true but trivial sentence,
(1) The evening star = the evening star,
can be obtained from the true, but far from trivial,
sentence,
(2) The evening star = the morning star,
by substituting 'the evening star' for 'the morning star'.
These two singular terms have the same reference, the
planet Venus, and, as is required by the substitution
principle for reference, (1) and (2) have the same truth
value. But (l) and (2) do not have the same cognitive
value: (1) is an instance of the Law of Identity, while
(2) expresses a significant astronomical discovery.
This difference in cognitive value between (1) and (2) is
attributed to the fact that, while 'the evening star' and
'the morning star' have the same reference, they do not
have the same sense: 'the evening star' picks out the
planet Venus as that bright object in the heavens
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appearing just over the horizon at dusk, while 'the
morning star' picks out the planet Venus as that bright
object in the heavens appearing just over the horizon at
dawn. That the bright object in the heavens appearing
just over the horizon at dusk is the same as the bright
object in the heavens appearing just over the horizon at
dawn is, of course, just what constitutes the great
astronomical discovery; and, according to Frege, that the
bright object in the heavens appearing just over the
horizon at dusk is.the same as the bright object in the
heavens appearing just over the horizon at dawn is just
what constitutes the cognitive content of (2), i.e., the
thought it expresses.
Frege's sharp distinction in SR between an
expression, its sense, and its reference, successfully
eliminates the logical difficulties of his Bg theory,
and it does not appear to have generated any similar
logical difficulties of its own. To be sure, a number of
philosophers have raised important questions about a
criterion for determining when two expressions have the
same sense; but the notorious difficulties in finding
such a criterion indicate a lack of clarity about the
notion of sense, not, as yet, any deep-rooted logical
incoherence. The only philosopher who has presented a
significant argument to show that the sense/reference
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distinction is logically incoherent is Russell. "The
whole distinction of meaning and denotation has been
wrongly conceived,"2 he claimed, for "we cannot succeed in
both preserving the connexion between meaning and
denotation and preventing them from being one and the
same." 3  But the "inextricable tangle" Russell claimed to
find in the sense/reference distinction appears to have
been of his own making: as has been amply demonstrated
by Church4 and Searle, 5 Russell's argument is riddled with
confusion between use and mention, and nobody has been
able to present a comprehensible reconstruction of his
reasoning.
The likelihood of finding logical difficulties with
the SR theory comparable to those we had found with Frege's
Bg theory, then,is rather small; and so we immediately
move to the question of the adequacy of his explanation of
the difference in cognitive value between fa=ao and true
ra=$\. Here, I think it would be fair to say that Frege's
SR explanation is widely believed to be the correct one,
save for one very important exception, namely, when a and
B are proper names.
Briefly, the problem is this. According to Frege,
the sense of a singular term determines its reference.
When our singular term is a definite description, the way
in which sense determines reference is readily grasped:
the referent of, say, 'the 37th president of the United
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States' is Richard Nixon, for he is the unique individual
possessing the properties specified in the description.
But when our singular term is a proper name, it is not so
obvious how the sense determines the reference. Frege
almost invariably gives as the sense of a proper name some
definite description, and, although it is debatable
whether this was in fact his view, Frege has been widely
believed to have held, like Russell, that proper names
are simply abbreviations for definite descriptions. Now,
if proper names are disguised descriptions, then, of
course, the way in which sense determines reference for
proper names will be essentially the same as the way in
which sense determines reference for definite descriptions.
But the view that proper names are simply disguised
descriptions is not particularly convincing; and, in so
far as this view of proper names appears to be required
by his proposed solution to the paradox, many philosophers
have to this extent been unhappy with Frege's solution.
There are two sorts of criticism of Frege's view
of proper names. On the one hand, philosophers like
Searle 6 and Dummett7 believe Frege's notion of sense for
proper names to be too rigid to capture adequately the
use of proper names in ordinary language, and they have
proposed that instead of supposing a proper name to be
associated with a single criterion for identifying the
reference, that one view the name rather as being
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associated with a cluster of such criteria. This
criticism of Frege, however, is seen, both by Frege's
critics as well as his defenders, as not essentially
involving any philosophically important change in the
view of proper names; it is taken, rather, in the spirit
of an emendation. On the other hand, we have those
philosophers in the tradition of Mill, who mark a sharp
distinction between proper names and definite
descriptions; on this view, proper names have no meaning
(in the sense of connotation), but serve simply as labels
or tags for the things to which they have been assigned.
Mill's view has been out of fashion for many years, for
two basic reasons: (1) on Mill's view, unlike Frege's,
there is no explanation of how the reference of a proper
name is determined; and (2), on Mill's view, unlike
Frege's, there is no explanation of the difference in
cognitive value between f=.a and true C=$¼, when a and
8 are proper names. Recently, however, Mill's view of
proper names has been championed in a new and interesting
manner by Saul Kripke. Kripke has addressed himself
directly to both of the points just mentioned; I will
consider the first point in the present chapter, and the
second point in the next chapter.
I will proceed in this chapter as follows. First,
I will trace the connections between the Bg theory and the
SR theory, showing how the latter evolved from the former.
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Second, I will outline some of the main points of the SR
theory. And lastly, I will consider Kripke's attack on
what he calls the "Frege-Russell description theory of
proper names" as well as Dummett's defense of the theory.
I will argue in this last section that Dummett has failed
to defend Frege adequately against Kripke's criticisms.
2. Bestimmungsweisen and Frege's Criticism of the Bg
Theory
There remains one very important element of the Bg
theory yet to consider: the Bestimmungsweise, i.e., the
mode of determination, of an object.
As we reconstructed the Bg theory in the last
chapter, Frege held that a sentence stands for or denotes
a thought [content] and that the parts of the sentence, in
turn, stand for or denote corresponding parts of the
thought. We noted, however, that Frege deviated from this
scheme when it came to singular terms, for he held that a
singular term denotes not, say, something like Carnap's
individual concept, but rather the object itself; and this
deviation led to difficulty when he attempted to account
for the informativeness of i-sentences. He could not
regard identity in the usual manner, namely, as a relation
holding between objects, because the substitution principle
required that replacement of one singular term by another
codenotational singular term preserve conceptual content,
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and so, where a and are distinct singular terms, the
true i-sentence (a=81 would have the same conceptual
content as the logically true ~a=al. However, Frege
struck on the idea of taking identity to be a relation
holding between expressions. Thus, if a and are
distinct singular terms, ~aEa and true a.-8a would not
have the same conceptual content, for where the content
denoted by raE-1 would have R as a constituent, the
content denoted by laE-a would have a as a constituent.
On the other hand, since singular terms stand for their
ordinary contents in all other contexts, the
substitution principle would appear to be satisfied
because if (aE 8c is true, then a and have the same
conceptual content.
This is how we presented the Bg theory in the last
chapter. We then went on to show that the superficial
appearance of success was deceptive and that the
proposed solution of the Paradox of Identity failed.
However, the Bg theory was a bit more complicated
than we had indicated, and thus our reconstruction was
somewhat inaccurate. We said that Frege had attributed
the informativeness of an i-sentence to the difference in
the singular terms flanking the identity sign, whereas he
had actually attributed the informativeness to the
difference in the way each of the terms determines its
content. Hence, although he construed identity as ec,
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i.e., as relating expressions, it was the Bestimmungsweisen
associated with expressions he was really after.
Much of the bulk of Frege's discussion of ec was
devoted to the notion of Bestimmungsweise, and it was aimed
precisely at dispelling the impression that ec was solely
concerned with expressions. Thus, immediately after
introducing the ec-symbol and explaining the unusual
convention that the terms at either end of the ec-symbol
were to stand for themselves, Frege noted:
At first sight this makes it appear as though it
were here a matter of something pertaining only
to expression, not to thought; as though we had
no need of two symbols for the same content, and
therefore no need of a symbol for equality of
content either. 1 0
Frege was anxious, then, lest the- reader believe that ec
was only incidentally, if at all, connected with thought;
for, were this so, there would seem to be little need for
the ec-symbol in what was supposed to be a formula
language of pure thought.
Frege had good reason to be apprehensive on this
score, for a strong prima facie case can be developed
against including the ec-symbol in his Begriffsschrift.
Consider: if a and 8 have the same conceptual content,
then Sa and Sa/S also have the same conceptual content,
excepting, of course, when Sc is an ec-sentence. It would
seem, then, to be of no logical consequence whether we use
the one term or the other in a given sentence, excepting,
91
again, an ec-sentence. But faEal and (ar58 differ in
conceptual content (if a and B are distinct signs) only
because of what now appears to be the purely ad hoc device
of having a and 8 stand for themselves. The information thus
obtained is of very limited applicability--limited, that
is, to ec-sentences: were we to excise the ec-symbol,
the remainder of the logical symbolism would be
indifferent to c and codenotational S. A comparison here
with Frege's treatment of the active/passive distinction
in Bg is quite telling. Since each one of an active/
passive pair of sentences has the same conceptual content
as the other, Frege ignored this grammatical distinction
in his Begriffsschrift and symbolized each in the same way.
Why didn't he adhere to this practice for sentences which
differ only in that where the one contains a the other
contains codenotational 8? The difference in singular
terms fails to reflect a difference in conceptual content,
so the indicated course would be to ignore the trivial
difference in formulation, symbolize each in the same way,
and thus eliminate the need for the ec-symbol altogether.
The assumption apparently underlying this
objection is that names are meaningless marks, arbitrarily
chosen labels or tags which simply stand for objects but
otherwise carry no meaning; and it is this assumption
Frege rejected in Bg. Instead, he urged:
92
. . . different names for the same content are not
always just a trivial matter of formulation; if
they go along with different ways of determining
the content, they are relevant to the essential
nature of the case.11
That is, Frege denied that the whole significance of a
name is captured by specifying its content: a name does
not merely stand for its content, it also goes along with
a particular way of determining this content. Frege
illustrated this as follows. Fix a point, A, lying on
the circumference of a given circle and pass a straight
line through A, extending the line so that it intersects
with the circle. This point of intersection, which we
will call 'B'. obviously depends upon the position of the
straight, line, so that as the line is rotated about A, B
varies accordingly.
We may now ask: What point corresponds to the
position of the straight line in which it is
perpendicular to the diameter? The answer will
be: The point A. The name B thus has in this
case the same content as the name A; and yet we
could not antecedently use just one name, for
only the answer to the question justified our
doing so. The same point is determined in a
double way:
(1) It is directly given in experience
[Anschauung];
(2) It is given as the point B corresponding to
the straight line's being perpendicular to the
diameter.12
One moral of this example is that, unlike the active/
passive case where sameness of conceptual content is
immediate, it is not always obvious whether two singular
terms, a and 8, happen to have the same conceptual content
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(and so, it is not always obvious whether Sc and Sa/B
have the same conceptual content. But this is only part
of the story. For, since we can generate additional
names for a given object as whim dictates, these names
differing only trivially in formulation, then the non-
obviousness might be attributed to the unpredictable
creativity of the language-using community. The main
point Frege wishes to establish, I take it, is that a
singular term carries with it something, a Bestimmungsweise,
which enables us to reason out whether, given a particular
object, the term stands for it, and thus to reason out
whether the term stands for the same object as does some
other singular term. This, then, provides the link
between names and thought. In the example, the same point
is determined in two different ways, and the nontrivial
fact that the same point is determined in each of these
two different ways is, as I understand it, adequately
expressed by the true ec-sentence 'AEB'.
Finally, now, Frege sums up the connection between
names, Bestimmungsweisen, and ec:
The need of a symbol for equality of content thus
rests on the following fact: The same content can
be fully determined in different ways; and that,
in a particular case, the same content actually is
given by two ways of determinilng it, is the content
of a judgment. Before this judgmet is made, we
must supply, corresponding to the two ways of
determination, two different names for the thing
thus determined. The judgment needs to be
expressed by means of a symbol for equality of
content, joining the two names together. 1 3
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(Another reason Frege offered for including the ec-symbol
in his Begriffsschrift was that it would be needed to
introduce definitions, but this was only a "superficial
reason. ")
Those who are already familiar with the SR theory
will immediately recognize the resemblance between the Bg
notion of Bestimmungsweise and the SR notion of an Art des
Gegebenseins or Darstellungsweise, i.e., way in which an
object is given or presented, this latter being the active
ingredient of an expression's sense [Sinn]. Indeed,
Frege's example in SR of an object's being presented in
different ways could easily have served in Bg as an example
of an object's being determined in different ways:
Let a, b, c be the lines connecting the vertices of
a triangle with the midpoints of the opposite sides.
The point of intersection of a and b is then the
same as the point of intersection of b and c. So
we have different designations for the same point,
and these names ('point of intersection of a and
b,' 'point of intersection of b and c') likewise
Indicate the mode of presentation; and hence the
statement contains actual knowledge.1 4
This similarity with the SR theory can be pushed still
further. Thus, as in SR, where Frege distinguished
between that which a term stands for, its reference
[Bedeutung] , and that which the term expresses [Ausdrucken],
its sense, so in Bg Frege distinguished between that which
a term stands for, its content, and that which the term
goes along with [Entsprechenden], a Bestimmungsweise. And,
again, as in SR, where Frege distinguished between that
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which identity relates and that wherein the information
conveyed by an i-sentence resides, so in Bg, it now
appears that although identity is to relate the terms
flanking the identity sign, the information is to be that
the same content is given by two ways of determining it.
I readily concede that the status of
Bestimmungsweisen within the Bg theory is problematic--
in fact, I shall argue below that they cannot carry the
load Frege assigned to them--and I also admit to some
exaggeration in seeking parallels between the Bg and SR
theories. But I take this license because it has gone
largely unnoticed that Frege had such a notion in. Bg, and
thus a widespread misconception has developed about the
Bg theory and about Frege's reasons for rejecting it. It
is commonly believed that Frege had attributed the
informativeness of an i-sentence in Bg to the difference
in the terms flanking the identity sign; that he became
disenchanted with the Bg account because on close analysis
it turned out that the information thus conveyed could
only be of the arbitrary conventions of the language-using
community; that he subsequently discovered (some years
after Bg) that a term has, besides its denotation, a sense,
whose connection with the denotation is not a matter of
convention; and that this discovery allowed him, in SR, to
locate the "actual" or "proper" knowledge conveyed by an
i-sentence in the difference in the senses of the terms
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flanking the identity sign.
Obviously, this story cannot be correct. For, as
we have just seen, (1) Frege already had a notion in Bg,
that of a Bestimmungsweise, corresponding roughly to the
SR notion of sense; (2) he had attributed the informative-
ness of an i-sentence in Bg to the difference in the
Bestimmungsweisen associated with the expressions flanking
the identity sign, not merely to the difference in the
expressions alone; and (3), he had introduced
Bestimmungsweisen precisely to counter the charge that he
had trivialized i-sentences by construing identity as ec.
Clearly, then, our omission of the notion of
Bestimmungsweise in the last chapter is no reflection of
the weight Frege attached to it, either in Bg or in later
writings. Our decision to leave the matter until now was
based largely on the following reason. We wanted to show
that the Bg idea of taking identity to be a relation
holding between expressions was simply incoherent, and we
did not want the argument cluttered up by considerations
that would inevitably arise as a result of injecting the
notion of Bestimmungsweise into the discussion. This was
particularly important because received opinion faults
the Bg theory for making identity too dependent upon
linguistic convention, and we wanted to make it clear that
the grounds for rejecting the Bg theory are much closer
to hand.
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Typical examples of this received view are
[Linsky] Nor is Frege able to accept the other of
the two alternatives, that identity is a relation
between names or signs of objects. Then 'a=b'
would just say that the name 'a' and the name 'b'
are names for the same thing. This analysis can-
not be correct, Frege argues, because the fact
that 'a' is a name for a and that 'b' is also a
name for a results from a purely arbitrary
agreement concerning the use of these marks (or
sounds). Furthermore, when I say that Venus is
the morning star I am conveying information about
the heavens, not about our arbitrary use of
signs. 15
IKneale] As we have seen, Frege suggested that a
statement of identity must really be about the
expressions appearing on the two sides of the
identity sign, and he tried to make this clear by
saying that '-' was to be understood as a symbol
for identity of content between expressions. But
he came to see later that this was not a
satisfactory solution of the puzzle. For he
realized that if the original statement [that the
morning star is identical with the evening star]
was not really about the planet Venus, but about
the contents of certain phrases, it would belong
to philology rather than toastronomy, which is
obviously not the case, since the discovery of
the identity of the morning star and the evening
star was made by observation and calculation, not
by reflection on the use of words.1 6
This criticism of the Bg theory goes, roughly: if a
sentence expresses a relation holding between expressions
rather than what those expressions stand for, then the
sentence conveys no information about what those
expressions stand for, but only about the expressions
themselves, and since 'Venus = the morning star' conveys
information about Venus and the morning star, '=' cannot
relate the expressions 'Venus' and 'the morning star'
Yet, surely we are sufficiently sophisticated in the
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techniques of modern philosophy, e.g., shifting between
material and formal mode, semantic ascent, etc., to doubt
the premise of the criticism. The relation denotes the
same thing as clearly relates expressions, not what
expressions stand for, and yet the sentence ''Venus'
denotes the same thing as 'the morning star'' serves, in
certain circumstances, to convey information about the
heavens, and in other circumstances, to convey information
about words. Again, Linsky's claim that "the fact that
'a' is a name for a and that 'b' is also a name for a
results from a purely arbitrary agreement concerning the
use of these marks" is false. It might be arbitrarily
agreed that 'a' names a and arbitrarily agreed that 'b'
names b, yet although 'a' and 'b' name the same thing, it
would be a flagrant intensional fallacy to conclude that
it was arbitrarily agreed that 'a' and 'b' name the same
thing. Linsky saddles Frege with this argument, but I
find it hard to believe that Frege would commit just this
kind of error when spelling out the SR theory.
The Linsky-Kneale criticism, however, is doubly
wrong: not only is the argument weak, but the Bg theory
is misrepresented in the way noted earlier. Linsky and
Kneale both give the impression that Frege had supposed in
Bg that the informativeness of an i-sentence resides
simply in the difference in the terms flanking the
identity sign; and this, we have seen, is not so. Their
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free use of 'about' blurs the distinction Frege had
attempted to draw in Bg, viz. that although identity is to
be taken to be a relation holding between the terms
flanking the identity sign, so that, if you like, an
i-sentence is, in a sense, about the terms flanking the
identity sign, the judgment expressed by an informative
i-sentence is to be that the same content is given by two
ways of determining it, so that, if you like, an i-sentence
is, in another sense, about the ways of determining this
content. This distinction is, I admit, not very clearly
drawn in Bg, and it might be that Frege could not carry it
through; but this requires argument--argument which Linsky
and Kneale are incapable of supplying just because they
fail to acknowledge the distinction Frege was groping for.
There is, then, little to recommend this criticism
of the Bg theory, and I speculate that many, recognizing
the weakness of this criticism, have been inclined to
believe that the Bg theory was salvageable. I hope I have
disinclined them. But, to allay any lingering doubt, we
must show that our ignoring of Bestimmungsweisen in the
last chapter in no way affects our case there against the
Bg theory. So, we now argue that although Frege wished
to attribute the informativeness of i-sentences to
Bestimmungsweisen, these Bestimmungsweisen cannot be
integrated into the general semantic structure of Bg and
thus they are only a frill.
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If, as Frege maintained in Bg, the informative
identities were those in which the terms corresponded to
different Bestimmungsweisen, why didn't he take identity
to relate Bestimmungsweisen? All he need do, it would
seem, is stipulate that the expressions flanking the
identity sign stand for their Bestimmungsweisen--not for
their ordinary contents and not for themselves. Then,
identity would be construed as an equivalence relation
holding between Bestimmungsweisen, so that, e.g., the
i-sentence
Mark Twain is identical with Samuel Clemens
would be understood as
The Bestimmungsweise associated with 'Mark Twain'
determines the same content as the
Bestimmungsweise associated with 'Samuel Clemens';
and this would conform to his desire that an ec-sentence
express the judgment that "the same content actually is
given by two ways of determining it." The fact is,
however, that Frege did not do this, and he did not
explain why, though my guess is that he did not think of
Bestimmungsweisen as parts of conceptual contents, but
rather as intermediaries between signs and their contents
Ca consequence, I think, of the confusion in the notion of
Inhalt: the most likely place for Bestimmungsweisen in
conceptual contents had already been reserved for the
objects denoted). And so, instead of this direct approach
to Bestimmungsweisen, Frege construed identity as ec, i.e.,
as a relation holding between expressions, hoping thereby
to get at the Bestimmungsweisen indirectly via the signs
they go along with. But it is not clear that he
succeeded. For, the conceptual content of %E=81 differs
from the conceptual content of &-Ea if a and 8 are
distinct terms, whatever the Bestimmungsweisen. That is,
an ec-sentence turns out to be informative so long as the
expressions differ, and there is, thus, no distinction
between those cases where a and $ correspond to the same
Bestimmungsweise and those cases where they do not.
Conceptual content is all Frege deems of importance
in Bg, and since Bestimmungsweisen are not parts of
conceptual contents, there is just no room for them in the
Bg semantic structure. Thus, we have just seen that
Bestimmungsweisen are irrelevant to the semantic
interpretation of ec-sentences. And, if we now look at
sentences that do not contain the ec symbol, we find that
Frege is faced with a dilemma. Where d(a)=d(8), but the
Bestimmungsweise associated with a is different from the
Bestimmungsweise associated with B, either So and Sa/8
have the same conceptual content or they do not. If So
and Sc/5 have the same conceptual content, then, as far as
inference is concerned, and this is, recall, the sole
interest of Bg, it makes no difference whether the
Bestimmungsweisen a and 8 correspond to are the same or
different. On the other hand, if Sc and Sa/8 differ in
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conceptual content, then the substitution principle would
be violated.
Summing up, now, we have so far in this section
attempted to establish the following points: first, that
Frege had a notion of Bestimmungsweise in Bg which
corresponds roughly to the SR notion of Darstellungsweise
and to which Frege attached great importance; second, that,
unfortunately, the notion of Bestimmungsweise turned out
to be an idle excrescence of the theory; and third, that
the fact that Frege had such a notion in Bg indicates much
greater continuity between the Bg and SR theories than has
hitherto been recognized by Frege's commentators. In the
remainder of this section, we shall develop this last
point and propose a reconstruction of how the SR theory
grew out of the shortcomings of the Bg theory.
Frege had discarded the Bg theory of identity as
early as Grundlagen. Given the view he defended in
Grundlagen, namely, that numbers are logical objects, and
given the key role identity plays in his definition of
Cardinal Number, it is evident that he had to regard
identity as a relation holding between objects. Had he
persisted with the Bg idea of regarding identity as a
relation holding between expressions (e.g., between
numerals rather than numbers), he would, for example, have
had a very difficult time distinguishing his own view from
the naive formalism of Heine and Thomae which he attacked
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so vigorously. Indeed, I think that it was Frege's
rejection of formalism in mathematics which led him to
appreciate the distinction between sign and thing
signified, and thus to the rejection of the Bg theory of
identity. Yes, oddly, Frege does not criticize, let alone
mention, the Bg theory in Grundlagen. He doesn't even
acknowledge any tension between the view that identity
relates objects and the fact that i-sentences can be
informative, and this despite his obviously having been
aware of the tension, and, moreover, despite his having
rested some of the fundamental theses of Grundlagen, e.g.,
the rejection of contextual definition and the explanation
of how "the empty forms of logic come to disgorge so rich
a content" in arithmetic, on the'fact that i-sentences can
be informative. Also, Frege gives only the barest account
of this informativeness:
Why is it, after all, that we are able to make use
of identities with such significant results in
such divers fields? Surely it is rather because
we are able to recognize something as the same
again even although it is given in a different
way .17
We are, by now, acquainted with the family of notions to
which this being given in a particular way belongs, but
Frege says little about it in Grundlagen, and it is
doubtful whether we can identify this being given in a
particular w• either with the Bg Bestimmungsweise or the
SR Darstellungsweise. For, Frege was in between theories
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in Grundlagen. He had overcome the use/mention confusion
of Bg sufficiently to convince himself that the Bg account
of identity was incorrect, but he had not yet penetrated
the confusion in the Bg notion of Inhalt to formulate the
sense/reference distinction (and to this extent, his
understanding of the use/mention distinction was impaired).
Thus, Grundlagen is rife with confusion between meaning
and reference, as we see in this typical passage in which
it is impossible to determine whether the alternative to
a symbol's being empty is that it have a reference, that
it have a sense, or both:
Everyone who uses words or mathematical symbols
makes the claim that they mean something [sie
etwas bedeuten], and no one will expect any
sense [etwas Sinnvolles] to emerge from empty
symbols. But it is possible for a mathematician
to perform quite lengthy calculations without
understanding by his symbols anything
intuitable, or with which we could be sensibly
acquainted. And that does not mean that the
symbols have no sense [sinnloss]; we still
distinguish between the symbols themselves and
their content [Inhalt], even though it may be
that the content [Inhalt] can only be grasped
by their aid. We realize perfectly that other
symbols might have been arranged to stand for
the same things. 1 8
Still, Frege's failure to come to grips with the Bg theory
of identity in Grundlagen remains something of a mystery
to me. The only plausible explanation I have been able to
come up with is this. Though he was convinced that it
could be consistently maintained both that i-sentences can
be informative and that identity relates objects, he was,
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due to his confusion about Inhalt, unable to provide a
detailed alternative to the Bg theory, so he eschewed all
theoretical discussion about the matter in Grundlagen and
simply asserted what he was sure was true, secure that the
theoretical underpinnings would be forthcoming after
further analysis.
At any rate, it is not until SR, by which time
Frege had honed his function/argument analysis and
distilled out of the crude Bg Inhalt a sense and a
reference, that he confronts the Bg theory of identity.
Here is the famous opening passage from SR:
Equality gives rise to challenging questions which
are not altogether easy to answer. Is it a
relation? A relation between objects, or between
names or signs of objects? In my Begriffsschrift
I assumed the latter. The reasons which seem to
favour this are the following. [Here follows
Frege's version of the Paradox of Identity quoted
in the last chapter.] What is intended to be
said by a=b seems to be that the signs or names
'a' and 'b' designate the same thing, so that
those signs themselves would be under discussion;
a relation between them would be asserted. But
this relation would hold between the names or
signs only in so far as they named or designated
something. It would be mediated by the connexion
of each of the two signs with the same designated
thing. But this is arbitrary. Nobody can be
forbidden to use any arbitrarily producible event
or object as a sign for something. In that case
the sentence a=b would no longer refer to the
subject matter, but only to its mode of designa-
tion; we would express no proper knowledge by its
means. But in many cases this is just what we
want to do. If the sign 'a' is distinguished
from the sign 'b' only as object (here, by means
of its shape), not as sign (i.e. not by the
manner in which it designates something), the
cognitive value of a=a becomes essentially equal
to that of a=b, provided a=b is true. A
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difference can arise only if the difference
between the signs corresponds to a difference
in the mode of presentation of that which is
designated. 1 9
This passage is, I recognize, very important, but,
regrettably, my discussion will be somewhat disappointing.
For, I find this passage very perplexing. It certainly
looks as though Frege is criticizing the Bg theory here,
but I am not clear what this criticism is--if it is
criticism at all, for at times I see in this passage
merely a rehearsal of the reasons Frege required
Bestimmungsweisen to complete the Bg account of identity.
This latter reading is,. no doubt, incorrect, but it is due,
in large measure, to Frege's misrepresenting of the Bg
theory here. He gives the impression that in Bg he had
located the informativeness of an i-sentence solely in the
difference in the terms flanking the identity sign, and he
then goes on to criticize this account for failing to
recognize that the informativeness is to be attributed
rather to the difference in the way the terms present their
denotata. But, as we are now well aware, Frege had gone
over much the same territory in Bg when he urged that the
interesting and informative identities were those in which
the different terms coincided with different
Bestimmungsweisen. This is not to say, by the way, that
I approve, or even understand, Frege's arguments for this
claim; but only that one point Frege clearly wishes to
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establish here, viz. that the informativeness of an
i-sentence resides in the difference in the way the
objects are presented or determined and not simply in the
difference in the terms, is a point Frege had not only
granted but explicitly argued for in Bg. So, if this
passage does contain Frege's criticism of the Bg theory,
something more must be going on. And, indeed, there is a
second issue which occupies Frege through most of the
passage (but which he does not clearly separate), namely:
Can the interpretation of identity, whereby it is taken
to be a relation holding between expressions, adequately
capture differences in the way in which an object is
presented or determined? We, supposing that Frege is
criticizing the Bg theory here, expect a forthright
negative answer to this question. Unhappily, the text
seems inconclusive; the first half of the passage indicates
that the answer is, "No," but the second half appears to
leave .. open the door to such an interpretation if the
expressions are treated as signs rather than as shapes.
Thus, my perplexity.
Yet, I should like to think that Frege is
criticizing the Bg theory in this passage, and I shall
hazard a suggestion that his intention here is to establish
the following two points: first, that the informativeness
of an i-sentence derives from the difference in the way the
terms flanking the identity sign present their denotata;
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and second, that these modes of presentation must be dealt
with directly rather than, as in Bg, indirectly through
intermediary expressions. There is no question that Frege
is arguing for the first point, and so only the second
requires comment. My reasons for thinking that Frege is
arguing for this latter point are: (1) it indicates
recognition of the failure of the Bg theory to adequately
incorporate Bestimmungsweisen into the semantic analysis
of ec-sentences and thus, given the first point, cause to
reject the Bg theory; (2) it marks the crucial difference
in the way the Bg theory handles Bestimmungsweisen and
the SR theory handles Darstellungsweisen; and (3), it
makes sense out of the sign/shape distinction Frege
introduces at the end of the passage. We saw earlier in
this section that Bestimmungsweisen was irrelevant to the
semantic analysis of ec-sentences because fra-E and true
ag-~E would differ in conceptual content so long as a and
6 are distinct terms, whether they determine the object
in the same way or in different ways. So, for example,
'1-1' and 'l'-I would differ in conceptual content
because of the trivial notational difference between the
Roman 'I' and the Arabic '1'. What is desired,
presumably, is that such trivial differences in shape be
ignored so that faE-a and true (•-QE differ in conceptual
content only when a and 8 determine the object differently.
But were we to ignore these differences in shape, i.e.,
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were we to regard a and as signs, it is doubtful whether
we could any longer regard ec as an equivalence relation
holding between expressions. For, if '1-1' and 'l-I' are
to have the same conceptual content, '1' and 'I' would
have to stand for the same thing in this context; and,
since '1' and 'I' are distinct expressions, they could not
stand for themselves but only for what they have in common,
namely, the way in which they determine the object. Ec
would thus turn out to be an equivalence relation holding
between Bestimmungsweisen rather than expressions. So,
the original motivation for taking identity to relate
expressions rather than objects has been undercut.
Of course, our discussion here has been an attempt
only at determining what Frege is arguing for in this
passage. The arguments themselves have not been touched,
and they will remain that way. I find it very difficult
to reproduce Frege's arguments here, for a number of major
issues are run together and the reasoning is so sketchy.
And, again, I have the example of Linsky and Kneale before
me, who, in rushing in, have made Frege look so foolish.
Any adequate discussion of this passage would entail an
examination of Frege's arguments against formalism,20 and
also a discussion of the fundamental question about what
is and what is not to count as a purely linguistic matter.
I should like to avoid this issue here. By and large, my
stance in the present chapter will be to evaluate the SR
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theory assuming that Frege has made this distinction.
Returning, now, to the main theme, my suggestion
is that Frege was aware of the difficulties in integrating
Bestimmungsweisen and conceptual contents in the Bg theory
and that the SR solution was, essentially, to split up the
Bg conceptual content into a thought and a truth value.
Starting with the Bg conceptual content denoted by Sa,
Frege removed the object denoted by a and placed in its
stead the Bestimmungsweise going along with a, or, more
accurately, its descendent, the sense of a, and the result
of this transplant is the sense of Sc, a thought [Gedanke].
He then extended the relation between a singular term and
its Bestimmungsweise to hold generally between any
expression and its sense, so that a sentence expresses--
not denotes--a thought, and the parts of the sentence, in
turn, express parts of the thought. The object denoted by
a, on the other hand, i.e., the reference of a, is not a
part of the thought expressed by Sa, but rather combines
with the reference of the remainder of St (i.e., the
sentence fragment resulting from deletion of a in Sa) to
result in the reference of Sa, which Frege took to be the
truth value of St. And, whereas we had only one
substitution principle in Bg, we now have two. In general,
substitution of coexpressional terms, i.e., terms
expressing the same sense, preserves sense; substitution
of codenotational terms preserves reference. In particular,
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substitution of coexpressional singular terms in a sentence
leaves the thought unchanged, i.e., preserves cognitive
value; and substitution of codenotational singular terms in
a sentence preserves truth value.
On the SR account, then, an i-sentence, l=B
receives the following semantic analysis. '=' denotes a
relation, being identical with, which holds between d(a)
and d(a) if and only if (a=c B is true. Thus, identity
relates objects, and, according to the substitution
principle for reference, efa=a and true f=8 ~ have the
same reference, namely, the truth value, True. The
cognitive value of fa=8a, however, is to be found in the
thought expressed. Thus, a and B each express a sense,
and '=' expresses an equivalence relation (a sense-
function, as Jackson calls it21 ) holding between the sense
of a and the sense of 8, viz. being a sense of the same
object as. So, although *a=al and true fa=8a have the
same reference, they would express different thoughts if
a and 8 expressed different senses. Thus, in SR Frege is
at last able to get the equivalence relation holding
between modes of presentation, which he could not manage
in Bg.
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3. The Sense/Reference Theory
Frege's Sense/Reference theory is well known, and
so I shall restrict myself in this section only to its most
significant features.
Whereas in Bg, Frege had responded to the Paradox of
Identity by rejecting the view that an i-sentence, (a=81, is
about d(a) and d(8), in SR Frege rejects the substitution
principle which takes the informational or cognitive value of
a sentence as invariant under substitution of codenotational
singular terms. Instead, Frege now takes only the truth
value of the sentence as the invariant property. We shall
formulate the new substitution principle provisionally as
follows:
(III). If d(a)=d(B), then Saand Sa/B have the same truth
value.
Underlying this substitution principle is a fundamental meta-
physical law: if an object x is identical with an object y,
then any property of x is equally a property of y, i.e.,
(IV) If x=y, then every property of x is equally a property
of y.
(III) and (IV) are both commonly referred to in the litera-
ture as Leibniz' Law. We shall not follow this practice here,
however, because, aside from the questionable attribution to
Leibniz, it obscures the fact that (III) and (IV) are dis-
tinct principles. (IV) cannot plausibly be denied. For, in-
tuitively, to suppose that x is one and the same thing as y,
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and yet to suppose further, that x has a property y lacks
(or conversely), would be, in effect, to suppose that one and
the same thing both has and lacks the given property.
(III), on the other hand, is not so firmly grounded. Here is
Quine's well known counterexample.
(3) Cicero = Tully,
and
(4) 'Cicero' has six letters,
are both true. Hence, d('Cicero')=d('Tully'), so by (III),
replacement of 'Cicero' by 'Tully' in (4) ought to result in
a true sentence. But
(5) 'Tully' has six letters,
is false; 'Tully' only has five letters.
Quine's case is a counterexample to (III) only, not
to (IV). We would have a counterexample here to (IV) only if
(4) and (5) both ascribed the same property to the same ob-
ject, one truly and the other falsely. But, on the most nat-
ural interpretation, (4) and (5) ascribe the same property to
different objects. For, (3) says that the man Cicero is iden-
tical with the man Tully, while (4) says that the name 'Cic-
ero' has six letters, and (5), that the name 'Tully' has six
letters. Now, a man is not, in general, identical with his
name (or names); and, indeed, although (3) is true,
(6) 'Cicero' = 'Tully',
is false. Were (6) true, i.e., were the name 'Cicero' iden-
tical with the name 'Tully', then, according to (IV), any
property of the one would have to be a property of the
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other. But, (6) is not true, and certainly, (IV) does not
require that distinct objects need have all their
properties in common. So, since the name 'Cicero' is not
the same object as the name 'Tully', there is no conflict
with (IV) arising from the fact that 'Cicero' has a
property, viz. having six letters, which 'Tully' lacks.
Of course, although we have supplied an inter-
pretation on which Quine's case is seen to be consistent
with (IV), we have not thereby shown that there is no
interpretation on which it would conflict with (IV); and
so, further assurance might be requested. But what
reason remains for persisting in this direction? Only,
as far as can be determined, the occurrence of the name
'Cicero' in (4) and the name 'Tully' in (5); for one might
be inclined to suppose that (4) must therefore be about
Cicero and (5) about Tully. The operative assumption here
is that if a sentence contains a singular term, then that
sentence must be about that which the singular term stands
for, either ascribing a property to the object or
expressing that it is one of the relata in some n-ary
relation; in short, the assumption is,
(V) Sc is of d(a).
Assuming CV), (4) would receive the following analysis:
the name 'Cicero' denotes the man Cicero, and the remainder
of the sentence, viz.
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(7) ' ' has six letters,
stands for the property ascribed to Cicero. And
similarly for (5): the property denoted by (7) is ascribed
to the man Tully. So, since (3) is true, we would have
that (4) and (5) both ascribed the same property to the
same object.
Whether we have a counterexample to (IV), however,
is still unclear, for what has yet to be shown is that
C41 and (5) differ in truth value on this interpretation.
We had originally agreed that (4) was true and (5) false,
but that was based on the original interpretation and it
cannot, without argument, be assumed here. Until we are
told what property (7) is alleged to stand for, then, we
must suspend judgment about truth value. But this is a
minor point. The real interest in the case attaches to
CV), because (V) is the link between (III) and (IV): if
(IV) and (V) are both true, then (III) must also be true.
And, since we have established that (III) is false, one
(at least) of (IV) or (V) must therefore be false. Now,
what has been suggested in the last paragraph is that
(V) is true, and thus (IV) is false. But (IV), as we
saw earlier, is among the most fundamental of logical
principles; hence, if we are to reject (IV) in favor of
(V), it would seem that (V) would have to be at least as
basic. Yet it is doubtful that (V) is even true. The
notation for natural language is not so uniform that a
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given sequence of letters must always serve the same
function in every context in which it occurs--indeed, that
the different functions served by a given sequence of
letters need even be related one to the other. Thus, the
sequence of letters which forms an initial segment of the
term 'cicerone' serves in (4), e.g., to stand for the
Roman; but that is accidental to its occurrence in
'cicerone'. Similarly, the name 'Cicero' surely occurs
in (4), but it does not stand for the man in that context;
rather, it exhibits itself, as the single quote marks
indicate, and (4) is thus about the name, not the man.
The only reasonable course, then, is to reject (V) and the
purported counterexample to (IV).
We see from this example that a singular term
occurring in a sentence need not be serving in that
sentence simply to stand for what it ordinarily denotes;
and in such a case we ought not expect that the sentence
is about that which the singular term ordinarily denotes.
And, if Sc is not about d(a), then we cannot expect the
truth value of Sa to depend simply on d(a); and so we
cannot expect Sc/8 to have the same truth value as Sa
even though d(a)=d(8). This analysis of the purported
counterexample to (IV) does, however, have a constructive
side. For, in exposing the assumption (V), the nature of
the connection between (III) and (IV) has been revealed,
and thus, the needed correction for (III) becomes
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apparent. If Sc is about d(a) then it would seem that
Sa and Sa/B must agree in truth value whenever d(a)=d(O);
as Quine remarks, "whatever can be affirmed about [an]
object remains true when we refer to the object by any other
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name." So, we replace (III) by
(VI) If Sc is about d(a), then
if d(a)=d(8),.then Sa and Sa/ý have the same truth value.
(Actually, (VI) is still not quite right; it does not handle,
for example, (again from Quine) "Giorgione was so-called
because of his size." But the principle behind the repair
has already been explained, and since the refinements would
take us too far afield there is no need to pursue the matter
further.)
This analysis of quotations is derived from
Frege's own analysis of what have come to be called
"opaque contexts." I shall return to these later. The
point I should like to emphasize here is the connection
Frege has drawn between a singular term denoting a given
item and a sentence containing that term being about that
item, for this is essentially the ro-le denotation plays
in Frege's theory: the denotation of a singular term is
that which we use the term to speak about. The paradigm
of reference, as Dummett correctly points out,23 is the
name/bearer relation, and in the case of proper names, the
two coincide: the referent of 'Aristotle' is just the
bearer of that name, Aristotle, the famous Greek,
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philosopher. However, a term need not be assigned to an
object, in the way a proper name is assigned to its bearer,
in order that it refer to the object. A definite
description, like 'the teacher of Alexander the Great',
has a referent, namely, again, Aristotle; the description
is not assigned to him, but he is the referent because he
is the one uniquely satisfying the description. Moreover,
just as in
(8) Aristotle invented symbolic logic,
we use the name 'Aristotle' to speak about Aristotle, so in
(9) The teacher of Alexander the Great invented symbolic
logic,
we use the description 'the teacher of Alexander the
Great' to stand for that which the sentence is about,
namely, again, Aristotle.
This part of Frege's notion of reference seems to
me to be unquestionably correct: the substitution
principle, wherein the connection is made between the
denotation of a singular term and the truth value of a
sentence containing it, and the recognition that the
denotation of a singular term is that which we use the
term to speak about. As is well known, there was a great
deal more to Frege's notion of reference: in particular,
he also supposed predicate expressions to refer--the
predicate 'horse', e.g., denoted the concept horse--and
he even supposed declarative sentences to refer, namely,
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to truth. values. These other features of Frege's notion
of reference, however, are extremely problematic: it is
highly doubtful whether they are true, or can even be
made coherent. But we need not get into these issues;
what I have presented so far of Frege's notion of
reference is all that is essential in that notion for his
solution to the paradox.
So much for the notion of reference. Let us now
turn to the notion of sense.
The referent of a singular term, as we have seen,
is the object for which it stands, either by having been
assigned to that object or by uniquely describing it.
Each of 'the Stagirite'. 'Aristotle'r 'Plato's greatest
pupil', and 'the teacher of Alexander the Great' refer to
the same object, namely,. Aristotle. But they do not all
have the same sense. The sense of a singular term is that
"wherein the mode of presentation is contained," and it
thus carries the burden of introducing, presenting, or
picking out the referent. 'The Stagirite'> for example,
picks out Aristotle as having been Stagira's most famous
native son, while ' Plato's greatest pupil' picks him out
as having studied with Plato and as having been his finest
student. Both of these terms refer to Aristotle, but
since they pick Aristotle out in different ways, they do
not have the same sense. To take another example, compare
'the number which is obtained by adding 2 four times' with
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'the number which is obtained by adding 4 twice'. Both
terms have the same referent, the number 8, but the first
instructs us to take 2 four times, i.e.,
X X
X X
X X
X X
while the second instructs us to take 4 twice, i.e.,
X X X X
X X X X
and so they do not have the same sense.
The sense of an expression is that which is
communicated or conveyed by the expression, the information
it contains. The sense of an expression is not. material,
nor is it perceptible, but it is an objective entity
nonetheless which exists independent of any individual's
consciousness. "For one can hardly deny that mankind has
a common store of thoughts which is transmitted from one
generation to another";' 24 but "if every thought requires
a bearer, to the contents of whose consciousness it
belongs, then it would be a thought of this bearer only
and there would be no science common to many, on which
many could work." 2 5  Frege is here especially anxious to
distinguish senses, which are objective, from ideas
[Vorstellungen], which are private to each individual:
IA] man never has somebody else's mental image,
but only his own; and nobody even knows how far
his image (say) of red agrees with somebody
else's; for the peculiar character of the image
I connect with the word 'red' is something that
I cannot convey.26
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When a person grasps [Fassen] a sense, "something in his
27
consciousness must be aimed at [it]"; nevertheless,
"one does not create [the sense] but only comes in a
certain relation, which is different from seeing a thing
or having an idea, to what already existed before hand."2 8
Senses, then, belong neither in the outer world of
material entities nor in the many private inner worlds,
but in a specially designated third realm.
The sense/reference distinction is partly an
ontological distinction, but it is also a distinction
between the ways in which entities are related to signs:
an entity might be referred to by a sign, or it might be
expressed by the sign, or it might be associated with the
sign. "Idea" and "sense" serve to label particular types
of entities, and it appears that ideas are the only sort
of things that can be associated with an expression and
that senses are the only sorts of things that can be
expressed by an expression. "Reference," however,
carries no such implications: the referent of an
expression is simply that which we use the expression to
talk about, and insofar as we talk about ideas and
senses as well as anything else, we use expressions that
refer to them. A's idea of the moon is not the referent
of the expression 'the moon', but presumably that which
A associates with the expression; on the other hand, A's
idea of the moon is the referent of the expression 'A's
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idea of the moon', and with this expression, yet another
idea might be associated. Again, the sense of the
expression 'the morning star' is the sense of 'the
morning star'; but it is the referent of 'the sense of
'the morning star", and with this expression yet another
sense would be expressed. However, although Frege does
not explicitly say so, it is reasonable to suppose that
the sense, the referent, and the associated idea of a
given expression must be distinct; hence, no expression
can both refer to and express one and the same entity. 2 9
A sequence of noises or of marks on paper, if it
is to be a word or phrase--what Frege calls a "sign"--
must have a sense; but it need not follow that any
reference corresponds to it. For example, ,'the celestial
body most distant from the Earth" and 'the least rapidly
converging series', Frege says, both have a definite
sense, but it is doubtful whether the first has any
reference, and it is demonstrable that the second lacks
one. Many of the names found in fiction and myth fall
here: 'Medusa', 'Odysseus', 'Santa Claus', Thus Frege
answers the question that vexed Russell: How is it that
a name that refers to nothing at all can still be a
meaningful sign? Nondesignating singular terms have a
sense but no reference: corresponding to such an
expression is a criterion for recognizing whether a given
object is the referent, and although there is no object
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satisfying the conditions laid.down, the "way of
recognizing' gives the term the stability in discourse
necessary for communication.
As we mentioned earlier, Frege's distinction
between sense and reference is intended to disambiguate the
Bg notion of content; and just as in Bg Frege held both
sentences and parts of sentences to have content, so in SR
he extends the sense/reference distinction to sentences as
well as to singular terms. In Bg, recall, Frege construed
a sentence as a complex name constituted of a function-
expression and argument-expressions in such a manner that
the contents of the parts of the sentence were parts of the
content of the whole sentence. The same idea is at work in
SR, except that Frege now takes the reference of the
sentence to be composed out of the reference of the parts
of the sentence; and he takes the sense of the sentence to
be composed out of the senses of the parts of the sentence.
By distinguishing sense from reference, Frege now avoids the
awkward feature of the Bg theory that had gotten him into
trouble, namely, the fact that objects themselves were parts
of contents. For, now, if a sentence contains a singular
term, then the reference of that singular term, i.e., the
object for which it stands, is part of the reference of the
sentence. It is not a part of the thought expressed by the
sentence, because the thought, which Frege identifies with
the sense of the sentence, contains the sense of the
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singular term as a part, not its reference.
But it is unfortunate that Frege should express
the contribution of the sense of a part of a sentence to
the sense of the whole sentence in terms of parts and
wholes of senses. We must distinguish between saying, on
the one hand, that the reference (sense) of a complex name
is a function of the reference (sense) of the parts of the
name, and saying, on the other hand, that the reference
(sense) of a complex name contains the reference (sense)
of the parts of the name. Frege noted that we must be
careful about transferring our talk of parts and wholes
with regard to linguistic expressions into the realm of
sense and reference; and eventually he had to abandon the
claim that the reference of a part of a complex name is
part of the reference of the complex name. For, 'the Queen
of England' contains the name 'England' as a proper part,
but the Queen of England does not contain the country,
England, as a proper part. On the other hand, it is
interesting that Frege never dropped the part/whole
metaphor for senses.30
The sense of a declarative sentence is the thought
it expresses, and the reference of a declarative sentence
is its truth value; and, as was the case with singular
terms, a sentence might have a sense but lack- a reference.
A sentence is, for Frege, a complex name, and the relation
between the reference of a sentence and the reference of the
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parts of the sentence is given by the substitution
principle for reference. But what about the relation
between the sense of a sentence and the sense of the parts
of the sentence? That we must recognize the sense of the
sentence, the thought it expresses, as consisting of parts,
is given in this very famous passage from "Compound
Thoughts":
It is astonishing what language can do. With a few
syllables it can express an incalculable number of
thoughts, so that even a thought grasped by a
human being for the very first time can be put
into a form of words which will be understood by
someone to whom the thought is entirely new. This
would be impossible, were we not able to distinguish
parts in the thought corresponding to the parts of
a sentence, so that the structure of the sentence
serves as an image of the structure of the
thought. . . . If, then, we look upon thoughts as
composed of simple parts, and take these, in turn,
to correspond to the simple parts of sentences, we
can understand how a few parts of sentences can go
to make up a great multitude of sentences, to
which, in turn, there correspond a great multitude
of thoughts. 3 1
And, in SR, he notes:
If it were a question only of the sense of the
sentence, the thought, it would be unnecessary
to bother with the reference of a part of the
sentence; only the sense, not the reference, of
the part relevant to the sense of the whole
sentence.
This suggests a substitution principle for sense analogous
to that for reference. If the sense, and only the sense of
a given name contributes to the sense of a sentence
containing that name, then were we to replace that name by
any other having the very same sense, the resultant
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sentence ought to express the same thought as the
original. Frege does not actually state such a principle
in his published writings, but he often comes close, as,
for example, in this passage from Grundgesetze:
The names, whether simple or themselves composite,
of which the name of a truth-value consists,
contribute to the expression of the thought, and
this contribution of the individual [component]
is its sense. If a name is part of the name of a
truth-value, then the sense of the former name is
part of the thought expressed by the latter name.33
We thus have a substitution principle for sense comparable
to the substitution principle for reference discussed
earlier. Where n is an expression, let Is(n)P • abbreviate
rthe sense of n1. Then, we have as our substitution
principle for sense:
(VII) If Sc is about d(a), then
if s(a)=s(B), then Sa and Sa/8 have the same
cognitive value.
Finally, I should like to mention Frege's treat-
ment of what are called "opaque contexts," i.e., contexts
in which substitution of codenotational singular terms
fails to preserve truth value. From,
C1) the evening star = the morning star,
and
(10) John knows that the evening star is a body
illuminated by the sun,
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we cannot validly conclude
(11) John knows that the morning star is a body
illuminated by the sun.
Far from being a counterexample to the substitution
principle (V), however, Frege regards the invalidity of
this inference as evidence that (10) is not about the
evening star, and so, that 'the evening star' is not
serving in (9) to stand for the evening star. In so far
as it is serving to refer to something in (10), however,
it will, as we mentioned earlier in discussing the notion
of reference, denote that which one intends to speak
about in (10). And Frege says that what we are speaking
about in this context is the sense of the expression.
Thus Frege distinguishes between the customary reference
of an expression and its indirect reference. In (10),
'the evening star' does not have its customary reference,
the evening star, but its indirect reference; and since
what one is using the term in that context to speak about
is the sense of the expression, that is the indirect
reference. Similarly, Frege distinguishes between the
customary sense of an expression and its indirect sense.
Frege's treatment of these cases is controversial.34
What is important and correct however, is his recognition
that they do not stand as counterexamples to the
principle (III), but rather show that the terms in those
contexts do not serve purely to stand for what they
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ordinarily denote.
4. Frege and his Critics
Michael Dummett claims that "there is no
alternative theory of proper names that can be opposed to
"135Frege's. 3  In simplified form, according to Dummett,
Frege's theory is that "a proper name possesses a unique
and specific sense, common to all users of the name, which
determines its * ,36determines its reference.36 The proper name, "if it is
to be considered as having a determinate sense, must have
associated with it a specific criterion for recognizing a
given object as the referent of the name; the referent of
the name, if any, is whatever object satisfies this
criterion."37 This simplified theory, Dummett claims,
"requires qualification in many respects before it becomes
a realistic picture of our actual employment of names." 38
One such qualification Dummett would place on this
simplified theory is Wittgenstein's replacement of a
"single sharp criterion for identifying the referent by a
cluster of alternative ones."39
For Wittgenstein, the sense of a proper name is
given, not by a single specific criterion of
identification, but by a cluster of such criteria:
for an object to be the referent of the name, it
is not necessary that it satisfy all these criteria,
but only that it satisfy most of them, or, perhaps,
merely a suitable number of them. Thus, for
Wittgenstein, the sense of a proper name over-
determines its reference, and is, at the same
time, elastic, in that we are'prepared in advance
to drop some of our criteria of identification if
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they are discovered not to converge with the
others. 40
But Dummett urges that the complexities thus introduced in
order to provide a more realistic account of our actual
use of proper names ought not becloud the essential
correctness of Frege's theory:
What must be resisted is the temptation to think
that the need for these multiple qualifications
of the simple account in order to do justice to
the complexity of actual linguistic practice
destroys the utility of the original model, where-
by a name has reference in virtue of its sense;
for that model displays the only mechanism by
which a name could acquire reference, even though
the actual working has been simplified for the
sake of perspicuity. It is not a choice between
Frege's theory and some a ternative theory:
there is no other theory.
Dummett concedes that his remarks might "appear
preposterous"; he does not, however, admit that they are
preposterous. And they most certainly are: unless
'Frege's Theory' is an utter platitude--in which case it
is not a theory at all--it is implausible to claim that
there can be no alternative theory of proper names. It is
not clear to me what Dummett is actually denying here, but
it certainly seems to be the case that a number of other
theories have been put forward which are at least thought
to be alternative theories. Indeed, Dummett has been
prompted to defend Frege in this very forceful manner by
the attack Saul Kripke has launched in "Naming and
Necessity" against what he takes to be Frege's account of
proper names. Kripke is very much alive to the power of
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Frege's account of proper names: "it is hard," he says,
"to see . . . how the Frege-Russell view, or some suitable
variant, can fail to be the case."42 "Nevertheless,"
Kripke claims, "I think it pretty certain that the view of
43Frege and Russell is wrong." While it is true that
Kripke has not offered an alternative theory to Frege's--
he believes that all philosophical theories are false--
and so, to this extent, agrees with Dummett that there can
be no alternative theory to Frege's, he does claim Frege's
account to be wrong, and he does offer in its place, not a
theory, but, as he says, "a better picture" of the way in
which proper names are used.
Dummett and Kripke are proponents of the two basic
competing theories of proper names. Dummett, on the one
hand, defends a Frege-type theory, on which the
significance of a proper name is not completely exhausted
by the name's standing for a given object; Kripke, on the
other hand, is a proponent of a Mill-type theory, on which
names are simply labels or tags for the things to which
they are assigned. The Kripke-Dummett interchange affords
us an opportunity in this section to discuss the two views,
and to present the strengths and the weakness of each.
I will begin with Mill.
Mill's semantic theory is a theory of what he
calls names', those expressions which the schoolmen termed
'categorematic', viz., "{a] word which could be used either
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as the subject or predicate of a proposition without being
accompanied by any other word."44 Noun phrases (i.e.,
many-worded names) and adjectives are names; adverbs,
prepositions, and inflected noun phrases in accusative and
dative cases, on the other hand, are syncategorematic
expressions. Of names, Mill draws three interlocking
distinctions: (1) between singular and general terms,
(2) between abstract and concrete terms, and (3) between
connotative and nonconnotative terms. The singular/
general distinction goes as follows:
A general name is, familiarly defined, a name
which is capable of being truly affirmed, in the
same sense, of each of an indefinite number of
things. An individual or singular name is a
name which is only capable of being truly
affirmed, in the same sense, of one thing. 4 5
'Man', is a general name, since it is capable of being
truly affirmed of any number of individuals, and it does
so, in the same sense each time. 'John', on the other
hand, is a singular term, for "though there are many
persons who bear that name, it is not conferred upon them
to indicate any qualities or any thing which belongs to
them in common, and cannot be said to be affirmed of them
in any sense at all, consequently not in the same sense. "46
Definite descriptions like 'the king who succeeded William
the Conqueror' count also as singular terms, it being
"implied in the meaning of the words" that there cannot be
more than one. Expressions like *'the king': and 'this
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stone', though capable of being applied to many
individuals in the same sense, also count as singular
terms on Mill's view since, in any given context of use,
only one such individual is the subject of which the
predicate is affirmed. A general term is the name of a
class, but it is predicated of each of the members of the
class; a singular term, on the other hand, is predicated
of the individual it names.
'Virtuous', Mill says, applies to all the virtuous
things "in consequence of an attribute which they are
supposed to possess in common, the attribute which has
received the name of virtue." 47 The crucial feature of
general terms like 'virtuous' and 'man' is that they are
truly applied to each of a number of items in virtue of
the fact that these items all possess an attribute or
attributes in common. This Mill calls the connotation of
the term, and the term is said to connote the attribute or
attributes. The denotation, on the other hand, is the
thing or things to which the term truly applies; the term
is said to denote each of these items to which it truly
applies. The terminology, then, goes as follows:
The name, therefore, is said to signify the
subjects directly, the attributes indirectly; it
denotes the subjects, and implies, or involves,
or indicates, or, as we shall say henceforth,
connotes, the attributes. 4 8
Connotation and denotation are not, so to speak, two parts
of the meaning of an expression; rather, Mill identifies
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the meaning of a term with its connotation:
S. .whenever the names given to objects convey
any information--that is, whenever they have
properly any meaning--the meaning resides not in
what they denote but in what they connote.49
And, as has already been indicated, Mill holds that some
names lack connotation, i.e., meaning, altogether. This
leads us into "one of the most important distinctions
which we shall have occasion to point out and one of
those which go deepest into the nature of language,"5 0
namely, the distinction between connotative and non-
connotative terms:
A nonconnotative term is one which signifies a
subject only, or an attribute only. A connotative
term is one which denotes a subject and implies
an attribute. 51
The paradigm of nonconnotative term is a proper
name:
Proper names are not connotative; they denote the
individuals who are called by them, but they do
not indicate or imply any attributes as belonging
to those individuals. When we name a child by
the name Paul or a dog by the name Caesar, these
names are simply. marks used to enable those
individuals to be made subjects of discourse. It
may be said, indeed, that we must have had some
reason for giving them those names rather than any
others, and this is true, but the name, once given,
is independent of the reason . . . Proper names
are attached to the objects themselves and are not
dependent on the continuance of any attribute of
the object. 5 2
A proper name, then, simply stands for an object because
the object is called by that name, and not because the
object happens to possess certain attributes by means of
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which we determine that the name truly applies to it.
General terms, on the other hand, are paradigms of non-
connotative terms. The term 'man'1 for example, truly
applies to Aron Nimzovich because he happens to possess
those attributes in virtue of which we call something a
man, namely, corporeity, animal life, rationality, and
human form. However, the connotative/nonconnotative
distinction does not coincide with the singular/general
distinction, because definite descriptions, which are
singular terms, are connotative. They "may be significant
of some attribute or some union of attributes which, being
possessed by no object but one, determines the name
exclusively to that individual."5 3  Unlike a proper name
which simply stands for an object, a definite description
denotes an object because that object happens to fit the
description uniquely.
Finally, Mill distinguishes between terms like
'white' and 'virtuous', on the one hand, and 'whiteness'
and virtue' ,. on the other. The former he calls concrete,
the latter abstract, according to the formula:
A concrete name is a name which stands for a
thing; an abstract name is a name which stands
for an attribute of a thing. 5 4
'Virtue' is an abstract term because it denotes the
attribute, not the things which possess the attribute,
those, that is, the virtuous things, being denoted by the
concrete general term 'virtuous'. 'Virtue' is also a
135
singular term; it denotes but a single attribute, and it
is nonconnotative--it is simply a mark for the attribute
and does not imply any attributes which an attribute must
possess in order to be called 'virtue'. Hence, 'virtue'
is exactly like the proper name 'John', except that
'virtue' is abstract while 'John' is concrete.
If a term is connotative, then the connotation of
the term enables us to determine whether a given item is
truly called by that term. All we need do is check to see
whether the item in fact possesses the attributes which
the term connotes. But, if a term is nonconnotative,
there remains a question about how we determine whether a
given item is properly called by it. Although it does not
appear in the usual accounts of Mill's theory, Mill
actually did anticipate this question, and he provided the
following answer:
When we impose a proper name, . . . we put a mark,
not, indeed, upon the object itself but, so to
speak, upon the idea of the object. A proper name
is but an unmeaning mark which we connect in our
minds with the idea of the object, in order that,
whenever the mark meets our eyes or occurs to our
thoughts, we may think of that individual object.
Not being attached to the thing itself, it does
not . . . enable us to distinguish the object when
we see it, but it enables us to distinguish it
when it is spoken of, either in the records of
our own experience or in the discourse of others,
to know that what we find asserted in any
proposition of which it is the subject is
asserted of the individual thing with which we
were previously acquainted. 5 5
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However, it is clear why Mill's answer has been by and
large ignored: this little story about our putting a mark
next to our idea of a given object is picturesque, but one
cannot take it in any literal sense. Moreover, if this
idea of a given object is something that more than one
person can possess, then, what he is associating the name
with is something objective, a concept, and thus something
very much like Frege's sense.
To sum up, now, let us see how Mill fares on the
issues with which we are specifically interested. On the
one hand, Mill does seem to be correct in contrasting
proper names with definite descriptions: we can say that
a definite description stands for a given object because
the description is true of the object (uniquely), but we
cannot say that a proper name stands for a given object
because it is true of the object--it has been assigned to
the object. 56 On the other hand, Mill fails to give an
adequate answer to the question of how we determine the
reference of a nonconnotative term; and also, since he
identifies information with meaning, and meaning with
connotation, then if proper names lack connotation, Mill
provides no explanation for the difference in cognitive
value between oa=a' and true a=1, when a and 8 are
proper names--indeed, it is difficultto see how, on his
view, they can even differ in cognitive value.
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Russell is a bridge between Mill and Frege: on
the one hand, he operates with the Mill assumption that a
proper name--a genuine proper name--has denotation but no
connotation; on the other hand, he believes most ordinary
proper names not to be genuine proper names at all, but
rather disguised descriptions, and thus as having meaning.
In a detective story propositions about "the man
who did the deed" are accumulated, in the hope
that ultimately they will suffice to demonstrate
that it was A who did the deed. We may even go
so far as to say that, in all such knowledge as
can be expressed in words--with the exception of
"this" and "that" and a few other words of which
the.meaning varies on different occasions--no
names, in the strict sense, occur, but what seem
like names are really descriptions. We may
inquire significantly whether Homer existed, which
we could not do if "Homer" were a name. The
proposition "the so-and-so exists" is significant,
whether true or false; but if a is the so-and-so
(where "a" is a name), the words "a exists" are
meaningless. It is only of descriptions--definite
or indefinite--that existence can be significantly
asserted; for, if "a" is a name, it must name
something: what does not name anything is not a
name, and therefore, if intended to be a name, is
a symbol devoid of meaning, whereas a description,
like "the present King of France," does not become
incapable of occurring significantly merely on
the ground that it describes nothing, the reason
being that it is a complex symbol, of which the
meaning is derived from that of its constituent
symbols. And so, when we ask whether Homer
existed, we are using the word "Homer" as an
abbreviated description: we may replace it by
(say) "the author of the ,Iliad and the Odyssey."
The same considerations apply to almost all uses
of what look like proper names. 5 7
As is evident in this passage, Russell had been
seeking to explain how a name which lacked denotation could
be meaningful, and so how any sentence containing such a
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name could also be meaningful. In his early work, The
Principles of Mathematics, 5 8 Russell had solved this
problem simply by enlarging Reality: Pegasus, although
not an existent, was or had being, and so there was
something answering to the name 'Pegasus'. However, in
"On Denoting,"59 he instead denied that what appeared on
the surface to be names were names at all. Most ordinary
proper names were, on this view, not genuine or logically
proper names, but rather disguised or truncated definite
descriptions; and he provided an analysis of sentences
containing definite descriptions on which they were seen
to "lack meaning in isolation." A sentence of the form
'the F is G', where 'the F' is a definite description,
would not. be given the logical form (Gac; instead it would
be taken to be equivalent to "there is at least one thing
that is F, and there is no more than one thing that is F,
and whatever is F is G"--in symbols f(Ex)((y)(FyEx=y).Gx)Y--
in which there is no singular term standing for the F.
The details of Russell's theory of descriptions
are by and large well known, but there is one point I
would like to mention briefly, since it will play an
important role later, and that is his scope distinction
for descriptions.
When a sentence containing a definite description
occurs as part of a largerconstruction, an ambiguity may
arise, depending upon whether, as Russell put it, the
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description has primary occurrence or secondary occurrence.
For example, the sentence,
(12) The present King of France is not bald,
might be understood in two ways. It might be taken as,
(13) It is not the case that the present King of France
is bald,
i.e., as the denial of the statement that the present King
of France is bald; or, it might be understood as,
C141 The present King of France is such that he is not
bald.
Whereas in (13) one is denying a statement, namely,
C15) The present King of France is bald,
in C14), one is affirming (so Russell would put it) that
one and only one thing is presently King of France, while
denying that that thing is bald. If we let 'Fg'
abbreviate 'g is presently King of France', and if we let
'Ba' abbreviate 'l is bald', the difference in the
symbolization would be as follows. (13) would be
symbolized as,
(16) -(Ex) ((y) (Fx. y=y). Bx),
while (14) would be symbolized as
(17) (Ex)((y) (Fx: x=y) .- Bx).
There being nothing which is presently King of France,
(16) is trivially true and (17) trivially false.
Russell says that in (16) the description has
se'condary occurrence while in (17), the description has
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primary occurrence
. . . writing ' (x) (Px)' for 'the term x which
satisfies .x', *( 1x) (4x) is to mean (Eb):
Dx.-x.x=b:pb. This, however, is not yet quite
adequate as a definition, for when (ix) (tx)
occurs in a proposition which is part of a
larger proposition, there is doubt whether the
smaller or the larger proposition is to be taken
as the "W(ix) (x)." . . . In order to avoid
ambiguities as to scope, we shall indicate the
scope by writing "[(ix) (ýx)]" at the beginning
of the scope, followed by enough dots to extend
to the end of the scope. .. . Thus we arrive at
the following definition:
*14.01 [(ix) (4x)] . (7x) ($x). = :(Eb) :x.Ex.x=b:bb Df60
Using Russell's notation, (16) would be expressed as
(18) -I (ix) (Fx)] . B(ix) (Fx),
and (17) would be expressed as
(19) [(tx) (Fx)] I -B(ix) (Fx).
Whenever the F exists, however, i.e., whenever
(Ey) ((x)Fx- x=y)]," (x)(#x) behaves, formally, like an
ordinary argument to any function in which it may occur":6 1
. . . provided (ix) (ýx) exists, it has (speaking
formally) all the logical properties of symbols
which directly represent objects. Hence when
(ix) (4x) exists, the fact that it is an incomplete
symbol becomes irrelevant to the truth-v ues of
logical propositions in which it occurs.
Restricting ourselves, then, to "logical propositions,"
i.e., to propositions which are either atomic or have been
constructed only by truth-functional or extensional
functions, we have
. . . when E! (ix)(cx), the scope of (ix) (tx) does not
matter to the truth-value of any proposition in which
(ix) (Gx) occurs. 6 3
141
That is, provided that F exists, and also that 'G .
is a context of the requisite kind,
(20) f(1x)Fx] G (ix)Fx: EG [(ix)Fx](ix)Fx.
Note, however, that this is not to say that when the F
exists, 'the F is G' will express the very same proposition
as 'Ga', supposing 'a' to be a proper name for the F. For,
on Russell's view, the object itself enters into the
proposition expressed by 'Ga'; the proposition expressed
by 'the F is G' will not contain the object, however, but
the denoting complex. And, although Russell does not say
so, I am inclined to believe that when the F exists, even
though (20) is true, it need not be the case that
f[(ix)Fx]G(ix)Fxl expresses the same proposition as
G*J (ix)Fx] (ix)Fx .
Russell had presented his theory of descriptions
explicitly as an alternative to Frege's sense/reference
treatment of singular terms which, as I mentioned earlier,
Russell believed to be logically incoherent. Despite this,
and despite the fact that Russell was working within the
semantic framework of Mill--genuine proper names were, for
Russell, simply labels or tags--Russell might actually be
viewed as an ally of Frege, elucidating Frege's view that
ordinary proper names have sense: to say that a proper
name has a sense is to say that a proper name is an
abbreviation for a definite description which uniquely
specifies the object. The name stands for the object
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because that object has the property specified by the
description. Kripke believes this to be so:
Frege and Russell both thought, and seemed to
arrive at these conclusions independently of each
other, that Mill was wrong in a very strong sense:
really a proper name, properly used, simply was a
definite description abbreviated or disguised.
Frege specifically said that such a description
gave the sense of the name. 6 4
Dummett, on the other hand, has denied this identification
of the two views.
IKripke] attributes to Frege an express declara-
tion that the sense of a proper name is always the
same as that of some one definite description,
though noting that Frege allowed that a proper
name in common use in natural language may have many
different such senses associated with it by
different speakers. He proceeds to launch an
attack on this theory. In fact, Frege made no
explicit statement to this effect, and it is
extremely dubious that he supposed such a thing.
It is true that, in giving examples of.possible
senses that may be associated with a proper name,
Frege expresses these by means of definite
descriptions; but this should be considered as
merely a device for a brief characterization of a
sense, rather than as a means of conveying the
thesis which Kripke ascribes to Frege. What is
important about Frege's theory is that a proper
name, if it is to be considered as having a
determinate sense, must have associated with it a
specific criterion for recognizing a given object
as the referent of the name; the referent of the
name, if any, is whatever object satisfies the
criterion. Sometimes the criterion may be capable
of being conveyed by means of a definite
description, in other cases not.65
Now, it is not clear to me what Dummett's
disagreement with Kripke comes to: in particular, it is
not clear how a "criterion for recognizing an object"
differs from a description that uniquely specifies it.
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If, for example, the criterion takes the form 'the unique
object satisfying conditions C1 , . . . ,C,', then this is
just so far as I can tell, to make the sense of a proper
name the same as some definite description. It might be
that Dummett regards a criterion as a feature of the
object itself, in which case the disagreement would be that
whereas Dummett takes a criterion to be associated with a
name, Kripke takes the specification of a criterion to be
associated with the name. It is not clear to me that this
is what Dummett has in mind, however, for he does, for
example, consider the description theory to be narrower
than Frege's "sense theory," as he calls it, and to this
extent, on the same level with it. In any event, it
would certainly not be Frege's view, for to take the
associated criterion as a feature of the object would make
of the sense of a name a perceptible, and so, nonconceptual
item, contrary to Frege's intention. Is the issue, then
what sort of description a name might abbreviate? Kripke,
when attacking the Frege-Russell description theory of
proper names says:
It seems to me to be wrong to think that we give
ourselves some properties which somehow
qualitatively uniquely pick out an object and
determine our reference in that manner.66
And, this theme, namely that the Frege-Russell view
requires that we have qualitative properties by means of
which we pick out objects, recurs throughout his lectures.
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Dummett clearly rejects this reading of Frege:
No one supposes that the reference of a proper
name is determined solely by qualitative features
of the individual either at the time at which the
name is used or at the time that is being spoken
of, that is, by features whose presence or absence
can be determined by examination of the individual
at the relevant time. If, to take a crude example,
the reference of 'Manhattan Island' is fixed by
'the long narrow island off the Atlantic coast of
the United States with all those skyscrapers, just
by the Statue of Liberty,' that does not preclude
the use of the name at, or of, a time when the
island did not yet have, or no longer has, all
those features. That is precisely why it is
essential to the understanding of a proper name
that one knows the criterion of identity associated
with it; the sense of a personal proper name
requires that its bearer be identified as the same
man as the one who, at an appropriate period,
fitted some description (if that is how the
reference of the name has been fixed). For this
reason, if the description by which we attempt to
fix the reference of a name is later found not to
have a unique application, we do not insist that
anyone fitting the description is a referent of
the name, but feel bound to change the sense of
the name. 67
But this 'criterion of identity' associated with a name,
on Dummett's view, is clearly a description. If the sense
of a proper name for a person is to be of the form 'the
same man who satisfies C, . . . , Cn at Tm ,: then the
sense of the proper name will just be the same as that of
some description.
Now, I find the positions becoming a bit confusing
here, and although I cannot be sure, I am inclined to
believe that one of the central issues separating Kripke
and Dummett is right here, with the kind of description
we use to determine reference. For Dummett seems, each
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time he explains his "criterion of identification," to
give, as the sense of a proper name some definite
description. And Kripke acknowledges in a footnote that
this is what his dispute with the description theorist
might eventually reduce to. 68
The main textual support for believing Frege to
have held that the sense of a proper name is the same as
that of some definite description is the following famous
passage from SR:
In the case of an actual proper name such as
'Aristotle' opinions as to the sense may differ.
It might, for instance, be taken to be the
following: the pupil of Plato and teacher. of
Alexander the Great. Anybody who does this will
attach another sense to the sentence 'Aristotle
was born in Stagira' than will a man who takes
as the sense of the name: the teacher of Alexander
the Great who was born in Stagira. So long as the
reference remains the same, such variations of
sense may be tolerated, although they are to be
avoided in the theoretical structure of a
demonstrative science and ought not to occur in a
perfect language. 69
This surely provides considerable support for Kripke's
claim that Frege had "specifically said that such a
description gave the sense of the name," and I am
unaware of any other passage in which Frege had indicated
otherwise. In his examples, Frege almost invariably
gives, as the sense of a proper name, some definite
description. Moreover, Russell's theory of descriptions
seems to give us just what Frege wanted in ascribing sense
to proper names, namely, a way of determining the
reference of the name and the machinery for accommodating
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the fact that different names for the same item might be
of significance in inference. Dummett's response to
Kripke, namely, that Frege's examples were meant to be a
"brief characterization" of the sense of a name and no
more, is certainly a reasonable response; but, when
Dummett himself attempts to fill out this brief
characterization, then, as we have seen, he ends up with
the sense just being that of a definite description. So,
taking into consideration both Frege's examples and
Dummett's inability to provide an account on which the
sense of a proper name is not a definite description, it
would appear that on Frege's view, the sense of a proper
name just is that of some definite description.
Happily, however, we need not decide the issue
here. Kripke, as we have seen, certainly believes Frege
and Russell to have held roughly the same view about
proper names; and Dummett, in his reply, sees the
substance of his dispute with Kripke as being in no way
affected by this interpretation. Since the argument is
cast by both as though Frege had held proper names to be
disguised descriptions, we shall continue as if this were
so.
Kripke's attack on Frege's theory has two prongs:
first, he charges Frege with having been confused about
the notion of sense for proper names; and second, he
argues that, whichever way one takes the notion of sense,
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Frege is wrong in supposing that sense determines
reference. Dummett's response also has two parts: first,
he argues that Frege was not confused about the notion of
sense, although Kripke is, and second, that sense does
determine reference.
. . . we may simply say that Kripke agrees with
Frege that a proper name is first introduced into
the language by associating with it a criterion
of identification, but that he differs from him
in holding that such a criterion serves merely
to fix the reference of the name and not to give
its meaning. In fact, Kripke accuses Frege
precisely of confusing these two things: he
says . . . that Frege uses 'sense' in two senses,
both for the way the reference of a term is
determined and for its meaning. We shall see
later what Kripke understands by 'meaning.'70
What we shall see later is that Dummett has completely
misunderstood Kripke's notion of meaning. But the notion
of meaning does seem to be one of the central issues
separating the two. Kripke, on the one hand, says:
Frege should be criticized for using the term
'sense' in two senses. For he takes the sense
of a designator to be its meaning; and he also
takes it to be the way its reference is
determined. Identifying the two, he supposes
that both are given by definite descriptions.
Ultimately, I will reject this second supposition
too; but even were it right, I reject the first.
A description may be used as synonymous with a
designator, or it may be used to fix its
reference. The two Fregean senses of 'sense'
correspond to two senses of 'definition' in
ordinary parlance. They should carefully be
distinguished. 71
Dummett, on the other hand, replies: "Kripke's meaning
is not a credible representation of the knowledge that
someone has when he understands the expression."72 And
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again:
IKripke's account] cannot be an account of what
endows a proper name with reference, as Frege
understands the term 'reference.' For reference,
as it figures in Frege's theory of meaning, has
an essential connection with sense: the sense--
which is what a speaker knows when he understands
the word--must be capable of being exhibited as
a means of determining the reference. The notion
of reference ought not, that is, to be idle
within the theory of meaning. When someone knows
the sense of a sentence, what he knows is how the
truth-value of the sentence is to be recognized,
whenever we are in a position to do so; and if a
reference is to be significantly attributed to a
word, then, for at least some sentences containing
the word, the account of the process of
recognizing that such sentences have one or other
truth-value must involve the recognition of
something as the referent of that word. If this
is not so, then, however clearly we may be able
to explain the attribution of something which we
choose to call 'reference' to that word, the
notion of reference we are employing has no role
to play within the theory of meaning, as far as it
relates to that word. Kripke's account, however,
does not describe anything which could be involved
in anyone's recognition of an object as the
referent of a proper name: hence, though it may
succeed in stipulating a sense in which we might,
for some purpose or other, choose to say that, by
using the name, someone had referred to the object,
the sense of 'reference' so stipulated can have no
part in any theory of meaning, that is, in a
theory of what the use of proper names consists
in so far as a mastery of a language requires a
mastery of that use. 7 3
For the remainder of this section I should like to look
carefully at Dummett's defense of what he calls Frege's
notion of meaning.
I find Dummett's characterization of Frege's view
to be very much more like something someone under the
influence of the later Wittgenstein would hold than
149
anything Frege himself held. In particular, I find
Dummunett's expression "mastery of the use of proper names"
to be utterly mystifying. Dummett speaks of a person's
having a "mastery of a name" or of having "grasped the use
of a name," and he even ponders whether, in a given
circumstance, one person might have a better grasp of the
use of a name than another. Here are some examples, in
which Dummett speaks of the difficulty in stating
precisely the point at which one could be said to grasp
the sense of a proper name.
If a person knows of Milan only that it is a
city somewhere on the continent of Europe, we
should hardly ascribe to him a complete grasp of
the name 'Milan.' But how much exactly should
he know in order to be said to have such a
grasp? 7 4
Suppose that someone, largely ignorant of science,
knows of General Relativity that it is that branch
of physics in which his nephew specialized at the
university. In one respect, he attaches a
definite sense to the name 'General Relativity
Theory': he has a reasonably precise criterion
for identifying some branch of physics as being
what the name denotes. Should we say that he has
a better grasp of the name than does someone who
has no such criterion, but can give a sketchy and
inadequate account of the theory? 7 5
But, surely, if two students are enrolled in a course on
General Relativity Theory, and one received an A in the
course and the other a C, it would be absurd to say that
the first student had a better grasp of the use of the
name 'General Relativity Theory' than the second. No;
the first had a better grasp of General Relativity
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Theory, not 'General Relativity Theory'. In the very same
vein, I would hardly suppose that the Mayor of Milan has
a complete grasp of the use of the name 'Milan', even a
better grasp of the use of the name 'Milan' than I have.
He might know a great deal more about the city than I do;
but this hardly counts as having a better grasp of the
use of the name 'Milan'.
This notion of "grasping the use of a name" is not
to be found in Frege.
On the other hand, there does seem to me to be a
sense in which one can speak of someone's having grasped
the use of a name, but this would be the sense in which
one might speak of a child's having learned to use a
language: to grasp the use of a name would be to know,
in a general sense, how proper names function in the
language. If, for example, the correct view about proper
names were that proper names are labels or tags, then to
have grasped the use of a proper name would be to know
that proper names are labels or tags and to use them as
such. And, it seems to me that it is Kripke, and not
Dummett, who has attempted to provide an account of what
it is to grasp the use of proper names in this sense.
For, Kripke is very much concerned with the fact that
proper names are different from definite descriptions and
that they have a very special role in language, and he has
attempted to say what this difference amounts to; while
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Dummett, on the other hand, has not acknowledged any such
difference, and, as such, he has failed to acknowledge
that proper names do have a special role in the language.
To this extent, then, it is Kripke, and not Dummett, who
has attempted to capture "our grasp of the use of proper
names. "
Now, Dummett appears to be way off base in his
characterization of Frege's notion of sense; and I am
inclined to believe that this is connected with Dummett's
supposing that for Frege the description fixes the
reference of a name. Let me then say a word about
Kripke's distinction between using a description to give
the meaning of a name and using it to fix the reference.
For a description to give the meaning of a name, the two
would be synonymous: if, for example, 'Cicero' meant the
same as 'the Roman orator who denounced Catiline' then,
since the two expressions would be synonymous, it could
not be the case that anything be Cicero and not have
denounced Catiline. For a description to fix the
reference of a name, the two need only in fact have the
same reference: if, for example, 'the Roman orator who
denounced Catiline' is used to fix the reference of
'Cicero', then although Cicero is the one who denounced
Catiline, he need not have been. If 'the Roman orator
who denounced Catiline' were used to fix the reference of
the term 'Cicero,' then the description would serve to
152
tell someone who Cicero is, not what the name 'Cicero'
means. Kripke believes that insofar as a proper name is
introduced by a definite description, as is envisaged by
both Russell and Frege, the description serves to fix the
reference, not to give the meaning. For if, he says,
'the Roman orator who denounced Catiline' were equivalent
in meaning with 'Cicero', then
Cicero = the Roman orator who denounced Catiline,
would express a proposition which was necessarily true.
And this, he argues is surely wrong: the proposition that
Cicero was the Roman orator who denounced Catiline is
contingent; it is only a contingent fact about Cicero that
he denounced Catiline, i.e., he might not have done so.
Now, Dummett, as we have seen, takes Frege's
notion of sense to be such that the description fixes the
reference of the name. The sense of a name is that which
one knows if one knows the use of the name, and anything
one knows about the referent, apparently, will fall into
this category, there being no one favored fact--the
meaning-m-which serves as our ultimate criterion for
determining reference. Hence, we find Dummett forced into
the position of saying that the more one knows about the
referent, the greater the mastery or grasp of the name one
has.
The first part of Dumnmett's defense of Frege,
then, seems to me to be just wild; the second part, in
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which he attempts to show how, on Frege's view, sense
determines reference, is also unconvincing.
On the description theory of proper names, the
referent of a proper name is to be whoever it is that
satisfies the associated description. Kripke, however,
drives a wedge between the name and the associated
description by presenting cases in which we would be
inclined to take the referent of a proper name as being
something other than the object picked out by the
associated description. For example:
Suppose that someone says that no prophet ever
was swallowed by a big fish or a whale. Does it
follow, on that basis, that Jonah did not exist?
There still seems to be the question whether the
Biblical account is a legendary account of no
person or a legendary account built on a real
person. In the latter case, it's only natural
to say that though Jonah did exist, no one did
the things commonly related to him. I choose
this case because while Biblical scholars
generally hold that Jonah did exist, the account
not only of his being swallowed by a big fish
but even going to Nineveh to preach or anything
else that is said in the Biblical story is
assumed to be substantially false. But never-
theless there are reasons for thinking this was
about a real prophet. 7 6
Another of Kripke's examples is this: one might suppose
the name 'Aristotle' to be associated with the description
'the teacher of Alexander', but this description serves
at best to fix the reference of the name, not to give the
meaning. For, Kripke says, it is only a contingent
property of Aristotle that he taught Alexander: that very
man might not have been the one to have taught Alexander.
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And if this is so, then the description cannot be the
ultimate appeal for determining the reference of the
proper name 'Aristotle'.
Dummett construes these cases as demonstrating the
inadequacy of a view on which one supposes a proper name
to be associated with a single description:
Not only can [the objection] be met by a
modification of a Wittgensteinian type, but
consideration shows that only such a modification
will account for those cases in which the
objection fails. For, in so far as a single
definite description supplies someone with the
only means he has for determining the reference
of a name, he cannot treat as intelligible the
suggestion that the description does not apply to
the bearer of the name.77
Now, it is not clear to me at all what is gained by
supposing the name to be associated with a cluster of
descriptions instead of a single description; in
particular, as McKinsey 7 8 has recently shown, when one
attempts to make precise the connection supposed to hold
between the name and the associated cluster of
descriptions, there is no advantage gained. But,
furthermore, Dummett's belief that the cluster theory is
necessitated by such examples seems to be simply wrong.
With regard to another of Kripke's cases, in which Kripke
attacks the view that the description 'the man to have
first proved the incompleteness of arithmetic' gives the
meaning of 'Gbdel'. Dummett says:
155
What makes it possible to entertain the
possibility that Gtdel might be discovered not
to have proved, or not to have been the first to
prove, the incompleteness of arithmetic is the
fact that there exist other generally accepted
ways of determining the reference of the name
'G~del.' This is always the case with any name
about whose bearer a good deal is known by at
least some who use the name; and it is never the
case with a name about whose bearer practically
nothing is known save that it satisfies the
description which fixes the reference of the
name. Hence something like Wittgenstein's
modification of Frege's account is not merely
adequate to meet this objection, but is actually
called for by the facts. 7 9
However, it seems to me to be false that there need be
other "generally accepted ways of determining the
reference of a]l name" in order that it be possible to
doubt that the referent satisfies the description at hand.
I might find, in an ancient manuscript, the phrase 'John,
the son of Harry, . . .' with no other reference to John:
as such, the description 'the son of Harry' is the only
description available for determining the reference of
'John', and yet I can still entertain the possibility that
John not be the son of Harry. Furthermore, Kripke's
causal account is designed specifically to show how the
reference of a name is determined independent of there
being an available description: namely, there is a
baptism of the object, and a historical link between the
current use of the name and the original baptism. This
is exceedingly vague, as Kripke himself admits, but it
does give a different 'picture' of how reference is
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determined, and it also shows that the view Dummett
advocates is not required by these examples.
Moreover, Dummett's attempt to explain how the
reference of a given proper name is determined on Frege's
theory is seriously inadequate. Consider, for example,
his handling of the following case:
Someone who can pick out Innsbruck from among
other cities only by the fact that it was there
that his Aunt Rosemarie broke her ankle will
nevertheless, in using the name 'Innsbruck,'
intend to be taken as referring to the city for
which that name is ordinarily understood as
standing; so that, if he happens to be mistaken
in supposing that it was Innsbruck that Aunt
Rosemarie broke her ankle, it will nevertheless
have been Innsbruck, and not the city where that
accident in fact occurred, that he will have
been talking about.8 0
This account is one with which Kripke would have very
little to quarrel, at least in essentials. But, it does
not seem to have penetrated Dummett that the situation he
describes here is not one his "criterion of identity"
account can easily handle. If sense determines
reference, then, if my sole criterion for determining
the referent of 'Innsbruck' is that it is the city in
which Aunt Rosemarie broke her ankle, and if Innsbruck is,
in fact, not that city, then the sense I attach to the word
would, it seems to me, pick out some city other than
Innsbruck. If, for example, it should turn out to be the
case that someone tells me that Aunt Rosemarie broke her
ankle in, say, Vienna, then I would no doubt drop this
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description as part of the sense of the term 'Innsbruck'.
But, then, all I am left with as a criterion of identity
is that 'Innsbruck' is whatever is ordinarily taken to be
such.
Dummett is certainly among the ablest of
philosophers working within Frege's semantic framework,
and his unsatisfactory defense of Frege's theory indicates
that Kripke has located some very deep problems with the
theory. Whether Kripke's own causal theory of reference
fares any better, I cannot say, and I have nothing of
significance to say about it. What I think I can
contribute is some clarity about Kripke's own view of
meaning; both critics and defenders of Kripke seem to me
to have missed what he has said.
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CHAPTER 4
KRIPKE'S RESPONSE TO THE PARADOX
1. Introduction
As we saw in the last chapter, Kripke's attack on
Frege's description theory of proper names is extremely
damaging. Whether Kripke's own causal account is any
more successful at explaining how the reference of a
proper name is determined is, as Kripke himself acknowl-
edges, open to question; in any event, the causal theory
needs to be made much more precise before any considered
judgment of it is possible. However, the most difficult
problem facing Kripke, if he is to defend Mill's view of
proper names, is this: Kripke must show how, on Mill's
view, (a=a- and true (a=BI can differ in cognitive value
when a and 8 are proper names. For it is widely believed
that the fact that a=awo and true a-a=8 can differ in cog-
nitive value when a and are proper names demands that a
and 8 have different meaning; and, so long as Kripke is
unable to show otherwise, there remains the feeling that,
despite Kripke's damaging criticism, Frege's description
theory--or something very much like it--must be the right
one.
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The point can be put very simply as follows. If
(1) Hesperus = Hesperus,
and
(2) Hesperus = Phosphorus,
expressed different propositions, then the information con-
veyed by 'Hesperus' would have to be different from that
conveyed by 'Phosphorus'. Where is this difference in
information to be located? Not, certainly, in the entities
denoted, for 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' denote the very
same object. Nor, it is commonly argued, in the words
themselves, for though the names differ, there is good rea-
son to deny that the proposition expressed by (2) presup-
poses (or entails) the existence of a language. It would
seem,then, that 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' would have to
differ in meaning. Conversely, if the sole significance
of a proper name is to stand for an object, then it is dif-
ficult to see how (1) and (2) can express different propo-
sitions. Indeed, many of those who hold that proper names
lack meaning would deny that fa=a and true a=8- express
different propositions when a and 8 are proper names.
Russell,l for example, maintained that if a were a genuine
proper name, then the object a stands for--not a concept--
would be a constituent of the proposition expressed by Sa;
and so, on this view, I =c and true a=83 would express
the very same proposition when a and 8 are genuine proper
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names. More recently, Alvin Plantinga has also main-
tained that 'a=a-c and true ca=5' express the same proposi-
tion when a and are both proper names, although, on
Plantinga's view, it is not the object itself which is a
constituent of the proposition but an essence of the object.
The view one holds about whether proper names have
or lack meaning, then, is intimately connected with the
view one holds about whether =ai and true •a=ý express
the same or different propositions when a and are proper
names. Frege's description theory of proper names would
appear to go hand-in-hand with the view that, e.g., (I)
and (2) express different propositions; Mill's theory of
proper names, on the other hand, would appear to go hand-
in-hand with the view that (1) and (2) express the same
proposition. And the preeminence of Frege's theory of
proper names is a consequence of the widely held belief
that sentences like (1) and (2) express different proposi-
tions.
What reason is there for supposing that (i) and
(2) express different propositions? One reason is this:
it is widely believed that it is a necessary truth that
Hesperus = Hesperus, and only a contingent truth that
Hesperus = Phosphorus. However, our modern defenders of
Mill's view, Kripke and Plantinga, both deny this: they
hold that fa=85 is necessarily true, if true at all,
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whenever a and 8 are proper names. Their defense of this
view depends heavily on their distinguishing the meta-
physical issue of whether a given proposition is necessary
or contingent from the epistemological issue of whether the
proposition is known 'a priori or a posteriori. For,
another reason for supposing that (1) and (2) express dif-
ferent propositions is that, while it is reasonable to
suppose that it is known a priori that Hesperus = Hesperus
(if it is reasonable to suppose that any proposition at
all is known a priori), it would seem to be an a posteriori
truth that Hesperus = Phosphorus. Now, Plantinga and
Kripke agree in separating the epistemological status of a
given proposition from its metaphysical status: indeed,
both view the running together of the metaphysical/episte-
mological issues as a concommitant to the view that proper
names are disguised descriptions. However, Plantinga and
Kripke disagree on the epistemological status of the propo-
sition expressed by (2). It is Plantinga's view that if c
and 8 are proper names, then (a=a and true f•a B express
the very same proposition; so, on Plantinga's view, if
it is known a.priori that Hesperus = Hesperus, then it is
also known a.priori that Hesperus = Phosphorus, for, on
Plantinga's view, the proposition that Hesperus = Hesperus
is the very same proposition as the proposition that Hes-
perus = Phosphorus. Plantinga, of course, is thus faced
with the problem of explaining what it is that constitutes
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the great astronomical discovery: it could not be that
the Babylonians discovered that Hesperus = Phosphorus,
for this, as we have just seen, is something the Babyloni-
ans knew a priori. Now, Plantinga does attempt to explain
what the great discovery amounts to, and I shall examine
it in detail below: I will argue, however, that Plantinga
has failed to make plausible his view that (1) and (2) ex-
press the very same proposition.
Kripke's view, on the other hand, is that (2) ex-
presses a proposition that is necessary and a posteriori,
while (1) expresses a proposition that is necessary and
a priori. That is, Kripke holds that (1) and (2) express
different propositions even though 'Hesperus' and 'Phos-
phorus' are proper names, and so lack meaning. I quote at
length his statement of the distinction between the meta-
physical notions and the epistemological notions:
What do we mean by calling a statement necessary? We
simply mean that the statement: in question, first, is
true, and, second, that it could not have been other-
wise. When we say that something is contingently true,
we mean that, though it is in fact the case, it could
have been the case that things would have been other-
wise. If we wish to assign this distinction to a
branch of philosophy, we should assign it to metaphys-
ics. To the contrary, there is the notion of an a
priori truth. And a priori truth is supposed to be
one which can be known to be true independently of all
experience. Notice that this does not in and of itself
say anything about all possible worlds, unless this is
put into the definition. All that it says is that it
can be known to be true of the actual world, independent-
ly of all experience, - It may, by_ some philosophical
argument, ...follow from our knowing, independently of
experience, that something is true of the actual world,
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that it has to be known to be true also of all
possible worlds. But if this is to be established,
it requires some philosophical argument to establish
it. Now, this notion, if we were to assign it to a
branch of philosophy, belongs, not to metaphysics, but
to epistemology. It has to do with the way we can
know certain things to be in fact true. Now, it may
be the case, of course, that anything which is
necessary is something which can be known a priori.
I will not have time to explore these notions
in full detail here, but one thing we can see from
the outset is that these two notions are by no means
trivially the same. If they are coextensive, it takes
some philosophical argument to establish it. As
stated, they belong to different domains of philosophy.
One of them has something to do with knowledge, of
what can be known in certain ways about the actual
world. The other one has to do with metaphysics, how
the world could have been; given that it is the way
it is, could it have been otherwise, in certain ways?
Now I hold, as a matter of fact, that neither class
of statements is contained in the other.3
It is Kripke's postion, then, that the notions of necessity,
and a-prioricity are not merely different concepts, but
that the predicates '5 is necessarily true' and '4 is
a priori true' are not'even coextensive: the class of
necessarily true propositions perhaps overlaps the class
of a priori true propostions, but neither class is con-
tained in the other. There are, for Kripke, four possi-
bilities: a proposition might be (i) necessary and a
priori, (ii) necessary and a posteriori, (iii) contingent
and a priori, or (iv) contingent and a posteriori. Cases
(i) and (iv) are relatively uncontroversial; it is Kripke's
claim that there are propositions of types (ii) and (iii)
that is of significance. Kripke argues that, where we
stipulate that one meter is to be the length of a given
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stick S at to, then,
(3) The length of stick S at t is one meter,0
expresses a proposition of type (iii), i.e., contingent and
a priori; and he argues that (2) expresses a propostion of
type (iv), i.e., necessary and a.posteriori. Kripke re-
serves the bulk of his argument to show that (2) expresses
a proposition of type (iv), though he of course intends
the result to hold good for the general case: "We have
concluded," he says, "that an identity statement between
names, when true at all, is necessarily true, even though
"14one may not know it a.priori.
Kripke thus offers a new and radical response to
the paradox. In this chapter, I will examine Kripke's
claim that one and the same proposition is both necessary
and a.posteriori. I am basically interested in establishing
the coherence of Kripke's view, and especially in correcting
Dummett's5 misrepresentations, which have gained currency
and contributed to a wide-spread misunderstanding of Kripke's
postion.
2. A Modal Paradox
It is widely believed that among true identities,
some are necessary and otherscontingent. It would seem,
for example, that the proposition that
(4) 9=9
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is a necessary truth: it simply could not be the case
that 9 be anything other than 9. On the other hand, the
proposition that
(5) The number of planets = 9
would appear to be a contingent truth. It is true that
there are exactly 9 planets, but, one is inclined to say,
it is only contingently true that this is so; the facts
could certainly have been otherwise, e.g., it could have
been that there were 10 planets. Indeed, I think it would
be fair to say that in so far as the distinction between
necessary and contingent truths marks any distinction at
all, it would be just that distinction we perceive between
(4) and (5). Yet there is a well known argument which
appears to threaten the viability of this distinction, for
it purports to show that if x is identical with y, then x
is necessarily identical with y. I should like now to
look at this argument.
Assume the following are both true:
(6) (x) (y)(x=y z (Fx Fy)),
(7) (x)O (x=x).
Substituting 'OC(x=0)' for 'FV' in (6), we obtain,
(8) (x) (y) (x=y. 0 (3(x=x)0••(x=y)) ;
and since (7) has been assumed true, we can delete 'J (x=x)'
from (8) to obtain,
(9) (x) (y)(x=y ) Cl(x=y)).
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Once we have derived (9), the rest is trivial. Suppose
that we have a true identity,
(10) a=b.
Applying Universal Instantiation twice to (9), we obtain,
(11) a=bO(a a=b) ;
and by Modus Ponens, finally, we derive,
(12) Q (a=b) .
Of the two assumptions made in the argument, (6),
it is widely agreed, cannot plausibly be denied. And so
our suspicions turn to (7).
In considering (7), however, we must be careful to
distinguish,
(7) (x) Q (x=x) ,
from
(13) (x) (x=x).
One might be inclined to suppose that (7) is true because
'(x) (x=x)' is a logical truth (of First Order Logic with
Identity), and all logical truths are necessary truths.
Certainly, on the traditional view of necessity, all logi-
cal truths are necessary truths; and this fact is embodied
in one of the rules of inference said to characterize
normal modal systems, namely,
(14) Ifj-p, then p.
But from our logical truth '(x)(x=x)', (14) allows us to
infer (13); it does not allow us.to derive (7). In order
to obtain (7) from (13), we require a principle which
~-- --
.173
allows us to move the. modal operator inside the quantifier;
and such principles are notoriously controversial. The
one that immediately comes to mind, of course, is the con-
verse Barcan formula,
(15) 1 (x)Fx•3(x)O Fx,
which would allow us to derive (7) from (13). But the
derivability of the. Barcan formula in the usual systems of
7modal logic has been seriously questioned by Kripke; and,
-moreover, there are fairly cogent intuitive reasons for
supposing the converse Barcan formula to be false, and so
for' not including it in any of the usual modal systems.
What reason, 'then, is there for accepting (7)?
The difference between (7) and (13) corresponds
to a distinction drawn by the Medievals between necessity
de.re and necessity de dicto. What is said to be neces-
sary in (13) is the proposition (dictum) that each thing
is identical with itself. In (7), on the other hand, it
is the property of being identical with itself that is
said to be necessarily true of each thing (res). We de,.re
necessity, one is not speaking of a proposition's being
necessarily true or contingently true, but of an object's
having a property necessarily (essentially) or contingently
(accidentally). Now, this distinction between essential
and accidental properties is not a particularly clear dis-
tinction; but I would think that if there are any essential
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properties, being identical with itself would certainly be
one. And so, it is this commitment to there being essen-
tial properties that leads one to believe (7) to be true.
Anyone who rejects the notion of de re necessity
will not be affected by the argument; so long as one re-
stricts one's ascriptions of necessity to propositions,
the argument poses no threat to the intuition that (4) ex-
presses a proposition that is necessarily true, and that
(5) expresses a proposition that is contingently true. It
is the Essentialist who is directly affected by the argu-
ment.
The Essentialist can gain some relief from the
paradoxical conclusion by adapting Arthur Smullyan's ex-
tension of Russell's scope distinction for definite de-
scriptions to modal contexts.8 According to Russell,
when a sentence containing a definite description is it-
self embedded in a sentence, an ambiguity arises about the
scope of the description. Smullyan shows that this holds
true as well when we have a sentence containing a definite
description embedded in a sentence containing a modal
operator. In the sentence,
(16) It is necessary that the number of planets = 9,
the definite description 'the number of planets' might be
taken as having large scope, in which case (16) would be
symbolized as
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(17) (Ex) ((y) (x=y PY) .Ox=9) ;
or, 'the number of planets' might be given small scope,
in which case (16) would be symbolized as
(18) 0 (Ex)((y) (x=y = PY)).x=9).
When (16) is taken to have the logical structure of (17),
it has the de, re reading: (16) expresses that that number,
which in fact numbers the planets, is such that it is
necessarily identical with 9. When, on the other hand,
(16) is taken to have the logical structure of (18), it
has the de dicto reading: (16) then expresses that the
proposition that the number of planets is identical with
9 is necessarily true. Clearly, when (16) is given the
de dicto reading, it expresses something false, for, the
proposition that the number of planets is identical with
9 is only contingently true. When (16) however, is given
the de.re interpretation, it is plausible to suppose that
it expresses something true: that number which in fact
-numbers the planets is 9, and surely,that number could not
be anything other than 9. Now, Smullyan shows how, con-
sonant with Russell's Principia Mathematica rules governing
the iota operator, (17), i.e.,, the true reading, can be
validly derived from (5) and (9), and (18), i.e., the false
reading, cannot be validly derived in this manner. In
this way, the paradoxical conclusion is somewhat disarmed:
(.5) expresses a contingent proposi.tion, as we intuitively
176
believe to be the case, and the de.re reading does not con-
trovert this, for, on the de,re reading of (5), (5) ex-
presses that a particular number has an essential property,
namely, that of being identical with 9.
Smullyan's proposal, however, works only for those
i-sentences in which we find definite descriptions. What
happens when we have an i-sentence,, where a and S
are both proper names? Here, Cartwright's comments are
pertinent:
The ambiguity in question has been noticed by others,
but some who have seen it have gone on to charac-
terize it inadequately. Arthur Smullyan saw it as
having to do with the scope of definite descriptions,
and he accordingly proposed to treat it by means of
an extended version of Russell's theory. But though
this may serve the purposes of disambiguation in some
cases, it does not in all. For '9 is.necessarily
greater than 7' would appear to admit of both de dicto
and de re readings. Of course, it is open to Smullyan
to argue that '9' is in reality a disguised definite
description; but he countenances names that are not,
and with these sentences exhibiting the ambiguity
will surely be constructible.9
I agree with Cartwright that sentences of the form OFcal
exhibit a de re/de.dicto ambiguity even when a is a proper
name; indeed, this holds true even of i-sentences %,=BI
where a and are both proper names. The sentence
(19) It is necessary that Hesperus = Phosphorus,
for example, is ambiguous: it might be read de dicto, ex-
pressing that the proposition that Hesperus = Phosphorus
is necessarily true, or, on the other hand, it might be
read de.re, expressing (say) that Hesperus is such that it
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(that object) is necessarily identical with Phosphorus.
However, I think that Cartwright has overlooked a rela-
tively noncontroversial way in which Smullyan's proposal
can be extended to handle cases like (19). Quine has
shown how, in his canonical notation, proper names can
be eliminated entirely, replacing, for example, 'Socrates',
a proper name, by 'the Socratizer', a definite descrip-
tion.10 This is a purely syntactic trick Quine has used
here, and it does not appear, so far as I can tell, to
beg any of the important questions about proper names.
Taking.proper names as definite descriptions in this
way, then, Smullyan's scope distinction will be applicable
to sentences like (19); and it therefore seems to me
that Smullyan's scope distinction does characterize the
de. re/de.,dicto distinction .adequately.
However, there are many who apparently believe
that the de re/de dicto distinction cannot be drawn for
sentences of the form OQFac where a is a proper name, or
more accurately, that the distinction collapses in such
cases; and apparently, they are inclined to take this
view because they believe that proper names are not, in
some substantial way, disguised descriptions. Ruth
i1 12 13
Marcus, Alvin Plantinga,1 David Kaplan, and Saul
Kripkel4 all reject the Russellian view of proper names
and favor instead Mill's view that proper names are simply
178
labels or tags. These philosophers reject the claim that
(19) is false on the de dicto interpretation; they hold
(setting aside questions about worlds in which Hesperus
does not exist) that if Hesperus is necessarily identical
with Phosphorus, then it is necessarily true that Hesperus
is identical with Phosphorus.
What stands in the way of these anti-Fregean views
is the wide-spread belief that (2) is a contingent propo-
sition. Quine, for example, provided the following re-
sponse to Marcus' use of the distinction between a tag
and., a description to buttress her case that (2) was a
necessary truth:
[I] think I see trouble anyway in the contrast between
proper names and descriptions as Professor Marcus
draws it. Her paradigm of the assigning of proper
names is tagging. We may tag the planet Venus, some
fine evening, with the proper name 'Hesperus'. We
may tag the same planet again, some day before sun-
rise, with the proper name 'Phosphorus'. When at
last we discover that we have tagged the same planet
twice, our discovery is empirical. And not because
the proper names were descriptions.1 5
That is, even though 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' are both
proper names, and even if we suppose that proper names are
tags, the truth of (2) was ascertained by empirical means
and it is therefore an a posteriori truth; and as such, it
would surely seem to be a contingent truth. Conversely,
the view under discussion would seem to be committed either
to the view that (2) is not a posteriori, or, alternatively,
that there are propostions that are both necessary truths
and a posteriori truths.
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The first alternative is that maintained by Plan-
tinga; the second, by Kripke. I will consider both of
these positions below.
3. Rigid Designators
Kripke believes Mill to have been right, and both
Frege and Russell wrong, on this issue of proper names:
proper names have no meaning, but are simply labels or
tags for the things to which they are assigned. Part of
what is involved in their acting in this manner is that
they be what Kripke calls rigid designators. This notion
of a rigid designator is very important for Kripke, and I
should like to explain it carefully in this section.
Here is Kripke's introduction of the notion of a
rigid designator:
Let's use some terms quasitechnically. Let's call
something a rigid designator if in any possible
world it designates the same object, a nonrigid or
accidental, designator if that is not the case. Of
course we don't require that .the objects exist in
all possible worlds. Certainly Nixon might not have
existed if his parents had not gotten married, in
the normal course of things. When we think of a
property as essential to an object we usually mean
that it is true of that object in any case where it
would have existed. A rigid designator of a neces-
sary existent can be called strongly rigid. 1 6
A rigid designator, then, is a term that designates the
same object in every possible world in. which the object
exists; and whether a given expression is a rigid designa-
tor is determined as follows:
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. we can perfectly well talk about rigid and non-
rigid designators. Moreover, we have a simple, in-
tuitive test for them. We can say, for example, that
the number of planets might have been a different
number from the number it in fact is. For example,
there might have been only seven planets. We can say
that the inventor of bifocals might have been someone
other than the man who in. fact invented bifocals. We
cannot say, though, that the square root of 81 might
have been a different number from the number it in
fact is, for that number just has to be 9. If we
apply this intuitive test to proper names, such as
for example 'Richard Nixon', they would seem intui-
tively to come out to be rigid designators. First,
when we talk even about the counterfactual situation
in which we suppose Nixon to have done different
things, we assume we are still talking about Nixon
himself. We say, "If Nixon had bribed a certain Sena-
tor, he would have gotten Carswell through," and we
assume that by 'Nixon' and 'Carswell' we are still
referring to the very same people as in the actual
world. And it seems that we cannot say "Nixon might
have been a different man from the man he in fact
was," unless, of course, we mean it metaphorically:
He might have been a different sort of person (if you
believe in free will and that people are not inherent-
ly corrupt). You might think the statement true in
that sense, but Nixon could not have been in the
other literal sense a different person from the person
he, in fact, is, even though the thirty-seventh Presi-
dent of the United States might have been Humphrey.
So, the phrase "the thirty-seventh President" is non-
rigid, but "Nixon", it would seem, is rigid.1 7
Let u s see now this test works. Kripke says that
the description 'the number of planets' is not a rigid
designator:.because .it.is.true that
(20) The number of planets might have been a differentnumber
from the number it in fact is.
Clearly, what Kripke has in mind here is not
(21) It is possible that (the number of planets Z the number
of planets),
for this is trivially false; rather, he must mean
181
(22) The number of planets is such that it is possible that
it 4the number of planets.
It is (22) Kripke claims to be true, not (21); and the truth
of (22) shows that 'the number of planets' is not a rigid
designator. Obviously, then, in order to determine whether
'the number of planets' is a rigid designator, we have to
separate the de re reading of (20) from the de dicto reading;
it is the truth or falsity of the de re reading that deter-
mines whether the designator is rigid or nonrigid. And
this must be true whether our designator is a definite de-
scription or a proper name. For, consider Kripke's claim
that 'Nixon' is a rigid designator. 'Nixon', he argues, is
a rigid designator because the following is false:
(23) Nixon might not in fact have been Nixon.
What Kripke has in mind here, clearly, is not
(24) It is possible that (Nixon 4 Nixon),
for, although (24) is false, it is trivially false, just
as (21) is: the falsity of (24) does not distinguish
'Nixon' from any other singular term in an interesting
manner. Hence, Kripke must mean that
(25) Nixon is such that it is possible that he $ Nixon,
is false, and this, of course, is the de-re interpretation
of (23).
Kripke is therefore committed to the de re/de \dicto
distinction for modal sentences containing proper names as
well as for modal sentences containing definite descriptions.
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I had earlier, in considering the paradoxical argument on
PP. 171-2 shown how one could make the scope distinction
for proper names without adopting the substantial Russel-
lian description theory of proper names: we use Quine's
technique of replacing 'Socrates' by, say, 'the Socratizer'.
This being a description, the scope distinction will be
available to us to capture the de re/de.dicto distinction
for proper names. In this way, the ambiguity seen in,
e.g.,
(26) Nine is necessarily greater than seven,
will be of the same sort as that found in
(27) The number of planets is necessarily greater than
seven,
which, as Kripke says., is adequately handled by the scope
distinction. Is Kripke's thesis about proper names in
any way affected by this syntactic trick of Quine's?
Kripke himself indicates that it is not:
When I speak of the Frege-Russell view and its vari-
ants, I include only those versions which give a
substantive theory of the reference of names. In.
particular, Quine's proposal that in a 'canonical
notation' a name such as 'Socrates' should be re-
placed by a description 'the Socratizer' (where
'Socratizes' is an invented predicate), and that the
description should then be eliminated by Russell's
method, was not intended as a theory of reference
for names but as a proposed reform of language with
certain advantages. The problems discussed here
will all apply, mutatis mutandis, to the reformed
language; in particular, the question,'How is the
reference of 'Socrates' determined? yields to the
question, 'How is the extension of 'Socratizes' de-
termined?' Of course I do not suggest that Quine has
ever claimed the contrary.1 8
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Apparently, then, it is consistent with Kripke's views
about proper names that we eliminate them la Quine; and
if this is so, then Smullyan's scope distinction will be
available to us.
What is the rigid/nonrigid distinction intended
to explain? We have already discussed Smullyan's scope
distinction and seen how it can be employed to explain an
ambiguity in certain modal statements, and also how it can
be employed to avoid the paradoxical consequence of the
argument we had considered on pp, 171-2, Kripke believes
this solution to be adequate, at least in so far as our
singular terms are definite descriptions:
Provided that the notion of modality de re, and thus
of quantifying into modal contexts, makes any sense
at all, we have quite an adequate solution to the
problem of avoiding paradoxes it we substitute de-
scriptions for the universal quantifiers in ((9)] be-
cause the only consequence we will draw, for example,
in the bifocals case, is that there is a man who both
happened to have invented bifocals and happened to
have been the first Postmaster General of the United
States, and is necessarily self-identical. There is
an object x such that x invented bifocals, and as a
matter of contingent fact an object y, such that y
is the first Postmaster General of the United States,
and finally, it is necessary, that x is y. What are
x and y here? Here, x and y are both Benjamin Frank-
lin, and it can certainly be necessary that Benjamin
Franklin is identical with himself. So, there is no
problem in the case of descriptions if we accept
Russell's notion of scope. And I just dogmatically
want to drop that question fre and go on to the
question about names . ..
Kripke, however, rejects this solution for the case of
proper names:
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It would . . . seem that the function of names is
simply to refer, and not to describe the objects so
named by such properties as "being the inventor of
bifocals" or "being the first Postmaster General."
It would seem that Leibniz' law and the law [(6)]
should not only hold in the universally quantified
form, but also in the form "if a=b and Fa, then Fb,"
wherever 'a'and 'b' stand in place of names and
'F' stands in place of a predicate expressing a
genuine property of the object:
(a=b.Fa) : Fb
We can run the same argument through again to obtain
the conclusion where 'a' and 'b' replace any names,
"if a=b, then necessarily a=b." And so, we could
venture this conclusion: that whenever 'a' and 'b'
are proper names, if a is b, that it is necessary
that a is b. Identity statements between proper
names have to be necessary if they are going to be
true at all.2 0
But what is it that Kripke is rejecting in the case of
proper names?
We have see that Kripke believes that Smullyan's
scope distinction provides the basis for an adequate re-
sponse to the paradox when the i-sentence contains definite
descriptions. Why, then, does the appeal to the scope
distinction constitute an inadequate reponse to the para-
dox in the case of proper names? The reason is not that
Kripke denies that the scope distinction can be drawn for
proper names, for he does no such thing. The reason is'
that, for Kripke, the identities are necessary if true,
whatever scope is given: 'that is, invoking the scope dis-
tinction for proper names would be incorrect if it were
attempted thus to show how there can be contingent identi-
ties when the expressions used are proper names. A rigid
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designator, then, will be, roughly, one for which scope
makes no difference.21 Note that Kripke's claim that
'Hesperus' is a rigid designator does not require that he
regard
(29) Hesperus is such that it is necessarily identical with
Phosphorus,
and
(30) It is necessary that Hesperus is identical with Phos-
Phosphorus,
as expressing the same proposition. In fact, as we have
argued, Kripke holds that (29) and (30) express different
propositions, the former, that Hesperus has an essential
property, the latter, that a given proposition is necessary.
That 'Hesperus' is a rigid designator only requires that
22(29) and (30) have the same truth value.
I have spent a considerable amount of time trying
to state Kripke's view clearly because Dummett, in his
criticism of Kripke's notion of a rigid designator, has
gotten matters quite confused. Let me turn, now, to Dum-
mett' s criticisms.
Dummettclaims that modal statements of the form
'It is necessary (contingent) that a is F' are ambiguous,
whether c be a proper name or a definite description:
S. . any theory which represents proper names and
definite descriptions as functioning in essentially
similar manners has an advantage over one that
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widens the difference between them, in that it allows
a uniform explanation to be given of what appears to
be just the same phenomenon--the occurrence of ambi-
guity in modal contexts--in the two cases.23
Dummett believes that the ambiguity in statements of the
form (It is necessary (contingent) that a is F1 is adequate-
ly and correctly diagnosed as an ambiguity in the scope
of the necessity operator; and that the distinction in the
scope of the necessity operator corresponds to the dis-
tinction between a statement's being necessary and an ob-
ject's having a property necessarily (or essentially).
Now, Dummett poses this view which I have just out-
lined as standing in opposition to Kripke's view:
Kripke, on the other hand, wants to give an entirely
different explanation of the phenomenon when it re-
lates to proper names. In this case, he acknowledges
no role for the notion of scope:. and so he explains
the ambiguity by saying that we are concerned, under
the two interpretations, with different modal notions,
different kinds of possibility.24
That is, according to Dummett, Kripke has denied that there
is a distinction for proper names, and he has explained the
ambiguity arising when we have modal statements containing
proper names by invoking a distinction between metaphysical
necessity and epistemic necessity. Thus, Dummett says:
Kripke's doctrine that proper names are rigid desig-
nators and definite descriptions non-rigid ones thus
reduces to the claim that, within a modal context,
the scope of a definite description should always be
taken to exclude the. modal operator, whereas the
scope of a proper name should always be taken to
include it.25
And, in another passage:
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This can only be interpreted as the thesis that, in
a modal context, a definite description must always
be construed as lying within the scope of the modal
operator, while a proper name must always be con-
strued as lying outside its scope. To assign to
a term a reference varying from. one possible world
to another is just to take it as having, in each
possible world, the reference which it would bear in
that world; conversely, to assign it a constant
reference is to take it as having, in each world,
just that reference which it has in the real world.
But to take a term in the former of these two ways
is precisely to treat it as being within the scope
of the modal operator, while to take it in the
second way is to treat it as falling outside that
scope. 26
However, it seems to me that Dummett has gotten Kripke all
wrong.
First, Dummett supposes that on Kripke's view
proper names are rigid designators and definite descrip-
tions are not; and this is just inaccurate. For Kripke,
the rigid/nonrigid distinction does not correspond to the
proper name/definite description distinction. A rigid
designator is one that designates the same object in every
possible world (in which the object exists); a designator
is nonrigid otherwise. Every proper name is, on Kripke's
view, a rigid designator; but the converse does not hold,
i.e., not every rigid designator is a proper name. For
example, the description 'the square of 2' designates the
same object in every possible world, namely, the number 4,
and so it is a rigid designator; but it is obviously not
a proper name. Kripke's own example is 'the ratio of the
circumference of a, circle to its diameter', which designates
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1 in every possible world.27 Hence, Kripke does not seek
to distinguish proper names from definite descriptions by
their behavior in modal contexts, as Dummett claims.
Second, it is quite clear that Kripke does acknowl-
edge the scope distinction for proper names as well as for
definite descriptions, as I have pointed out earlier.
Dummett sees this, but he finds this to be a peculiarity
or inconsistency in Kripke's view:
. . . in order to understand the sort of contingency
Kripke alleges to exist in these cases, we are com-
pelled after all to invoke just that notion of scope
to which Kripke appealed in the case of definite de-
scriptions . . . It is thus not merely that the uni-
form explanation, in terms of scope, of the ambiguity
that occurs when either definite descriptions or
proper names occur in modal contexts is preferable,
because more economical, than having in the latter
case to introduce the a.priori/necessary distinction:
it is that, in order to understand the notions of
necessity and contingency that Kripke uses, we find
ourselves forced to appeal to the notion of scope,
for proper names as well as definite descriptions. 2 8
But to admit the ambiguity for proper names, and thus to
admit a scope distinction for proper names, is not yet to
admit that the two readings need differ in truth value.
Dummett and Kripke thus agree that
(23) Nixon might not in fact have, been Nixon,
is ambiguous. It can be taken either as
(24) It is possible that (Nixon $ Nixon),
or as
(25) Nixon is such that it is possible that he $ Nixon.
On the other hand, Dummett and Kripke differ on the truth
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value of (25): Dummett believes (25) to be true, and
Kripke believes (25) to be false. Kripke believes (25) to
be false because 'Nixon', on his view, is a rigid desig-
nator, one that designates the same thing in every possible
world (in which Nixon exists).
It is clear, then, that Dummett and Kripke also
disagree on the connection between the scope distinction
and the assigning of reference. Let us just recall Dum-
mett's statement:
To assign to a term a reference varying from one
possible world to another is just to take it as
having, in each possible world, the reference which
it would bear in that world; conversely, to assign
it a constant reference is to take it as having,
in each world, ust that reference which it has in
the real world. 9
So far, Kripke would agree. But, Dummett continues:
But to take a term in the former of these two ways
is precisely to treat it as being within the scope
of the modal operator, while to take it in the
second way is to treat it as falling outside that
scope. 30
And this, Kripke believes to be just false. (It ought
not be surprising, however, that Dummett and Kripke should
disagree on this point; for it is here that the connection
is made between one's view about proper names and one's
view about the notion of necessity.)
Dummett appears to be maintaining a certain picture
about possible worlds Kripke explicitly seeks to reject.
Kripke describes this picture as follows:
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One thinks, in this picture, of a possible world as
if it were like a foreign country. One looks upon
it as an observer. Maybe Nixon has moved to the
other country and maybe he hasn't, but one is given
only qualities. One can observe all his qualities,
but of course, one doesn't observe that someone is
Nixon. One observes that something has red hair
(or green or yellow) but not whether something is
Nixon. So we had better have a way of telling in
terms of properties when we run into the same thing
again as we saw before; we had better have a way of
telling, when we come across one of these other pos-
sible worlds, who was Nixon.31
And again:
It is as if a 'possible world' were like a foreign
country, or distant planet way out there. It is
as if we see dimly through a telescope various actors
on this distant planet. Actually David Lewis' view
seems the. most reasonable if one takes this picture
literally. No one far away on another planet can
be strictly identical with someone here. But, even
if we have some marvelous methods of transportation
to take one and the same person from planet to
planet, we really need some epistemological cri-
teria of identity to be able to say whether someone
on this distant planet is the same person as someone
here.32
Now, Dummett voices some uneasiness about the metaphor of
possible worlds--as does Kripke himself--but he does
appear to be holding just this picture Kripke describes.
How is the reference of, say, 'Nixon', determined in
another possible world on Dummett's view? The reference
of 'Nixon' will be whoever in that world has the properties
specified in the criterion of identity associated with the
name 'Nixon': in so far as different objects may, in
different worlds, satisfy this criterion, it need not be
the case that the object which is .Nixon in one world is
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one and the same as the object which is Nixon in another.
On Dummett's view, then, 'Nixon' need not have a constant
denotation. Kripke's view about possible worlds is some-
what different. "Possible worlds are stipulated, not dis-
',33covered by powerful telescopes, 33he says. That is,
Kripke takes the domain of a possible world to be given
34
by specifying the objects themselves, not, as David Lewis
would have it, by saying that something is in a given
possible world if it satisfies a certain qualitative de-
scription. On Lewis' view, one determines whether a
given object is. in a possible world by determining whether
it has the requisite properties; not so on Kripke's view.
On Kripke's view, a proper name is not a disguised descrip-
tion, and so the reference of, say, 'Nixon', in another
possible world will be determined not by seeing who, in
that world, has such-and-such properties, but by seeing
who, in that world, is Nixon. Hence, on Kripke's view,
to treat a proper name as having constant reference is not
thereby to take the name as falling outside the scope of
the modal operator. For Kripke still distinguishes be-
tween a proposition's being necessary and an object's
having a property necessarily.
It seems fairly clear, then, that Dummett has not
read Kripke at all sympathetically. He has simply ignored
Kripke's careful attempt to dissociate his own view about
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possible worlds from the view of someone like David Lewis,
and he has therefore failed to appreciate the distinction
between (29) and (30) having the same truth value, and
their expressing the same proposition. In the next sec-
tion, I will explore the consequence of failing to observe
this distinction.
4. Plantinga's Position
Do
(1) Hesperus is identical with Hesperus,
and
(2) Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus,
express the same proposition? Alvin Plantinga, who holds
a view about proper names which is similar to Kripke's,
adopts the view that (1) and (2) do express the same prop-
osition, and having acknowledged this, he squarely faces
the issue of accounting for the felt difference in cogni-
tive value between (1) and (2). I should like to turn now
to Plantinga and examine his attempt at a solution to the
Paradox of Identity.
Here is Plantinga's statement of his position, and
of the problem he faces:
If my account is accurate, 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus'
express essences. This conceded, it is plausible to
suppose that they express the very same essence. If
so, however, does it not follow that the sentences
(20) Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus
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(21) Hesperus was named 'Phosphorus'
and
(22) Hesperus has the property of being identical
with Phosphorus
express the very same propositions as
(20') Phosphorus is identical with Phosphorus
(21') Phosphorus was named 'Phosphorus'
and
(22') Phosphorus has the property of being identical
with Phosphorus?
I think it does. But what about the Babylonian dis-
covery that Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus?
Suppose for simplicity that the Ancient Babylonians
spoke English rather than Ancient Babylonian. Prior
to their discovery, the Babylonian astronomers would
have accepted the primed items as trifling triviali-
ties. But their attitude towards the unprimed items,
one supposes, was quite different; here their atti-
tude was one of suspension of belief if not outright
denial. If 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' are proper
names of Venus, however, then (20) expresses the
very same proposition as (20'). And if (20) expresses
the very same proposition as (20'), then the Baby-
lonians did believe the former, since they believed
the latter. How, then, can we account for their sin-
cere claim to reject (20)? Shall we suppose that
they believed (20)--the proposition--but did not know
or believe that they believed it? No; for no doubt
they knew they believed (20'); and (20) is (20').35
Let us make sure that we understand Plantings's position.
It is Plantinga's postion, not only that (1) and
(2) express the very same proposition, but also that the
pair
(31) Hesperus was named 'Phosphorus',
and
(32) Phosphorus was named 'Phosphorus',
express the very same proposition, and, again, that the pair
(33) Hesperus has. the property of 'being identical with
Phosphorus,
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and
(34) Phosphorus has the property of being identical with
Phosphorus,
express the very same proposition. Clearly, there is a
general principle at work here. Plantinga claims that it
follows, in each case, that both sentences express the
same proposition from the fact that 'Hesperus' and 'Phos-
phorus' express the same essence. Now, in each case, we
have a pair of sentences which differ one from the other
only in that where the first contains the name 'Hesperus',
the second contains the name 'Phosphorus'. Obviously,
then, Plantinga is assuming some substitution principle
to the effect, roughly, that when a and 8 are singular
terms that express the same essence,then Sc and Sa/B are
sentences that express the same proposition. I say
roughly because Plantinga would surely not wish to hold
that we can replace. 'Hesperus' by 'Phosphorus' anywhere
and preserve propositionhood; Plantinga would, for example,
surely wish to eliminate those contexts wherein the names
occurred within quotation marks. Of course, such a context
is one in which oodenotational singular terms would not
even (necessarily) preserve truth value, and I suppose that
this is the most reasonable qualification to put on the
substitution principle, That is, I suppose that the sub-
stitution principle Plantinga has .in. mind here (at least,
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the weakest one I can think of) is that whenever substitu-
tion of one codenotational term for another preserves
truth value, then, whenever the two terms also express
the same essence, then substitution of one for the other
also preserves propositionhood. And, supposing that the
extensionility condition reduces to Sa's being about d(a),
then we can phrase this'substitution principle as follows:
(35) If So is about d(a), then if a and express the same
essence, then Sc and Sa/8 express the. same proposition.
We need not worry about the elaborate technical
mechanism Plantinga constructs in his book to explicate
the notion of essence. To say that a given singular term
expresses an essence, on Plantinga's view, seems to be
roughly the same as saying that the term' is a rigid desig-
nator:
S. . proper names express essences. The proper
name 'Aristotle' expresses an essence of Aristotle.
It therefore.,expresses a property P that is instan-
tiated by the same object in every world--in every
world in which P is instantiated, of course; for
there are worlds in which Aristotle does not exist.
What is characteristic of proper names, then, is that
the properties they express are instantiated by the
same ..objects in every world. 3 6
But, as Plantinga himself says, his account, if accurate,
qives him that the proper names 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus'
each. expresses an essence. However, it does not appear to
be necessary that the two expressions express the same
essence: Plantinga gives us no argument to this effect
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and does not even indicate that there is one, saying only
that it is plausible that they express the same essence.
And, again, even if we cede that it is plausible that
'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' express the same essence,
Plantinga still offers no argument to show that (1) and
(2) must therefore express the same proposition: he says
that he thinks that it follows, and, at the level at which
we are interested in this argument, that is sufficient for
us. That is, we shall take this passage in the spirit in
which Plantinga offers it to us: He believes it to be
true that 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' express the same
essence, and he also believes it to be true that (1) and
(2) (and the other pairs) must therefore express the same
proposition. He is not interested, at this point, in
arguing for this position, but only in showing how it can
account for the difference in cognitive value between (1)
and (2). In this section he is explaining how, given his
belief in the facts stated but not argued for, this felt
difference in..cognitive value is to be explained.
As we see, then, it is Plantinga's position that
(1) and (2) express the very same proposition; or, put in
a slightly different way, Plantinga holds that
(36) the proposition that Hesperus is identical with
Hesperus,
is the very same proposition as i:..e., is identical with)
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(37) the proposition that Hesperus is identical with
Phosphorus.
And since, on Plantinga's view as well as on Frege's,
propositions (as opposed, say, to sentences) are the objects
of belief, knowledge, assertion, and the other propositional
attitudes, it follows that anyone who believes the proposi-
tion-that Hesperus is identical with Hesperus to be true
thereby believes the proposition that Hesperus is identical
with Phosphorus to be true, these being, as we have just
mentioned, the very same proposition. In particular, it
turns out, as Plantinga explicitly acknowledges, that
(38) The Babylonians discovered that Hesperus is identical
with Phosphorus,
must have the same truth value as
(39) The Babylonians discovered that Hesperus is identical
with Phosphorus.
Apparently, then, Plantinga deems it to be a valid argument
to infer (38) from (39) and
(40) 'Hesperus' expresses the very same essence as
'Phosphorus'.
That is, Plantinga believes that since 'Hesperus' and
'Phosphorus' express the very same essence, we can substi-
tute the former for the latter in (38) and obtain a sen-
tence, L39), that has the same truth value as the original.
Now, the substitution principle appealed to here is not
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(35); for (35) sanctions substitution of terms in exten-
sional contexts. only, and the substitution here is made
in a notoriously nonextensional context. Hence, Plantinga
is assuming a different substitution principle. We can
state this principle as follows. If Sc is an extensional
construction on singular terms, then if a and B express
the very same essence, that-Sa and that-Sa/g have the
same truth value. That is,
(41) If a and 3 express the same essence, then that-Sa and
that-Sa/V have the same truth value.
Clearly, this will allow Plantinga to derive (39) from
(38) and (40).
Actually, Plantinga's remarks at the very end of
the quoted passage indicate that he holds a stronger sub-
stitution principle. Plantinga considers whether it is
true that
(42) The Babylonians believed that they believed that Hesper-
us is identical with Phosphorus,
and he argues that (42) is true because it is true that
(43) The Babylonians believed that they believed that
Phosphorus is identical with Phosphorus,
and the proposition that Hesperus is identical with Phos-
phorus is, as has already been admitted, the very same
proposition as the proposition that Phosphorus is identical
with Phosphorus. But the inference of (42) from (43) is
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not sanctioned by our substitution principle (41). What
(41) allows is that, since 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' ex-
press the very same essence, then
(44) The Babylonians believed that Hesperus is identical
with Phosphorus
has the same truth value as
(45) The Babylonians believed that Hesperus is identical
with Hesperus.
What is required for the inference to (43) is not that (44)
and (45) have the same truth value, but that they express
the same proposition. That is, Plantinga apparently be-
lieves, if his inference from (43) to (42) is to make
sense--and below we shall question whether he really wants
to maintain this--the following substitution principle:
(46) -If a and 8 express the same essence, then that-Sa and
that-Sa/f express the same proposition.
Where does this leave us, now, with regard to the
Paradox of Identity? It was Frege's view that (1) and (2)
did not express the same proposition because they differed
in cognitive value: the Babylonians discovered that Hes-
perus was identical with Phosphorus, not that Hesperus is
identical with Hesperus. In so far as they knew that Hes-
perus existed (and this discovery is not, so far as I know,
credited to the Babylonians), and in so far as they knew
the basic logical fact that each thing is identical with
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itself, then the Babylonians knew--but did not discover--
that Hesperus is identical with Hesperus. Frege therefore
maintained that (1) and (2) differed in cognitive value,
and therefore, that they did not express the same proposi-
tion; and Frege also maintained that'Hesperus' and 'Phos-
phorus' differed in sense, because they differed in the
contribution they made to the proposition expressed by a
sentence containing them. What is Plantinga's view of
the paradox?
Plantinga holds that (1) and (2) express the very
same proposition; and he therefore holds that anyone who
believes the proposition expressed by (1) thereby believes
the proposition expressed by (2), these being the very
same proposition. Supposing Seth, then, to have predated
the great Babylonian discovery, and supposing it to be
true that
(47) Seth knew that Hesperus is identical with Hesperus,
it would follow, on Plantinga's analysis, that it is also
true that
(48) Seth knew that Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus.
On Plantinga's view, then, the proposition that Hesperus is
identical with Phosphorus was known to be true by Seth,
and, linterestingly enough, it was known to be true in ad-
vance of the great Babylonian discovery. But, then, what
was the great Babylonian discovery? It would, I think,
be surely incorrect to suppose it to be true that the
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Babylonians discovered that Hesperus is identical with
Hesperus. But since (1) and (2) express the very same
proposition, it would also be incorrect to suppose that
the Babylonians discovered that Hesperus is identical with
Phosphorus. It would seem, then, that on Plantinga's
analysis, (38) is false: the Babylonians did not dis-
cover that Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus. Now, I
find this result to be utterly implausible: indeed, I
would, as would Frege, take this result as a reductio of
Plantinga's claim that (1) and (2) expressed the very
same proposition.
What, then, according to Plantinga, did the Baby-
lonians discover? Here is one attempt he makes at the
end of the relevant section:
It was not that the Babylonian linguistic competence
was insufficient, not that they did not grasp or
apprehend the proposition expressed by the sentence
(20) Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus
that is, the proposition that Hesperus is identical
with Hesperus. There may have been people who had
no grasp of this proposition--people who had never
studied astronomy or looked at the night sky, for
example. But this was not Babylonian trouble. Their
problem was that they did not realize that (20) ex-
presses the proposition that Hesperus is identical
with Hesperus; and they were not apprised of this
fact because they did not know that Hesperus bore
the name 'Phosphorus' as well as the name 'Hesperus'.37
However, I find Plantinga to be confused here and to have
failed to have provided an explanation for the fact that
the Babylonians discovered something to be true that had
not been known to be true before.
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In this passage, Plantinga is attempting to locate
what the Babylonians had been ignorant of prior to their
great discovery. This ignorance, Plantinga says, did not
stem from linguistic incompetence, and in this, Plantinga
is surely right. For one would like to say that their
ignorance was about the nature of the heavens, and that
they were enlightened, by by studying language, but by
studying the heavens. What knowledge, then, did they
lack? Plantinga says that the Babylonians did not realize
that (2) expressed a certain proposition, i.e., the
Babylonians did not realize that
(49) 'Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus' expresses
that Hesperus is identical with Hesperus.
Now, it is not immediately clear to me what to make of
this claim, but the reason Plantinga gives for supposing
that the Babylonians did not realize that (49) is true
is surely wrong. Plantinga says that the Babylonians did
not realize that 'Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus'
expressed that Hesperus is identical with Hesperus because,
he says, the Babylonians did not know that Hesperus bore
the name 'Phosphorus' as well as the name 'Hesperus'.
That is, Plantinga claims (if I understand him correctly)
that the Babylonians were ignorant of which proposition
(2) expressed because of the following:
(50) The Babylonians did not know both thatHesperus was called
'Hesperus' and that Hesperus was called 'Phosphorus'
203
And, I cannot see how Plantinga can maintain that (50) is
true. For, surely, it is true that
(51) The Babylonians knew that Hesperus is called 'Hes-
perus',
and, again, it is true that
(52) The Babylonians knew that Phosphorus is called
'Phosphorus'.
But, it is obvious that on Plantinga's view,
(53) Phosphorus is called 'Phosphorus'
and
(54) Hesperus is called 'Phosphorus'
express the same proposition, since 'Hesperus' and 'Phos-
phorus' express ..the same essence and (35) sanctions the
substitution. And since (53) and (54) express the very
same proposition, then if (54) is true, then, by (41),
(55) The Babylonians knews that Hesperus is called
'Phosphorus'
would also have to be true. But, if (52) and (53) are
both true, then the Babylonians knew Hesperus is called
'Phosphorus' and they knew that Hesperus is called 'Hes-
perus'; and if so, then they knew that Hesperus was called
'Phosphorus' and 'Hesperus'. Hence, it would appear that
on Plantinga's own view, (52) would have to be false.
Whatever the merits of Plantinga's proposal, viz.,
that the Babylonians did not know that (2) expressed a
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certain proposition, this much is clear: Plantinga's stated
reason for the Babylonians' ignorance will not do. It
simply could not be the case, as Plantinga claims, that the
Babylonians failed to see that Hesperus was called both
'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus'--if, as Plantinga also wishes
to hod, 'Hesperus' expresses an essence, and the very same
essence as 'Phosphorus'. I do not think that this is suf-
ficient to justify rejection of Plantinga's attempted
solution to the Paradox, but, at the very least, it is
certainly sufficient to cast grave doubts on the explana-
tion he offers: the Babylonians could not have been igno-
rant for the reason Plantinga gives, and since it is not
clear wherein their ignorance might arise, (other than the
usual reasons, which Plantinga cannot use), it would seem
to be a clearly questionable issue whether they were igno-
rant in the way Plantinga claims.
Our next question, then, is this: Can Plantinga
adequately characterize the Babylonians' ignorance in the
way he does in the quoted passage, namely, by holding it
to be false that
(56) The Babylonians knew that:'Hesperus is identical with
Phosphorus' expresses the propositon that Hesperus
isidentical with Hesperus?
There seems to me, again, to be a rather serious problem
with this explanation. For, surely, Plantinga would want
205
to hold that
(57) The Babylonians knew that 'Hesperus is identical with
Phosphorus'. , expresses the proposition that Hesperus
is identical With Phosphorus.
So, on Plantinga's view, it would seem that (57) is true
and (56) is false. But, judging from the way in which he
sets up the problem in the first passage we quoted, it
seems to me that Plantinga cannot consistently maintain
that (56) is false and (57) true. For, returning to our
substitution principle (46) above, which Plantinga
certainly seems to be committed to, we see that since
(56) and (57) differ only in that the one contains the
name 'Hesperus' and the other 'Phosphorus', and since
these two names express the same essence, (56) and (57)
would not only have the same truth value, they would,
according to (46), also have to express the same proposi-
tion. So, again, I do not see how Plantinga could con-
sistently offer this as his explanation of the ignorance
the Babylonians eventually overcame. And this also re-
deems a remark I made earlier, that it was not clear to
me whether Plantinga actually wished to commit himself to
(46): for the whole thrust of his attempt at reconciling
his view on essences andpropositions with the Paradox
requires that sameness of proposition not be preserved in
nested that-constructions.
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Let us see, then, if we can try to capture what
Plantinga was trying to get at, and set aside this substi-
tution principle (46). Consider the following explanation
Plantinga offers:
The Babylonians believed that an utterance of the
sentence 'this is identical with that' expresses a
true proposition when the speaker accompanies 'this'
with a demonstration (a pointing to) of Venus, and,
an instant later, accompanies 'that' the same way.
Had the circumstances surrounding the utterance of
this sentence been different, however, the Babyloni-
ans would have been doubtful. Imagine it thus:
pointing to the evening sky, to Venus, we say (very
slowly) "This is not identical with (long pause)
that" (pointing to the eastern sky, to Venus, some
fine morning when Venus is the morning star). Now
let us suppose that the sentence expresses the
same proposition on these two occasions. Of course
the Babylonians were not apprised of this fact.
But why not? Not because they had an insufficient
grasp of the semantic role of demonstratives such
as 'this' and 'that', nor because of any other in-
sufficiency in their command of the language.
Their difficulty was rather their failure to realize
that the second occurrence of 'that' was accompanied
by a demonstration of the same heavenly body as was
the second occurrence of 'this' and the first occur-
rences of 'this' and'that'. And this defect in
their knowledge issued in their failure to realize
that the second occurrence of 'this is identical
with that' expressed the same proposition as the
first occurrence. The truth is they did not really
know what proposition was expressed by that second
occurrence.
In the same way, the Babylonian astronomers were
ignorant of the fact that
(20) Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus
and
(20') Phosphorus is identical with Phosphorus
express the same proposition. They did not really
know what proposition was expressed by (20). The
latter did indeed express a proposition, and one
with which they were acquainted. But they did not
know that this proposition was the one (20) ex-
pressed. They knew that (20) expressed a proposi-
tion, and they knew that the proposition expressed
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by (20) was true if and only if the first heavenly
body to appear in the evening had the property of
lingering longer in the morning than any other
heavenly body. Still, they did not know that (20)
expresses the proposition that Phosphorus is identi-
cal with Phosphorus.3 8
Plantinga's suggestion in the quoted passage is
that the Babylonians were in some way ignorant or mistaken
about what proposition a given sentence expresses. In
particular, he says that the Babylonians did not 'really'
know what proposition was expressed by (2). I'm not sure
what it is to really know what proposition a given sen-
tence expresses, but I would certainly think it to be
true that
(58) The Babylonians knew that 'Hesperus is identical with
Phosphorus' expresses that Hesperus is identical with
Phosphorus,
and, to that extent, the Babylonians knew which proposition
the sentence expresses. Again, it seems to be clear that
the Babylonians were sufficiently knowledgeable to grasp
or apprehend the proposition expressed by (2), that is,
(59) The Babylonians grasped or apprehended the proposition
that Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus.
Now, I suppose that Plantinga would agree that both are
true, and I do not think he would wish to deny that the
Babylonians knew which proposition a given sentence ex-
pressed in this sense. Well, then, in which sense did he
mean it? Plantinga suggests that the Babylonians were
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ignorant of the fact that (1) and (2) expressed the same
proposition. I take it, then, that Plantinga wishes to
hold it to be true that
(60) The Babylonians discovered that the proposition that
Hesperus is identical with Hesperus is the very same
proposition as the proposition that Hesperus is
identical with Phosphorus,
even though, as I understand it, 'he would hold it to be
false that
(61) The Babylonians discovered that the proposition that
Hesperus is identical with Hesperus is the same as the
proposition that Hesperus is identical with Hesperus.
Again, Plantinga apparently wishes to hold it to be false
that
(62), The Babylonians knew that 'Hesperus is identical
with Phosphorus' expresses the proposition that Hes-
perus is identical with Hesperus.
even though, I would think, Plantinga would clearly wish
to hold it to be true that
(63) The Babylonians knew that 'Hesperus is identical
with Phosphorus' expresses the proposition that
Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus.
I think, then, that Plantinga is attempting the
following. In ceding that 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus'
both express the same essence, Plantinga is ceding the
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truth of
(64) (The proposition that Hesperus = Hesperus) = (the
proposition that Hesperus = Phosphorus).
However, he apparently wishes to distinguish this from
(65) The proposition that [(the proposition that Hesperus=
Hesperus) = (the proposition that Hesperus = Phos.-
phorus)] = [(the proposition that Hesperus = Hesperus)
= (the proposition that Hesperus = Hesperus)].
Again, Plantinga is committed to the truth of (64) and the
truth of
(66) (The proposition that Hesperus = Hesperus) = (the
proposition that Hesperus = Hesperus),
but he apparently wishes to deny that he is therefore com-
mitted to the fact that (64) and (66) express the very
same proposition. In other words, Plantinga has raised
the Paradox of Identity to a new level. He apparently
believes that when a and 8 are proper names for the same
object, then f a= • and true Qa=Bl express the same proposi-
tion (i.e., have the same cognitive value) although it need
not be the case that the trivially true
rthe proposition that a=a"=Tthe proposition that
expresses the same proposition as
fthe proposition that a=ac=lthe proposition that a=?'.
Now, I am inclined to believe that this particular
tactic on Plantinga's part is mistaken: I am inclined to
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believe that the same sort of reasons which led him to deny
that (1) and (2) expressed different propositions are also
operative here, and should also lead him to deny that (64)
and (66) express different propositions. More specifical-
ly, I think that the reasons which led Plantinga to decide
that the proper names 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' express
essences are the same as those which should lead him to
decide that 'The propostion that Hesperus = Hesperus' and
'The propostion that Hesperus = Phosphorus' also express
essences.
An expression like
(67) The proposition that Hesperus = Phosphorus,
is not, on the face of it, a proper name, at least not in
the way in which 'Hesperus' is clearly a proper name; but,
simply because we find 'the' in front, we ought not yet
conclude that we have here a definite description. (67)
ought clearly to be distinguished from, say,
(68) The proposition that Plantinga says the Babylonians
knew to be true on p. 85 of his book.
Here we clearly have a description of the given proposi-
tion: it is the proposition said to have the property of
being claimed by Plantingaetc. And it is certainly a
contingent property of this proposition that it was claimed
to be such-and-such by Plantinga, that is,
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(69) The proposition that Hesperus = Phosphorus is such
that it might not have been the proposition Plantinga
said the Babylonians knew to be true on p. 85 of his
book.
But, it seems to me that (67) does not work in this way.
It does not seem to me that (67) has picked out the proposi-
tion by specifying a property it has, in the way (69) does;
(67) seems to me as close as one can come to a proper name
for propositions. Just as it could not be the case that
(70) Hesperus might not be identical with Hesperus,
it coild; not be the case that
(71) The proposition that Hesperus = Phosphorus might not
be identical with the proposition that Hesperus =
Phosphorus.
Again, if this is so, then, clearly, (67) and
(72) the proposition that Hesperus = Hesperus
would express essences, and, I would suppose, the very
same essence; and so (64) and (66) would express the same
proposition.
If my argument is correct, then Plantinga has
failed to explain adequately the nature of the Babylonian
discovery. I don't claim to have refuted the view Plan-
tinga was attempting to defend, namely, that (1) and (2)
expressed the same proposition, but, (a) the explanation
he offered fails, (b) it is not, as he supposes, so intui-
tively plausible that (1) and (2) express the same prosposi-
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tion, and (c) I don't see any way in which Plantinga could
make it seem so.
5. Kripke's. :Position
Kripke rejects the common identification of the
metaphysical notions of necessity and contingency with the
epistemological notions of a priori and a posteriori truth.
How something is discovered or known to be true, he says,
is a question that belongs to epistemology; whether some-
thing might have been or might not have been true, on the
other hand, is a question that belongs to metaphysics.
And any attempt to identify the a priori/a posteriori dis-
tinction with the necessary/contingent distinction takes
argument.
The terms 'necessary' and 'apriori', then, as applied
to statements are not obvious synonyms. There may be
a philosophical argument connecting them, perhaps
even identifying them; but an argument is required,
not simply the observation that the two terms are
clearly interchangeable. (I will argue below that
in fact they are not even coextensive--the necessary
a,posteriori truths, and probably contingent a,priori
truths, both exist.
I think people have thought that these two things must
mean the same for these reasons. First, if something
not only happens to be true in the actual world but is
also true in all possible worlds, then, of course, just
by running through all the possible worlds in our
heads, we ought to be able with enough effort to see,
if a statement is necessary, that it is necessary, and
thus know it a priori. But really this is not so
obviously feasible .. at all. 3 9
Kripke's position can be put roughly as follows: don't
assume that the notions are the same, for that leads to
213
well known difficulties; prise them apart and we will find
interesting philosophical answers to traditional problems.
Of course, Kripke intends his denial in a stronger way,
but at this point, let us take it in the spirit given.
It is so novel an idea that a number of philosophers have
failed to grasp it.
Plantinga, for example, rejects the identification
of necessary truth with a priori truth, but he does so
only in order to make plausible the claim that the proposi-
tion that Hesperus = Phosphorus is necessarily true. He
does not go so far as Kripke, in holding that the very
same proposition is known a,posteriori. For Plantinga be-
lieves that the reasons for supposing that Hesperus =
Phosphorus is necessary if -true are reasons for supposing
that the proposition that Hesperus = Phosphorus is the
very same as the proposition that Hesperus = Hesperus, and
since the latter is known a priori, so is the former.
Of course this undercuts somewhat Plantinga's attempt to
distinguish the necessary and the a.priori; at any rate, if
our argument in the last section is correct, Plantinga's
position is untenable. In this section, I should like
to consider Kripke's position, namely, that the proposi-
tion that Hesperus = Phosphorus is necessary and a posteriori.
I am basically interested here in clarifying Kripke's posi-
tion and establishing that it is coherent.
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Let me begin with Kripke's distinction between
what might be the case and what might have been the case:
If I say, "Gold might turn out not to be an element,"
I speak correctly: 'might' here is epistemic and
expresses the fact that the evidence does not justify
a priori (Cartesian) certainty that gold is an ele-
ment. I am also strictly correct when I say that
the elementhood of gold was discovered a posteriori.
If I say, "Gold might have turned out not to be an
element," I seem to mean this metaphysically . . 4
It seems to me to be reasonable for Kripke to distinguish
what might be the case from what might have been the case;
it does seem to capture a distinction we make in ordinary
language between expressing some notion of epistemological
possibility and some other notion of--following Kripke's
terminology--metaphysical possibility. That is, to say
that such-and-such could be the case or might be the case
seems to mean something like: for all we know, such-and-
such is the case. On the other hand, to say that such-
and-such could have been the case or might have been the
case (except where what we are talking about occurred in
the past, in which case it could have been the case could
be taken either way) is to mean something different. For
example,
(73) The number of planets might be 7,
would seem to' mean something like
(74) For all we know, there are 7 planets,
and this, surely, is false: given the epistemological
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situation we are in, i.e., given all we know, surely,
everybody knows that there are 9 planets. On the other
hand,
(75) The number of planets might have been 7,
cannot be understood in this way. (75), rather, has the
force of
(76) It might have' been the case that there be 7 planets,
i.e., it is not necessary that there be 9 planets.
Kripke's claim, then, that
(2) Hesperus = Phosphorus,
expresses a proposition that is both necessary and a posteri-
ori, is therefore the claim that
(77) It could not have been the case that Hesperus f
Phosphorus,
while
(78) it could be that Hesperus Phosphorus.
And Kripke explains how it is possible that (77) and (78)
both be true as follows:
Any necessary truth, whether a priori or a posteriori,
could not have turned out otherwise. In the case of
some necessary a posteriori truths, however, we can
say that under appropriate qualitatively identical
evidential situations, an appropriate corresponding
qualitative statement might have been false . .
The inaccurate statement that Hesperus might have
turned out not to be Phosphorus should be replaced
by the true contingency mentioned earlier in these
lectures: two distinct bodies might have occupied
in the morning and the evening, respectively, the
very positions actually occupied by Hesperus-
_ II ~ _1_1 __
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Phosphorus-Venus . . . I have not given any general
paradigm for the appropriate corresponding qualita-
tive contingent statement. Since we are concerned
with how things might have turned out otherwise, our
general paradigm is to redescribe both the prior
evidence and the statement qualitatively and claim
that they are only contingently related. In the case
of identities, using two rigid designators, such as
the Hesperus-Phosphorus case above, there isa simpler
paradigm which is often usable to at least approxi-
mately the same effect. Let 'R ' and 'R ' be the two
rigid designators which flank tAe identi y sign.
Then 'R = R ' is necessary if true. The references
of 'R 1 ' and R2 ', respectively, may well be fixed by
nonrigid designators 'DI ' and 'D ' in the Hesperus
and Phosphorus cases these have he form 'the heavenly
body in such-and-such position in the sky in the
evening (morning)'. Then although 'R = R ' is neces-
sary, 'D1 = D ' may well be contingent, ana this is
often what leads to the erroneous view that 'R = R '
might have turned out otherwise.41
It might appear, from the way Kripke puts the
matter, that what night .be is one thing and what, might ave
been another; that what is necessary is one thing, and what
is a posteriori another. What appears to be necessary is
that Hesperus = Phosphorus; what appears to be a posteriori,
on the other hand, is that a planet having such-and-such
characteristics is identical with a planet having such-and-
such characteristics. Kripke might appear to be arguing,
then, not that one and the same thing is both necessary and
a.posteriori, but that one thing is necessary, another
a posteriori. Again, consider the following passage in
which Kripke seeks to explain the sense in which the sen-
tence
(79) This table is not made of ide,
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expresses a proposition that is necessary and a posteriori:
. . . if I hold that this table could not have been
made of ice, then I must also hold that it could not
have turned out to be made of ice; it could have turned
out that P entails that P could have been the case.
What, then, does the intuition that the table might
have turned out to have been made of ice or of anything
else, that it might even have turned out not to be
made of molecules, amount to? I think that it means
simply that there might have been a table looking and
feeling just like this one and placed in this very
position in the room, which was in fact made of ice.
In other words, I (or some conscious being) could
have been qualitatively in the same epistemic situation
that in fact obtains, I could have the same sensory
evidence that I in fact have, about a table which was
made of ice. The situation is thus akin to the one
which inspired the counterpart theorists; when I speak
of the possibility of the table turning out to be made
of varous. things, I am speaking loosely. This table
itself could not have had an origin different from the
one it in fact had, but in a situation qualitatively
identidal to this one with respect to all the evidence
I had in advance, the room could have contained a table
made of ice in place of this one. Something like coun-
terpart theory 'is thus applicable to the situation, but
it applies only because we are not interested in what
might have been true of this particular table, but what
might or might not be true of a table given certain
evidence. It is precisely because it is not true that
this table might have been, made of ice from the Thames
that we must turn here to qualitative descriptions and
counterparts. To apply these notions to genuine de re
modalities is, from the present standpoint, pervers-e. 2
Now, Dummett believes Kripke to be holding just this
view, and so he charges Kripke with holding that the notions
of arprioricity and of necessity apply to different sorts of
things.
As we have seen, Kripke does not succeed in disen-
tangling epistemic properties from others as com-
pletely as he claims. Properly speaking, Kripke's
notions of contingency and necessity are not prop-
erties of statements at all, but of facts. His
wish to dispense with the notion of sense for proper
names leads him to regard a fact as consisting, e.g.,
in the possession by an object of a certain
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property, or in two objects' standing to one another
in a certain relation. A fact, so conceived, may be
taken as forming the content of a particular state-
ment, but it certainly cannot be identified with the
thought expressed by the statement, as Frege conceives
of it, and hence cannot properly speaking be said to
be an object of knowledge at all. The knowledge which
someone expresses by means of an assertion (when it is
knowledge) is the knowledge that the thought expressed
by the.sentence used to make the assertion is true; it
cannot, properly speaking, be taken to be the knowledge
that that fact obtains (in Kripke's sense of 'fact')
which is the content of the assertion. Thus, for in-
stance, Kripke's notion of facts leads straight to the
conclusion, willingly drawn by Kripke, that the fact
which is the content of a true statement of identity
is always a necessary one: for it is just the fact
that a certain object bears to itself that relation
which every object bears to itself and to no other.
By adopting Russell's Theory of Descriptions, it is
possible for Kripke to refrain from applying this doc-
trine to identity-statements involving definite de-
scriptions. This, however, has no real bearing on
the tenability of Kripke's view; it merely serves to
make it less evident that the fact conveyed by a state-
ment, as understood by Kripke, cannot be equated with
its cognitive content, and thus to prepare the trap
which Kripke falls into when he speaks of someone's
knowing a contingent fact. 4 3
However, this interpretation of Kripke seems to me to be
wrong.
Dummett is still working, of course, on the basis of
his erroneous reading'of Kripke mentioned earlier. Dummett
believes that instead of drawing the scope distinction for
proper names, Kripke had employed the epistemological/
metaphysical distinction to the same purpose: according to
Dummett, Kripke took the de.re reading to be metaphysical
necessity and the de dicto reading to be epistemological
necessity. And so, according to Dummett, Kripke had ap-
plied these notions to two different things: he has
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epistemic necessity applied to a statement, and metaphysical
necessity applied not to a statement, but rather to an ob-
ject's having a property. So, Dummett says, Kripke has not
shown that one and the same thing is both necessary and a
posteriori; what Kripke has shown if anything, is that the
statement that Hesperus = Phosphorus is a posteriori and
that Hesperus has the property of being necessarily identi-
cal with Phosphorus.
What makes Dummett's interpretation plausible is that
Kripke, in explicating the notion of metaphysical necessity,
employs a possible world semantics in which individuals can
exist in more than one possible world, while for the epis-
temological notion of necessity, in so far as Kripke employs
anything like a possible worlds semantics, it is not the
possible worlds semantics for necessity but something which,
as Kripke describes, is somewhat closer to Lewis' counter-
part theory. Lewis' view is that no object exists in more
than one possible world, but that an object in a given world
has counterparts in others, related not by identity, but by
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similarity 44 We should note, however, that it is not
evident that Kripke assigns more than one interpretation to.
"Hesperus = Phosphorus, . Perhaps he assigns distinct in-
terpretations to
(80) It is (metaphysically) necessary that Hesperus =
Phosphorus,
and
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(81) It is (epistemically) necessary that Hesperus =
Phosphorus.
But from this it does not follow that he assigns distinct
interpretations to 'Hesperus = Phosphorus'.
But also, I think that Dummett is making a certain
assumption here. If 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' are rigid
designators, then one can substitute one name for the other
inside the scope of the necessity operator andpreserve truth
value., Given that these are rigid designators, it will fol-
low that
(82) It is necessary that (if Hesperus exists) Hesperus =
Hesperus,
and,
(83) It is necessary that (if Hesperus exists) Hesperus =
Phosphorus
have the same truth value. Now, suppose
(84) It is known a priori that Hesperus = Hesperus,
Does the fact that 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' are rigid
designators allow us to infer
(85) It is known a priori that Hesperus = Phosphorus?
The answer is, I think, No: to say they are rigid designa-
tors is to say they designate the same object in every
possible world in which the object exists. But that, the
notion of possible world, has to do with metaphysical neces-
sity, not the epistemological notion of necessity. To say
that 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' are rigid designators,
then, is to allow us to substitute one for the other within
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the context 'It is necessary that'; it does not thereby license
substitution within the context 'it is known a priori that'.
It is not recognized how radical this suggestion of
Kripke's is. Dummett takes Kripke to be holding the follow-
ing:
It is rather natural to think that, while the actual
reference of an expression relates only to the real
world, its sense must be determined by what its ref-
erence would be in every possible world. For instance,
must not the sense of a predicate both determine and
be determined by what objects it would be true of in
all possible circumstances? It therefore seems very
plausible that we may identify the sense of an expres-
sion with what Kripke calls its 'meaning', i.e., the
function which maps each possible world on to the
reference of that expression within that world. Ac-
tually, however, this is an illusion. Kripke's notion
of meaning is still a nonepistemic one; that is, it
does not give an account of what it is that someone
knows when he understands a word, which is precisely
what the notion of sense, as introduced by Frege, is
required to do. In certain cases, it is at least
plausible that there will be a one-one correspondence
between Frege's senses and Kripke's meanings: but
that will be so only for words and expressions of
which we can say that there is no gap between their
meanings and the way in which their reference is de-
termined, as we saw might, in general, be said of
definite descriptions. Of course, even in such a
case, Kripke's meaning is not a credible representation
of the knowledge that someone has when he understands
the expression: what someone grasps when he under-
stands a predicate is the principle by which we de-
termine whether or not it applies to any given object,
not what its actual extension is in each of the in-
finitely many possible worlds. 45
Dummett's assumption, then, is that the notion ' of
possible worlds is being used to explicate the notion of
meaning. Now, this, classically, is the way in which neces-
sity had been understood. The attempt to characterize the
notion of necessary truth is intimately connected with the
attempt to characterize the notion of meaning and, therefore,
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the notion of proposition. It is usual for modal logicians
to take a proposition as a function from sentences to the
possible worlds in which the sentences are true, or, what
comes to the same thing, to identify a proposition with the
set of possible worlds in which it is true. And on this
notion of proposition, the proposition expressed by (2)
would obviously be identified with the proposition expressed
by
(1) Hesperus = Hesperus,
for in every world in which the planet Venus exists, Hes-
perus would be none other than Hesperus, i.e., Phosphorus.
This, I am inclined to believe, lies behind Plantinga's
view: it is his view that because 'Hesperus' and 'Phospho-
rus' designate the same thing in every world (in which
Hesperus exists), they therefore express essences, and (1)
and (2) therefore express the very same proposition.
This identification of a proposition with the set of
possible worlds in which it is true is, however, definitely
inadequate: it does not cut fine enough. In every possible
world in which the number 25 exists, for example, the number
125 would be identical with 52. Hence,
(86) the proposition that 25 = 25, and
(87) the proposition that 25 = 52
would be one and the same proposition; for (86) would be
true in exactly those worlds in which (87) is true. But the
inadequacy of this identification is even more dramatic when
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we recognize that there would be, on this view, exactly one
necessary truth: for if a proposition is identical with the
set of possible worlds in which it is true, then any two
sentences which express necessary propositions and hence,
propositions that are true in every possible world, would
therefore express the same proposition.
To get around this difficulty, Carnap46 had proposed
that we require as well that the propositions be intensionally
isomorphic, roughly, that they be constructed from the same
intensional entities and in the same way. With this added
requirement, (86) would turn out to be a different proposi-
tion from (87), because '25' and '52, correspond to entities
which are not intensionally isomorphic. On Carnap':s view,
(1) and (2) would also be distinct propositions because
'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' express, as Carnap says, differ-
ent individual concepts.
But Kripke explicitly rejects this notion of individual
concept: proper names have no meaning in this sense. Those
who accept possible world semantics and who also deny that
proper names have meaning, would thus be forced to hold that
(1) and (2) express the same proposition: Plantinga does,
as we have seen, and so does David Kaplan.4 7 Kripke, how-
ever, holds a different view.
Kripke is denying that possible world semantics
exhausts the notions of meaning and of propositionhood:
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I think, .even in cases where the notion of rigidity
versus accidentality of designation cannot be used to
make out the difference in question, some things called
definitions really intend to fix a reference rather
than to give the meaning of a phrase, to give a synonym.
Let me give an example. r is supposed to be the ratio
of the circumference of a circle to its diameter. Now
it's something that I have nothing but a vague intui-
tive feeling to argue for: it seems to me that here
this Greek letter is not being used as short for the
phrase 'the ratio of the circumference of a circle to
its diameter' nor is it even used as short for a clus-
ter of alternative definitions of rr, whatever that
might mean. It is used as a name for a real number,
which in this case is necessarily the ratio of the cir-
cumference of a circle to its diameter. Note that here
both 'rr and 'the ratio of the circumference of a circle
to its diameter' are rigid designators, so the argu-
ments given in the metric case are inapplicable.48
These are both rigid designators, then, and so they designate
the same thing in every possible world; but as he says, he
does not believe that the description gives the meaning of
the name.
Again, we look to his definition of analytic truth:
S. . let's just make it a matter of stipulation that
an analytic statement is in some sense true by virtue
of its meaning and true in all possible worlds by vir-
tue of its meaning. Then something which is analytic-
ally true will be both necessary and a priori. 4 9
In other words, what others have tried to capture about'
meaning in terms of possible worlds semantics, Kripke is
saying is inadequate; meaning is rather an amalgamation of
what is going on in possible world semantics as well as
whatever would be needed to explicate the notion of
epistemological necessity.
However, I am unable to state Kripke's position with
any greater clarity. I hope that I have at least made
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plausible Kripke's claim that
(1) Hesperus = Hesperus,
and
(2) Hesperus = Phosphorus,
might both express necessary truths even though (1) ex-
presses an a priori truth and (2) an a posteriori truth.
But much remains to be done before Kripke could be said to
have provided a solution to Frege's problem.
Since, on Kripke's view, (2) expresses a necessary a
posteriori truth, it cannot be analytic, and so 'Hesperus'
and 'Phosphorus' cannot be synonyms. Now, there are two
ways in which 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' can fail to have
the same meaning: either (i), 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus'
lack meaning altogether, and so fail to have the same mean-
ing, or (ii), 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' both have meaning,
though different meaning. This second possibility does not
seem consonant with the main thrust of Kripke's account,
which is, of course., that Mill was right in supposing proper
names to lack meaning. I would think that the first possi-
bility is the obvious one Kripke should take. The problem
is that if 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' lack meaning, then
it is difficult to see how to account for the contribution
each makes to the proposition expressed by (2). The only
relevant difference would seem to be in the names; but I
do not think that Kripke would be any more comfortable in
supposing that the "informational content" of (2) is that
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the names name the same thing than Frege was.
Kripke seems to be holding that a proposition encom-
passes ingredients both of meaning and knowledge. (1) and
(2) express different propositions, not because 'Hesperus'
and 'Phosphorus' differ in meaning, but because they differ
in "cognitive value," i.e., in associated qualitative de-
scriptions. This, however, is precisely where Kripke's ac-
count requires filling in. For, if 'Hesperus' and 'Phos-
phorus' are both rigid designators, i.e., if they both serve
simply to refer to objects, then it is difficult to fathom
how (1) and (2) could express different propositions; no
doubt, 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' differ in "cognitive
value," but what has yet to be explained is how this infor-
mation. can be conveyed via expressions whose role is simply
to refer to objects.
Kripke has.not, I think, provided us with a solution
to Frege's problem. He has, however, provided us with the
framework for a solution, one which, for its novelty and
imaginativeness, for its ability to cast new light on old
problems, is certainly worth pursuing.
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